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Advances in Economic Forecasting
Matthew L. Higgins
Western Michigan University
The six chapters that follow this introduction are based on lectures 
the authors gave at Western Michigan University as part of the 2009–
2010 Werner Sichel Lecture Seminar Series, organized under the same 
title as the present volume. The lectures were given over an academic 
year during a time when the U.S. economy was just beginning to recover 
from the “Great Recession.” The economics profession’s inability to 
predict this catastrophe may have seemed like an inauspicious back-
ground for a lecture series on economic forecasting. However, the eco-
nomic distress and surrounding uncertainty actually benefi ted the series 
because they heightened interest in the topic of economic forecasting. 
The question-and-answer sessions following each lecture revealed that 
some audience members had a healthy skepticism of economists’ abil-
ity to ever predict the future course of the economy. I think, however, 
that each speaker’s candid and realistic assessment of opportunities to 
improve economic forecasting left most attendees with some sense of 
optimism.
Several common recommendations emerge from the following six 
chapters for improving the reliability of economic forecasts. Authors 
Dean Croushore, Kajal Lahiri, and H.O. Stekler all emphasize that 
improvements in forecasting will require proper evaluation of the per-
formance of forecasting methods, focusing particularly on the ability 
of methods to forecast in real time and predict turning points in major 
macro aggregates. David E. Rapach and Tae-Hwy Lee, in their chap-
ters, argue that the abundance of economic data can be more effi ciently 
exploited through model and forecast combination. Rapach, Lee, and 
coauthors Michael D. Bradley and Dennis W. Jansen each advocate 
using models that are adaptive and perform well in the presence of 
nonlinearity and structural change. Below, I briefl y summarize each 
author’s chapter to help direct the reader to these specifi c themes.
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In the book’s second chapter, Croushore addresses the complica-
tions that data revisions have on economic forecasts produced in real 
time. He begins by advocating the use of forecasts provided by the Sur-
vey of Professional Forecasters (SPF). He argues that these forecasts 
are unbiased and effi cient over long time periods. This survey is made 
publicly available by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia in an 
easily accessible format. (Croushore provides the Web address for this.) 
Furthermore, because this survey can be easily matched to the real-time 
macroeconomic data also maintained by the Philadelphia Fed, the sur-
vey provides a good data set for studying the role of data revisions in 
the forecasting process. 
Croushore asserts that many forecast evaluation studies are fl awed 
because real-time forecasts are compared to ex post forecasts that are 
based on revised data that actual forecasters did not have access to. To 
the real-time forecaster, recognition of the possible magnitude of data 
revisions causes uncertainty about model inputs, structure, and coef-
fi cient values. Croushore’s research indicates that all three factors can 
degrade the quality of forecasts. Based on his own work, and the work 
of others, Croushore suggests that attempts to explicitly incorporate the 
process of data revision into model construction have so far had limited 
success in improving the quality of economic forecasts.
To illustrate these issues, Croushore examines forecasts in the 1990s 
from the SPF. When compared to the 2001 vintage actual values, the 
forecasts of gross domestic product (GDP) growth were consistently 
too low, and forecasts of infl ation and unemployment were consistently 
too high. Forecasters appeared to be slow to recognize the effect of high 
productivity growth in that decade. When the forecasts are compared 
to actual values observed in real time for the variables, the forecasts 
appear much better. This may explain why forecasters were slow to 
adapt their models to the surge in potential output. Croushore’s chapter 
demonstrates that research on the role of data revisions in economic 
forecasts is at a very early stage and should prove to be productive in 
the coming years.
In the third chapter, Lahiri addresses the intriguing question of how 
far into the future forecasters can provide information about the growth 
of GDP. He uses a survey of forecasts of the annual growth rate of GDP 
for 18 countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), obtained from Consensus Economics Inc. The 
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forecasts are monthly and begin at a 24-month horizon. For each coun-
try and forecast horizon, Lahiri calculates the Diebold-Kilian informa-
tion statistic and Theil’s U-statistic. Although there is variation across 
countries, he fi nds that the quality of the forecasts tends to continuously 
improve as the forecast horizon declines. For many countries, he fi nds 
a dramatic improvement in the information content of the forecasts 
beginning at about an 18-month horizon. This striking fi nding suggests 
that the current state of economic forecasting provides useful predic-
tions only when the lead time is a year and a half or less.
Lahiri also examines the usefulness of the probability forecasts 
contained in the SPF to predict downturns in U.S. GDP at different 
horizons. These probability forecasts have been reported since 1968 but 
have been greatly underutilized by the profession. Lahiri fi rst demon-
strates how to use a receiver-operating-characteristic (ROC) curve to 
select a probability threshold for signaling the rare event of a downturn. 
Selecting an appropriate threshold, he reports hit/miss frequencies, 
Kuipers scores, and odds ratios for the implied predicted downturn. He 
fi nds that the probability forecast contains useful information for pre-
dicting GDP declines for up to two quarters ahead.
Rapach, in Chapter 4, proposes forecasting methods to deal with 
problems associated with forecasting regional and industry-level (RIL) 
variables. When forecasting such variables, an economist is confronted 
with a large number of potential aggregate and region/industry-specifi c 
predictor variables. In such a scenario, a traditional regression approach 
would tend to overfi t the model, and the resulting model would likely 
forecast poorly out of sample. To operate in this data-rich environment, 
Rapach suggests forecasters consider three new methodologies: 1) 
bagging, 2) forecast combination, and 3) factor models. Bagging is a 
Monte Carlo technique that stabilizes the model selection of the tradi-
tional approach of choosing variables based on signifi cant t-statistics. 
Forecast combination averages forecasts from separate autoregressive-
distributed lag models using each candidate predictor. A factor model 
uses one model and a small number of aggregate input variables to fore-
cast the cross section of RIL variables. A fi nal forecast is obtained by 
averaging the forecasts from the three methods. Rapach cites research 
that shows such methods have been demonstrated to improve the fore-
casting of fi nancial returns, another environment where a multitude of 
potential predictors exists.
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To provide evidence that such methods improve forecasts of RIL 
variables, Rapach applies the methods to forecast quarterly employ-
ment growth in Michigan and Missouri from the end of the fi rst quarter 
of 1990 to the end of the fi rst quarter of 2010. He constructs forecasts 
using the three methods and 11 predictor variables. He fi nds that the 
three forecasts tend to outperform forecasts based on a simple auto-
regressive model and also tend to outperform those based on regression 
models that use each predictor separately. The best forecast, however, 
is obtained by averaging the bagging, forecast combination, and fac-
tor model forecasts. Seemingly, each method contributes some unique 
information for forecasting state-level employment growth.
Chapter 5 is based on a Sichel lecture delivered by Jansen, in which 
he summarized his paper (coauthored with Bradley) exploring the pos-
sibility of incorporating nonlinear structure to improve the forecasts of 
fi nancial and real variables. The authors conduct an exercise to fore-
cast monthly observations on the index of industrial production, the 
10-year Treasury yield, and the excess return on Standard and Poor’s 
stock index (the S&P 500). They focus on the threshold autoregressive 
(TAR), logistic smooth transition autoregressive (LSTAR), and expo-
nential smooth transition autoregressive (ESTAR) models, which allow 
the structure of the model to depend on an observable state variable. 
They use lagged values of the series as the state variable. For the indus-
trial production and stock returns series, they also introduce a “current 
depth of recession” variable, which is the difference between the cur-
rent value of the series and its previous peak. This variable allows the 
series to have asymmetric dynamics, depending on whether the series 
is contracting or expanding.
Although Bradley and Jansen fi nd strong evidence of nonlinearity 
in the estimation period, the performance of the forecasts based on 
the nonlinear models is mixed. Depending on the evaluation criterion 
used, some of the nonlinear models do outperform naive and simple 
autoregressive models. Formal tests for forecast improvement suggest 
that the nonlinear models marginally improve the quality of the fore-
casts of industrial production and excess stock returns. Bradley and
Jansen’s work demonstrates both the challenges and potential benefi ts 
of exploiting nonlinear structure.
Stekler, in Chapter 6, presents a survey of methods for evaluating 
macroeconomic forecasts. He begins by posing a list of questions that 
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any evaluation strategy should answer. He briefl y describes the com-
mon statistical measures that test for unbiasedness, effi ciency, and per-
formance relative to a benchmark. He then describes two new develop-
ments in forecast evaluation. First, he proposes a method for jointly 
evaluating the directional accuracy of forecasts of both output growth 
and infl ation based on the predictive performance test of Pesaran and 
Timmermann. Second, he furnishes an innovative method for apprais-
ing a forecast based on the benefi t to the user. To measure the benefi t 
of forecasts produced by the Federal Reserve (the Fed), he proposes 
comparing two things: 1) the targeted federal funds rate from a Taylor 
rule that uses the Fed’s forecasts of output and infl ation and 2) the tar-
geted federal funds rate from a Taylor rule that uses the actual values 
of output and infl ation. He reports fi nding that the Fed’s forecasting 
errors produce a 100-basis-point error in the targeted federal funds rate. 
Although this error seems large, it is much smaller than errors produced 
by naive forecasts. 
Having described evaluation procedures, Stekler then examines 
actual forecasts of output growth and infl ation. Summarizing the fi nd-
ings of his previous research on forecasts for the Group of Seven (G7) 
countries, he reports that the results are mixed but tend to suggest that 
forecasts do have systematic biases and informational ineffi ciencies. 
There is also only marginal evidence that the profession’s forecasts 
have improved over time. Stekler suggests that the poor forecasting 
performance can be attributed to the inability to forecast recessions.
Stekler concludes by describing the evaluation of labor market fore-
casts. U.S. unemployment is countercyclical and is coincidental with 
the business cycle in expansions, but lags in contractions. He asserts 
that the use of nonlinear models to represent this asymmetry has had 
only limited success in forecasting unemployment. He proposes a new 
method for evaluating the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) long-term 
forecast of employment by age/gender categories and for evaluating 
the Census Bureau forecast of population by state. He decomposes 
the category/state forecast errors into components: errors that result 
from forecasting the aggregate and those that result from forecast-
ing the category/state share. He evaluates the share errors using a dis-
similarity index. He fi nds some evidence that the BLS employment-
share forecasts outperform a naive forecast, but that the Census Bureau 
population-share forecasts do not outperform a naive forecast.
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In the fi nal chapter, Chapter 7, Lee presents a survey of the methods 
to effi ciently combine abundant economic data to produce an improved 
forecast of a particular variable. He considers scenarios where there are 
many input variables and possibly many forecasts of the variable of 
interest. When many input variables exist, he presents recently devel-
oped methods for reducing the data using principal components and 
then constructing a forecast using a factor model. When many forecasts 
exist, he describes advanced methods for optimally combining the fore-
casts. This now-well-developed theory has mainly focused on produc-
ing point forecasts. Lee demonstrates that these techniques can also be 
applied to quantile, density, interval, and binary forecasts.
To conclude, I would like to acknowledge some individuals who 
made the 2009–2010 lectures a success and a pleasure for me to host. 
First, I would to thank the six presenters for their enthusiastic and stim-
ulating public lectures, which, again, formed the basis for the present 
volume. The long success of this lecture series has always depended on 
the quality of our speakers. 
There are others who must be acknowledged as well. The W.E. 
Upjohn Institute for Employment Research provided fi nancial support 
and made the publication of this volume possible. Connie Volenski’s 
administrative skills made the organization of the lectures effortless 
for me, and I am greatly appreciative. Werner Sichel deserves special 
acknowledgement for initiating this lecture series nearly 50 years ago. 
His nurturing of this series over the many years has made an invaluable 
contribution to the WMU Economics Department. Finally, I would like 
to thank my wife, Shohreh Majin, and my son, Bakhtyar, for allowing 
me evenings away from home to contemplate the future of economic 
forecasting over late dinners with the presenters.
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 Real-Time Forecasting
Dean Croushore
University of Richmond and
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
This chapter will discuss real-time forecasting in a macroeconomic 
policy context. I will begin by talking about the Survey of Professional 
Forecasters (SPF), a survey of private-sector forecasters. Next, I will 
discuss research on real-time data analysis and its importance in fore-
casting. Finally, I will discuss real-time forecasting in the 1990s.
In a policy environment, such as the one I faced for 14 years at the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, you have three basic choices 
for developing forecasts in a real-time forecasting environment. One 
possibility, used by many policy analysts, is simply to rely on forecasts 
made by others, such as the consulting fi rm Macroeconomic Advisors. 
After all, forecasting fi rms devote considerable resources to forecast-
ing, so why not trust their forecasts? An alternative is to look at surveys 
of forecasters, such as the SPF. This gives you a range of forecasts, and 
you can base your decisions on the median forecast, which is usually a 
better forecast than the forecast provided by any individual forecaster. 
The third possibility is to create your own forecasting model. This gives 
you the ability to tweak the forecast to your own needs and to specify 
your own baseline underlying the forecast. You can do some simple 
things such as I did at the Fed—for instance, forecasting GDP for the 
current quarter based on the employment data that are released early in 
the month. Or you can run time-series models of your own specifi ca-
tion, which often hold their own against much larger, more sophisti-
cated models. Or, you could buy a large-model forecasting software 
program, such as the one provided by Macroeconomic Advisors, and 
then modify some of its assumptions to your own liking to produce 
your own forecast based on its model structure. Unless you have many 
resources at your disposal, however, you probably do not want to pro-
duce a large-model forecast on your own. You are unlikely to do better 
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than others, and almost certain to produce much worse forecasts, unless 
you have a large number of economists working on it, such as the doz-
ens that work on forecasting at the Federal Reserve Board.
The major concern that you should have about all these forecasting 
models is the role of judgment in the outcome of the forecasting exer-
cise. The more you study forecasting, the more you realize how much 
impact judgment has—there is no such thing as a pure model forecast. 
First, there is judgment in determining what model to use. Second, there 
is judgment about the underlying key parameters of the model: how do 
you determine the natural rate of unemployment, or the growth rate of 
potential GDP, or the equilibrium real interest rate, which are generally 
not determined within a model? Those factors tend to drive the forecast 
much more than you might think.
THE SURVEY OF PROFESSIONAL FORECASTERS
My own involvement with forecasting began in 1990 with a research 
paper in which I wanted to get data on infl ation expectations. I used 
a survey that was run by the American Statistical Association and the 
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) and was known as the 
Economic Outlook Survey. The survey contained much useful informa-
tion, and I was impressed that the survey had begun in 1968 and was 
the longest quarterly survey of forecasters in existence. But shortly after 
using the survey myself, I read an announcement that the survey was 
folding because of lack of interest and because there was no organiza-
tion that was willing to run it. As an economist at the Federal Reserve, I 
thought the survey was incredibly useful—it gave great insight into the 
expectations of the country’s leading forecasters. I was determined that 
the survey should not die, and so I contacted Robert Allison of the NBER 
and Victor Zarnowitz of the University of Chicago about the possibility 
of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia taking over the survey. They 
were both enthusiastic about having an institution like the Fed running 
the survey, and so we took over, missing only one quarterly survey in the 
transition.
After taking over the survey, I, along with my coresearcher Leonard 
Mills, began to rehabilitate it. We renamed it the Survey of Professional 
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Forecasters. We increased the number of participants (the participant list 
was down to 13 forecasters when we took it over), tightened procedures 
for production of the survey results, and added questions to increase the 
value of the survey to researchers and to policymakers. Today, the sur-
vey is used to provide forecasts to policymakers before the meetings of 
the Federal Open Market Committee, as well as to provide a solid data-
base of historical forecasts for use by macroeconomic researchers. The 
Philadelphia Fed’s Web site provides complete details on the survey’s 
history and all the individual responses to each survey, as well as write-
ups for each survey and both median and mean data across forecasters 
for each macroeconomic variable included in the survey.1
If people wish to use a forecast, or a survey of forecasts, for mak-
ing decisions, they would like to feel confi dent that the survey provides 
valid forecasts. Hence, much research has been done on the accuracy 
of forecasts from surveys, including the SPF. Two standard tests of the 
accuracy of forecasts are tests of 1) unbiasedness (that forecast errors 
have a zero mean over long periods) and 2) effi ciency (that forecast 
errors are uncorrelated with information known when the forecast was 
made). If forecasts are unbiased and effi cient, then people are likely to 
fi nd them useful. If forecasts are biased or ineffi cient, then it should be 
possible for someone to improve on the forecasts in real time.
SPF forecasts generally pass the tests of unbiasedness—forecasts 
are unbiased in long samples. However, over short periods, the forecasts 
might have persistent errors. Figure 2.1 provides an example of SPF fore-
casts of infl ation (based on the GDP defl ator) compared with the measure 
of the infl ation rate that is released one month after the end of the quarter.2 
In the short run, the forecasts sometimes exhibit patterns in which fore-
cast errors persist for some time. But, as I point out (Croushore 2010), 
forecasters adapt fairly quickly to structural changes in the economy that 
lead to short-run persistence of forecast errors, and before long the errors 
disappear. If the forecasts were perfectly accurate, all the points would 
lie on the 45-degree line in Figure 2.1. Although many points are off the 
45-degree line, on average over the 35 years of data shown here, the plot-
ted points lie fairly symmetrically around that line.
Most research also shows that the SPF forecasts pass tests for effi -
ciency. However, there are exceptions. Some of the exceptions found in 
the literature are not valid because although they show that the forecast 
errors are correlated with another variable, they don’t use the data that 
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the forecasters had at the time they made their forecasts. Instead, those 
studies use revised data, which the forecasters would not have had, so 
their tests are not really tests of effi ciency.
Ball and Croushore (2003) show that there is a tendency for fore-
cast errors to be correlated with changes in monetary policy. As Figure 
2.2 shows, SPF output forecast errors are negatively associated with 
changes in the real federal funds interest rate. When the Fed tightens 
monetary policy (and thus the real federal funds rate increases), fore-
casters reduce their forecasts for output growth, but not by enough. 
As a result, output growth falls more than the forecasters expect, and 
thus there is a negative relationship between output forecast errors and 
changes in the real federal funds rate.
For the most part, though, despite the Ball-Croushore fi ndings, the 
forecast errors in the SPF tend to be small. The survey’s forecasts are 
SOURCE: Author’s calculations from data from the SPF and the Real-Time Data Set 
for Macroeconomists, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
Figure 2.1  SPF Forecasts versus One-Quarter-Later Actuals
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generally better than simple univariate time-series models at short hori-
zons, as Stark (2010) notes in a recent review of the forecast accuracy 
of the SPF. However, there are some imperfections in the survey fore-
casts, especially for long horizons and with respect to the survey’s effi -
ciency in responding to changes in monetary policy.
REAL-TIME DATA
In evaluating forecasts of macroeconomic variables, researchers 
must be aware of data revisions. Some researchers are not careful about 
this issue, so they grab data from the current database and perform tests 
on forecasts as if the data in their database were the same as the data 
that were available to researchers in real time. This is a dangerous and 
invalid practice. Many papers have been written that show that some 
SOURCE: Author’s calculations from data from the SPF, Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia; and the FRED database, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
Figure 2.2  Output Forecast Errors and Change in Real Federal 
Funds Rate
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new model or other provides better forecasts than the SPF, but in most 
cases the forecasting advantage comes because the researcher is com-
paring forecasts from a model using a recent data set to forecasts made 
by the SPF forecasters using a completely different data set. Of course, 
the two sets of forecasts are not comparable.
To be able to compare forecasts made with a new model to the SPF 
forecasts in a legitimate manner, one would need to have at one’s dis-
posal a real-time database, showing what the data looked like at the 
time the SPF forecasters were making their forecasts. This is, in fact, the 
purpose of the Real-Time Data Set for Macroeconomists, which Tom 
Stark and I developed in the late 1990s and early 2000s. (See Croushore 
and Stark [2000, 2001] for details.) The data set was developed at the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, and new variables are continu-
ously being added to the data set, based on work that continues at the 
Philadelphia Fed and work that my students have completed at the Uni-
versity of Richmond. A database of this nature needs good institutional 
support, as it is a public good. The Federal Reserve is a natural institu-
tion for supporting such projects, as it falls under the domain of provid-
ing macroeconomic data to the public for no charge.
Following the success of the Real-Time Data Set for Macroecono-
mists, other real-time databases have been developed all over the world. 
In the United States, the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis developed 
the ALFRED database, keeping successive vintages of the FRED (Fed-
eral Reserve Economic Data) database and making the data available 
in a convenient form. The Bureau of Economic Analysis has also, since 
2002, kept all the vintages of its Excel fi les containing National Income 
and Product Accounts data and made that data available. The OECD 
now has a large real-time data set containing data for all the countries in 
the OECD, and the Euro Area Business Cycle Network recently made 
a real-time database available for all the countries in the Euro area. The 
United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Japan also maintain their own real-
time databases.3
Some government statistical agencies in some countries have been 
reluctant to help researchers develop real-time data sets: they fear that if 
data revisions are examined by researchers, the statistical agencies will 
be subject to criticism because of systematic revisions. But research 
on data revisions is not intended to be critical of those agencies. The 
research fi ndings might help the agencies strengthen their procedures 
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to avoid having predictable revisions, for example. Economists under-
stand that data agencies have limited resources and cannot produce per-
fect data releases given their constraints. The goal of research is to help 
people understand the limitations of the data and to explore the implica-
tions of those revisions for structural macroeconomic modeling, fore-
casting, and policy analysis. In addition, data revisions often refl ect new 
information that cannot be known any earlier. For example, tax returns 
give the government statistical agencies much better data on income 
for the preceding year than the agencies had during that year, so GDP 
and income statistics are improved dramatically. Or, take the example 
of infl ation measures: by construction, the consumer price index is not 
revised (except for changes in the seasonal pattern), whereas the per-
sonal consumption expenditures price index is revised; yet the latter is 
a much superior measure of infl ation precisely because the revisions 
refl ect changes in weights applied to different sectors that provide a 
more accurate view of the economy.
The typical structure of real-time data sets is shown in the data 
matrix in Table 2.1, which illustrates real-time data on real U.S. out-
put. Each column reports a data vintage—that is, the date at which the 
data are observed. So, the column labeled “Nov. 1965” tells you what 
someone in November 1965 would have observed at the time. Each 
row shows the data for a date for which real output is measured. Thus 
the upper left value of 306.4 (in billions of real dollars) is the value 
for real output in the fi rst quarter of 1947 as someone in November 
1965 would have observed in the government’s database. As you move 
across a given row in the table, you see how data are revised. For exam-
ple, in November 1965, the fi rst release of the data on real output for 
1965Q3 was 609.1 (as before, in billions of real dollars). That number 
was revised to 613.0 in the data set of February 1966 and remained at 
that level in the data set of May 1966. The large increase seen in later 
vintages of the data of 3636.3 is not because of revisions to data but 
because of changes in the base year, from 1958 in the vintages of 1965 
and 1966, to a base year of 2005 in vintages of 2009 and 2010. Mov-
ing down the main diagonal of the table, we see that the last recorded 
observation in each column shows the initial release of the data for each 
date: 609.1 for 1965Q3, 621.7 for 1965Q4, 633.8 for 1966Q1, 13,014.0 
for 2009Q3, 13,155.0 for 2009Q4, and 13,254.7 for 2010Q1.
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If data revisions were small and random, we would not worry about 
them affecting the structural modeling, forecasting, and policy analysis. 
But a look at the revisions should convince you that the revisions may 
be large and consequential. For example, Figure 2.3 shows the revisions 
to real output growth for the fi rst quarter of 1977. From the data set’s 
initial release at 5.2 percent, it was revised upward a few months later to 
7.5 percent, and ultimately was revised upward as high as 9.6 percent. 
But later it was revised down as low as 4.7 percent in the benchmark 
revision of July 2010. So the revisions can be large and can occur even 
three decades after the fi rst release of the data for a particular date.
You might think that such large revisions are rare and affect output 
growth for just one quarter, but even in the long run, data revisions can 
be large. For instance, if you average real output growth over fi ve-year 
periods, you will fi nd large revisions, which could potentially affect 
your view of long-run economic growth. As Table 2.2 shows, however, 
the fi ve-year growth rate can be revised by as much as 0.6 percentage 
points, which is a large revision for a growth rate that is as low as 1.9 
percent. For example, the growth rate in the fi rst half of the 1970s was 
initially released as 2.1 percent, but by 1999 it was revised upward to 
2.6 percent, nearly a 25 percent increase.
Table 2.1  Data Matrix for Real U.S. Output (billions of real dollars)
Vintage Nov. 1965 Feb. 1966 May 1966 Nov. 2009 Feb. 2010 May 2010
Quarter
1947Q1 306.4 306.4 306.4 1,772.2 1,772.2 1,772.2
1947Q2 309.0 309.0 309.0 1,769.5 1,769.5 1,769.5
1947Q3 309.6 309.6 309.6 1,768.0 1,768.0 1,768.0
1965Q3 609.1 613.0 613.0 3,636.3 3,636.3 3,636.3
1965Q4 621.7 624.4 3,724.0 3,724.0 3,724.0
1966Q1 633.8 3,815.4 3,815.4 3,815.4
2009Q2 12,901.5 12,901.5 12,901.5
2009Q3 13,014.0 12,973.0 12,973.0
2009Q4 13,155.0 13,149.5
2010Q1 13,254.7
SOURCE: Real-Time Data Set for Macroeconomists, Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia.
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In modeling data revisions, a key question for which an answer is 
needed for modeling or forecasting is whether the data revisions can 
be modeled as providing news or reducing noise. Data revisions that 
provide news are those that come about when the government’s data 
releases are optimal forecasts of later releases. Under that situation, 
data revisions will not be predictable in advance from data known (by 
anyone) at the time the data are released. Providing such data revisions 
requires the government statistical agency to not report its sample infor-
mation alone, but to use judgment and forecasting models to optimally 
forecast the values of missing data, so that the data release is an optimal 
forecast of later data releases. However, often data releases are not con-
structed in this manner, but rather fi ll in the missing source data with 
forecasts in such a way that the data release is not an optimal forecast 
of later data releases—usually because today’s data release is correlated 
with other data known at the time. In such a situation, future data revi-
sions will be predictable, and data revisions reduce measurement error, 
but each data release is not an optimal forecast of future data releases. 
For example, we know that there is a strong correlation between GDP 
data and employment data. If the government reports the GDP data 
SOURCE: Real-Time Data Set for Macroeconomists, Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia.
Figure 2.3  Real Output Growth for 1977, Quarter 1 (as viewed from the 
perspective of 133 different vintages)
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based on its sample of the elements of GDP but ignores the information 
contained in the employment data, then its data release will contain 
measurement error, and data revisions will reduce noise. If I were a 
forecaster interested in predicting future data revisions, I would look 
at the data on employment and form a forecast of future GDP releases 
using a model combining the data from the GDP release and the data 
from the employment release. Such a forecast would be a better forecast 
of future releases of GDP than the government’s release of GDP data.
This discussion raises a key question: should the government use 
the limited source data that it knows, combined with other informa-
tion such as data on employment and industrial production, to form an 
optimal forecast of GDP? Or should the government follow a simple 
rule to fi ll in its missing data on forecasts of GDP and produce a noisy 
measure, ignoring data on other variables? You might think that the 
fi rst method would be preferable, which seems intuitively clear. But 
the danger is that once you start forecasting with extraneous variables, 
since forecasting is more of an art than a science, the data releases for 
GDP will become very subjective. As an employee of a government 
Table 2.2  Five-Year Average Annual Growth Rate of Real Output across 
Vintages
Vintage 1975 1980 1985 1991 1995 1999 2003 2009 2010
Five-year period
’49Q4 to ’54Q4 5.2 5.1 5.1 5.5 5.5 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3
’ 54Q4 to ’59Q4 2.9 3.0 3.0 2.7 2.7 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2
’59Q4 to ’64Q4 4.1 4.0 4.0 3.9 4.0 4.2 4.2 4.3 4.3
’64Q4 to ’69Q4 4.3 4.0 4.1 4.0 4.0 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4
’69Q4 to ’74Q4 2.1 2.2 2.5 2.1 2.3 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6
’74Q4 to ’79Q4  3.7 3.9 3.5 3.4 3.9 4.0 3.9 3.9
’79Q4 to ’84Q4   2.2 2.0 1.9 2.2 2.5 2.5 2.5
’84Q4 to ’89Q4    3.2 3.0 3.2 3.5 3.6 3.5
’89Q4 to ’94Q4     2.3 1.9 2.4 2.5 2.5
’94Q4 to ’99Q4       3.9 4.0 4.1
’99Q4 to ’04Q4         2.2 2.4
’04Q4 to ’09Q4         1.2
SOURCE: Author’s calculations from Real-Time Data Set for Macroeconomists, Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
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statistical agency, you then open yourself up to the criticism that you 
are manipulating the data for political means. On the other hand, if you 
follow standard and well-established procedures for fi lling in missing 
data, you avoid any possibility of people thinking that you are manipu-
lating the data for political reasons, because anyone can replicate your 
results, even though your data releases are not optimal forecasts of later 
data releases. In this situation, noise trumps news.
FORECASTING
How does a forecaster produce optimal forecasts in real time? 
First, any forecaster needs good data; a forecast is only as good as the 
data used to generate the forecast. The literature on forecasting mainly 
focuses on model development—trying to build a better forecasting 
model, especially comparing forecasts from a new model to other mod-
els or to forecasts made in real time.4 
The fi rst question in this literature is, “Are data revisions large 
enough to affect forecasts in a meaningful way?” We have seen that 
data revisions may be substantial, but what is the impact of those revi-
sions on forecasts? Stark and Croushore (2002) suggest three ways this 
can occur: 1) by changing the data that are input into a model; 2) by 
changing the coeffi cient estimates of the model; and 3) by changing the 
structure of a model, such as changing the number of lags that provide 
the model’s best fi t. Stark and Croushore (2002) illustrate these ideas 
using repeated observation forecasting (ROF), which uses different 
real-time data vintages for the same sample period to see how fore-
casts change as the vintage of the data changes. By running these ROFs 
allowing changes in the lags in the model, allowing coeffi cient esti-
mates to change, and changing vintages, we can observe all three ways 
in which forecasts change. To isolate which reason is the main cause of 
changes in the forecasts, we can run another set of ROFs that keeps the 
number of lags unchanged. A comparison of the baseline result and this 
one reveals the importance of changes in the lag structure in the model. 
To isolate the effect of changes in parameter estimates, we can keep the 
parameter estimates fi xed and generate forecasts based on the different 
vintages of data, to see how much the forecasts are affected by param-
Higgins.indb   17 11/3/2011   10:22:13 AM
18   Croushore
eter changes. Everything else must be due to changes in the data input 
into the model. Looking at the literature on forecasting with real-time 
data reveals no broad, general tendency. For some variables and for 
some forecasting methods, the forecasts change signifi cantly because 
of data revisions. However, other variables and forecasting methods are 
more robust to data revisions, as Croushore (forthcoming) shows. 
Because data revisions have mixed effects on forecasts, we might 
ask, “Is there an optimal method for forecasters to adjust their forecasts 
in the face of data uncertainty?” This is a much more diffi cult ques-
tion to answer, and there have not been very many research papers that 
have tried to tackle it. A few papers seem to fi nd some degree of abil-
ity to improve forecasts by accounting for data revisions (see Koenig, 
Dolmas, and Piger 2003), but the predictability of data revisions is fairly 
small, and larger forecasting gains may be found by pursuing aspects of 
modeling other than modeling data revisions. Some researchers model 
data revisions with time-series models, but the evidence in Croushore 
and Stark (2001) suggests that this will be problematic because bench-
mark revisions cannot be characterized as autoregressive moving aver-
age (ARMA) models, and benchmark revisions are the most signifi cant 
type of data revisions. This explains why sophisticated fi ltering methods 
and state-space models often fail to deliver improvements in forecasts.
In summary, forecasters face diffi cult issues in forecasting in real 
time in the face of data revisions. It is not clear that the payoff to opti-
mally handling data revisions exceeds the benefi ts of working on other 
aspects of forecast modeling, especially if data revisions are diffi cult to 
predict, as is generally the case.
APPLICATION: FORECASTING IN THE 1990s
To illustrate real-time forecasting problems, I will demonstrate with 
a real-life example from my own forecasting experience at the Federal 
Reserve. This example uses forecasts from the SPF to show the effects 
of data revisions. In the 1990s, the tech boom provided an unexpected 
burst of productivity, increasing output growth, reducing the unemploy-
ment rate, and causing forecasters to rethink key aspects of their mod-
els. In this section, I will look at the forecast errors made in the 1990s 
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and show how forecasters eventually caught up to the change in produc-
tivity growth, although it took some time.
In my analysis, I will look at one-year-ahead forecasts of various 
macroeconomic variables. Each of the SPF forecasts is made in the 
middle of the quarter, shortly after the fi rst release of the GDP data for 
the previous quarter. After that, data revisions occur once a year for data 
over the past three years, and benchmark revisions every fi ve years or 
so cause signifi cant data revisions for many years’ worth of data.
Forecasts for real GDP growth made in the mid-1990s were wrong 
for many years in a row (Figure 2.4). The forecasters had expected real 
GDP growth to be just a bit over 2 percent for those years, and it turned 
out to be double that number. Forecasters were slow to realize that the 
tech boom had brought a persistently high growth rate of productiv-
ity, which translated directly into higher GDP growth. After persistent 
forecast errors from 1996 to 1998, the forecasters began to raise their 
forecasts for GDP growth in 2000. By 2001, the forecasts called for 
GDP growth close to 3 percent, just in time for the tech bubble to burst, 
driving GDP growth substantially lower as the United States experi-
enced a mild recession.
With GDP growth occurring much faster than the forecasters 
expected, you might think that infl ation would be higher than the fore-
casters thought, but in fact the opposite was true (Figure 2.5). Because 
the source of the increase in GDP growth was productivity growth, this 
was a classic supply shock, causing faster real GDP growth and slower 
growth of the price level. So the forecasters were again persistently 
incorrect in their infl ation forecasts from the early 1990s until the end 
of 1999. They thought that output was above potential output, so they 
kept thinking that infl ation would rise in the future. But in fact the fore-
casters had pegged potential output too low, and infl ation fell almost 
continuously throughout the decade. 
For the most part, the forecast errors on real GDP growth translated 
into errors in unemployment forecasts (Figure 2.6). The stronger-than-
anticipated growth of GDP meant that the unemployment rate would 
decline more than was forecast, to be sure. But the forecasters were 
also very unsure of what the natural rate of unemployment was. Several 
years after the economic recovery from the 1990–1991 recession, they 
thought the unemployment rate might have bottomed out at 5.5 percent. 
But the tech boom kept the demand for workers growing throughout 
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SOURCE: SPF, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia; and FRED database, Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
Figure 2.4  Real GDP Growth Forecasts and Actuals
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Figure 2.5  Infl ation (GDP Price Index) Forecasts and Actuals
SOURCE: SPF, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia; and FRED database, Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
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the decade, and the forecasters were wrong almost continuously that 
decade. They gradually ratcheted down their view of the natural rate of 
unemployment, but they were always behind the curve until the 2001 
recession.
In describing these forecast errors, I have used a data set of vintage 
November 2001, which could be deceptive because of data revisions. In 
real time, the forecasters did not see the line labeled “Actual” that I have 
shown in these charts. Rather, they observed early releases of the data, 
which may have looked quite different. So, the forecasts in Figures 2.4, 
2.5, and 2.6 look pretty bad, as they clearly made severe and persistent 
errors. But, if you knew only what the forecasters knew at the time they 
made their forecasts, the forecast errors would not have looked as bad, 
which is why the forecasters were slow to adjust their methods. For 
example, Figure 2.7 shows the same data as Figure 2.4 for real GDP 
growth forecasts but adds in a line labeled “Real-time actual” showing 
at each date what the last data point looked like when the forecast-
ers made their forecasts. Of course, because these are one-year-ahead 
forecasts, the forecasters are always a year behind, so they still appear 
to make persistent forecast errors. But the “Real-time actual” line is 
Figure 2.6  Unemployment Rate Forecasts and Actuals 
SOURCE: SPF, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia; and FRED database, Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
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generally closer to the forecast line than is the “Actual” line. The point 
is, of course, that the forecasters did not know how severe their forecast 
errors were in real time; they only realized it much later.
Another way to see how slow the forecasters were to change their 
outlook is in their long-term forecasts for real output growth. The SPF 
forecasters are asked to provide a forecast for average real GDP growth 
for the next 10 years. As Figure 2.8 shows, the forecasters seemed to 
be reluctant to change their views about real GDP growth in the future, 
despite persistent real GDP growth rates of about 4 percent throughout 
the second half of the 1990s. In fact, the forecasters had lowered their 
forecasts of real GDP growth over the coming decade in 1996, just as 
the productivity boom was starting. They fi nally changed their view in 
2000 and 2001, just as a mild recession was beginning.
CONCLUSION
Forecasters face a diffi cult task in real time. As we have seen, data 
revisions can wreak havoc with forecasts. As the example from the 
1990s shows, when structural change occurs in the economy, it may 
take forecasters a long time to adjust their models. That situation is 
exacerbated when data are revised and the initial releases of the data are 
much different from the later data, as was the case with real GDP growth 
in the second half of the 1990s. The key to good forecasting is prob-
ably the use of judgment, rather than technical expertise. In the 1990s, 
some forecasters recognized the permanent (or at least persistent) shift 
in productivity growth, including Fed chairman Alan Greenspan. The SPF 
forecasts took a long time to catch up to the productivity boom, but 
some individual forecasters performed much better.
If you want to become a real-time forecaster, you should think 
about major elements of your model, such as the growth rate of poten-
tial output (and the growth rate of productivity) and the natural rate of 
unemployment. If you can make a better guess about changes in these 
variables over time, you can outperform forecasters who have greater 
technical expertise. But every forecaster, no matter how talented, will 
have trouble dealing with data revisions, which are largely unforecast-
able, and which can make forecast errors surprisingly large.
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Figure 2.7  Real GDP Growth Forecasts and Real-Time Actuals
SOURCE: SPF, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia; and FRED database, Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
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Figure 2.8  Real GDP: 10-Year Forecasts 
SOURCE: SPF, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
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Notes
1. http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/real-time-center/survey-of-
professional-forecasters/ (accessed January 21, 2011).
2. See Croushore (2010) for more details on the data shown here.
3. See my Web page at https://facultystaff.richmond.edu/~dcrousho/data.htm for 
links to all of  these data sets.
4. In this section, I will report the main results in two survey papers, Croushore 
(2006) and Croushore (forthcoming).
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Limits to Economic Forecasting
Kajal Lahiri
University at Albany, State University of New York
Economic forecasting is not a very reputable profession. There 
is skepticism not only by laymen but by most academic economists 
regarding the true capability of macroeconomic forecasters. The con-
ventional wisdom is that economic forecasters are mere charlatans. 
However, there are numerous reasons why economic forecasts are 
so hard to get right. Not only do we not understand the continuously 
changing economic processes that generate the variable we want to 
predict, but we do not always have the appropriate measurements to 
identify the effects of sudden structural breaks that are due to economic 
and noneconomic factors. One way to make forecasts more useful—
though not necessarily more accurate—might be to follow the “truth 
in labeling” often used in the marketing of many products. By this I 
mean every forecast should come with the associate expected errors 
like forecast uncertainty, so that both the forecasters and their clients 
would know what level of confi dence to place in a forecast. This aspect 
of any forecast should be communicated, in addition to the forecasts 
themselves. Makridakis, Hogarth, and Gaba (2009) forcefully make 
the point that not having a proper estimate of the underlying uncer-
tainty means succumbing to the illusion of control and experiencing 
surprises, often with negative consequences. It is in this spirit that since 
the mid-1990s the Bank of England and Sveriges Riksbank of Sweden 
have been reporting fan charts that show subjective confi dence bands 
surrounding offi cial forecasts. Since November 2007, each member of 
the U.S. Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) has also been pub-
lishing information about uncertainty associated with that committee’s 
economic outlooks. As Granger (1996) points out, in many disciplines 
there seem to be horizons beyond which useful forecasting is not pos-
sible; for instance, in weather forecasting it is four or fi ve days. An 
essential element of forecasting is to extract useful signals from noisy 
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data, and to project them into the future. Certainly, an aspect that pro-
vides limits to how far ahead one can forecast is when the forecastable 
signals get lost in the noise. It would also be helpful to be aware of these 
kinds of limits to economic forecasting in cases where the underlying 
uncertainty is hopelessly high. 
Against this backdrop, in this chapter I will evaluate the capabil-
ity of a large number of professional forecasters to forecast real GDP 
growth at different horizons and will determine how far ahead they can 
really forecast. The advantage of analyzing the predictions made by a 
large number of professional forecasters is that abrupt structural and 
policy changes that are hard to pick up by estimated forecasting models 
can possibly be incorporated into the subjective judgments of experts. 
There seems to be a widely held expectation that the economy can be 
forecast over a typical business cycle, which is about fi ve to seven years 
long. I will contrast two types of forecasts: 1) the actual growth rate and 
2) whether the growth will be negative in some specifi ed quarter in the 
future. I fi nd that forecasts for the actual GDP growth do not have much 
value when the horizon goes beyond 18 months. However, the probabil-
ity forecasts for negative GDP growth have no value when the horizon 
exceeds six months. I explore reasons why the directional probability 
forecasts perform worse than the quantitative real GDP forecasts. 
INFORMATION CONTENT OF REAL GDP FORECASTS
In this section I analyze the quantitative forecasts using 15 years 
of monthly private-sector forecast data for 18 developed countries, 
reported over 24 different forecast horizons. The real GDP forecasts 
come from Consensus Economics Inc., an international economic 
survey organization. Since October 1989, Consensus Economics Inc. 
has been polling more than 600 forecasters each month and recording 
their forecasts for principal macroeconomic variables (including GDP 
growth, infl ation, interest rates, and exchange rates) for a large number 
of countries. Forecasts are made for the current year (based on par-
tial information about developments in that year) and for the following 
year. The number of forecasters ranges from 10 to 30 for most of the 
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countries, and for the major industrialized countries the panelists are 
based in the countries for which they forecast. 
We study the consensus forecasts of average annual real GDP 
growth. Survey respondents make their fi rst forecasts when there are 24 
months to the end of the year being forecast; that is, they start forecast-
ing GDP growth in January of the previous year, and their last monthly 
forecast is reported at the beginning of December of the target year, 
23 months later. So for each country and for each target year I have 24 
forecasts of varying horizons. Our data set ranges from October 1989 
to June 2004. The countries we study are the 18 industrialized countries 
for which forecasts are available from Consensus Economics Inc.1 
In order to evaluate the forecast errors correctly, the forecasts should 
be matched with the actual data being forecast. It is well documented 
in the literature that data revisions may have an important impact on 
the perceived performance of the forecasters. Since forecasters cannot 
possibly be aware of data revisions after they report their forecasts, we 
use an early revision as the actual value, which is compiled from the 
midyear reports of the issue of OECD Economic Outlook immediately 
following the target year. However, because of the changes in variable 
defi nitions (i.e., GNP to GDP, or West Germany to unifi ed Germany), 
some of the data are not available in the June issue of OECD Economic 
Outlook. We collected these data from the original sources, such as the 
May and June issues of the Bureau of Economic Analysis’s Survey of 
Business, or issues of Deutsche Bundesbank’s Monthly Report in the 
year immediately following the target year.
The information value of a forecast is related to how accurate the 
forecast is. In this section, we will provide statistics such as mean squared 
error (MSE), mean absolute error (MAE), and Theil’s U-statistic, 
along with another statistic recently proposed by Diebold and Kilian 
(2001). Whereas MSE and MAE depend on the variability of the actual 
process, Theil’s U-statistic scales the root mean square error (RMSE) 
by the variability of underlying data and has the advantage of being 
independent of the variance of the actual process. Formally,
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Equation (3.1) compares the forecast errors with a naive forecast, yn . If 
Uh is more than one, the forecast does not beat the naive forecast. An 
important issue in calculating the Uh is the selection of the naive fore-
cast. In this study, we will follow the literature and use the forecast of 
no change as the naive forecast, i.e., 1n ty y  .
To see the improvement in the performance of forecasts over 
decreasing horizons, we also provide an R2 measure, which is based 
on the idea of a predictability measure proposed by Diebold and Kilian 
(2001). They propose the measure of predictability as
 
 ,
( )
1
( )
s
s k
k
E L e
p
E L e
  , 
where  ( )kE L e  denotes the expected loss in the long-run forecasts and  ( )sE L e  denotes the expected loss in the short-run forecasts. If MSE 
is used as the loss function, then we have 
, 1 ss k
k
MSEp
MSE
  .
Diebold and Kilian (2001) use this measure to compute the pre-
dictability of several macro variables using the realized data. Using 
k-period-ahead survey forecasts as the naive forecast, ps,k will give the 
improvement in the forecasts as horizon decreases. 
Table 3.1 presents MAE, MSE, and Theil’s U-statistics for 12- and 
24-month-ahead forecasts. Later we also provide the Theil’s U-statistics 
for all horizons. For 24-month-ahead forecasts, Theil’s U-statistic is less 
than one for only Canada, Denmark, Germany, and the United States. 
The worst performers in 24-month-ahead forecasts are Portugal, Ire-
land, and the Netherlands, which have Theil’s U-statistics of 1.45, 1.41, 
and 1.39, respectively. For 12-month-ahead forecasts, all the countries, 
with the exception of Ireland and Portugal, have Theil’s U-statistics of 
less than one, implying that the forecasts have value over the no-change 
forecast.
Figure 3.1 presents Diebold and Kilian’s ph,24 and Theil’s 1( )h tU y   
for each forecast horizon and country. Notice that large values of 
Theil’s U imply large forecast errors. On the other hand, large values 
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of ph,24 imply that forecasts improve signifi cantly over the 24-month-
ahead forecast ,24tf . The right axes in the fi gures show ph,24 , whereas the 
left axes show the values of 1( )h tU y  . Since 1.0 is the threshold value 
of 1( )h tU y  for determining whether the forecast can beat the naive 
forecast of no change, the plots in Figure 3.1 include a horizontal line 
through 1.0. In addition, to pinpoint the longest horizon at which the 
forecasts beat the naive forecast, the graphs also include a vertical line 
through the longest horizon at which the estimated 1( )h tU y   is lower 
than one. This provides an easy way to compare the countries with each 
other. For all the countries, as the forecast horizon decreases, the qual-
ity of the forecasts increases, as expected. The graphs also point out 
signifi cant heterogeneity across countries.
When we look at the performance rankings based on Theil’s 
1( )h tU y  , we observe that in addition to the four country forecasts that 
T able 3.1  Goodness of Fit of Forecasts (MAE, RMSE, and Theil’s U)
12-month-ahead forecasts  24-month-ahead forecasts
Country MAE RMSE Theil’s U MAE RMSE Theil’s U
Austria 0.98 1.16 0.81 1.24 1.48 1.01
Belgium 0.99 1.15 0.72 1.28 1.68 1.02
Canada 1.21 1.36 0.70 1.44 1.70 0.88
Denmark 0.72 0.99 0.75 0.96 1.14 0.84
Finland 2.24 2.89 0.87 2.70 3.37 1.07
France 0.79 0.99 0.73 1.15 1.50 1.08
Germany 0.79 1.03 0.60 1.49 1.96 0.99
Ireland 2.35 2.76 1.08 2.98 3.67 1.41
Italy 0.77 0.87 0.65 1.39 1.61 1.19
Japan 1.41 1.58 0.74 1.90 2.30 1.04
Netherlands 0.89 1.06 0.88 1.38 1.72 1.39
Norway 0.92 1.13 0.73 1.14 1.33 1.00
Portugal 0.98 1.31 1.02 1.40 1.89 1.45
Spain 0.61 0.86 0.66 1.18 1.58 1.20
Sweden 0.90 1.13 0.69 1.46 1.84 1.13
Switzerland 1.22 1.45 0.92 1.71 2.04 1.26
United Kingdom 0.77 1.02 0.70 1.08 1.62 1.12
United States 0.96 1.09 0.64 1.28 1.59 0.96
SOURCE: Author’s own research.
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Figure 3.1 Information Content of Forecasts over Horizons, October 
1989–June 2004
  
 
 
Higgins.indb   30 11/3/2011   10:22:18 AM
Limits to Economic Forecasting   31
Figure 3.1  (continued)     
 
 
 
NOTE: U(h) = Theil’s U; P(h,24) = Diebold-Kilian predictability statistic.
SOURCE: Author’s analysis of data from the SPF.
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beat the naive forecast when horizon is 24 months (i.e., the American, 
Danish, German, and Canadian forecasts given in Table 3.1), we now 
see that Austrian and Norwegian forecasts beat the naive forecast when 
the horizon is 23 months. In terms of the worst performances in beating 
the naive forecast, we fi nd that the Irish and Portuguese forecasts beat 
the naive forecast at horizons of 10 and 11 months, respectively. These 
are followed by Switzerland and the Netherlands, which beat the naive 
forecast when the horizon is 13 months.
The Diebold-Kilian measure of predictability, ph,24 , shows the 
improvement in the information content of the forecasts as measured by 
the decrease in the mean squared errors over the MSE of the 24-month-
ahead forecasts. As shown in Figure 3.1, the predictive ability of GDP 
forecasts for some countries (e.g., France, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
Japan, and the United States) does not improve over the 24-month-
ahead forecasts when the horizon is relatively long, but for some other 
countries (e.g., Germany, Ireland, and Spain), each additional month 
increases the information content of the forecasts over the previous 
month, even in longer-run forecasts. For most of the countries, we see 
that MSE substantially decreases in the short-run forecasts, causing ph,24 
to be close to 100 percent when the forecast horizon is one month. Two 
exceptions are the Norwegian and Irish GDP growth forecasts, where 
the fi nal values of ph,24 are less than 80 percent. 
EXPLORING THE DATA-GENERATING PROCESSES
We fi nd that, historically, real GDP has been a diffi cult variable to 
predict beyond 24 months at the maximum. One might think that this 
can be attributed to the variability of the underlying series. However, it 
is not the variability but rather the predictability of the target variable 
that is one of the important factors in the analysis. This is the focus of 
this section.
Following Galbraith (2003) and Galbraith and Tkacz (2007), we 
calculate the forecast content and content horizons for the quarterly 
GDP growth rate for all seven countries in our sample over the period 
1990–2007. The forecast content is defi ned as the proportionate gain 
in the MSE from the best-fi tting autoregressive model over the uncon-
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ditional mean of the series as the benchmark. The forecast content 
horizon is defi ned as the horizon beyond which the forecast content is 
close to zero. Galbraith (2003) has characterized the content function of 
AR(p) models analytically, taking into account the uncertainty associ-
ated with parameter estimation. We allow p to be no greater than 4 for 
quarterly GDP data. The value of p is chosen by the Schwarz informa-
tion criterion, using an upper bound. The benchmark values were the 
unconditional means of the individual series during 1990–2007. All the 
data used in this section are downloaded from Datastream, a fi nancial 
statistical database from Thomson Reuters.
The results of the estimation of forecast content functions for seven 
industrialized countries are presented in Figure 3.2. For annual GDP 
growth using quarterly data, the forecast content becomes less than 0.05 
when the horizon exceeds six quarters. These fi ndings are consistent 
Figure 3.2  Real GDP Predictability Based on AR(p) Models 
 (quarterly horizons)
SOURCE: Author’s analysis of SPF data.
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with the results reported in Galbraith (2003), who has looked at the 
predictability of GDP and infl ation for Canada and the United States. 
We should point out that our forecast content functions are based 
purely on linear autoregressive models of the target variables. In real-
ity, forecast content and predictability can be and possibly are improved 
upon by incorporating additional information and using more compli-
cated models.2 In addition, the forecast content functions are typically 
estimated using currently available revised data. For variables like real 
GDP that go through a substantial amount of data revision, their predict-
ability in real time can be quite different. Since the variance of the early 
revisions of a variable is necessarily less than that of the revised series, 
the predictability of a series may seem to be less attractive than what 
one may get using real-time data. In that sense, the forecast content 
from the simple AR model provides an overall lower bound on the true 
predictability of a series. For real GDP, Croushore (2006) reports mixed 
evidence as to the effect of data revisions on predictability, depending 
on the sample period. Since data revisions are relatively small for infl a-
tion, they have very little effect on predictability. In our analysis, the 
relative ranking of different countries in terms of RMSE does not match 
the relative ranking of those countries in terms of forecast content hori-
zons that one obtains from Galbraith’s method for the variable. The 
ranking can also depend on the specifi c benchmark used in the analysis. 
Thus it is necessary to study the predictability of real GDP by profes-
sional forecasters in real time with respect to a more natural benchmark. 
EVALUATING PROBABILITY FORECASTS FOR REAL 
GDP DECLINES 
In this section I report on the value of the subjective probability 
forecasts that are obtained from the SPF as predictors of GDP down-
turns. Even though these forecasts have been available since 1968 and 
have drawn media attention, very little systematic analysis has been 
conducted to look into their usefulness as possible business cycle 
indicators.3 
One purpose of this section is to illustrate that an evaluation of 
recorded probability forecasts by professional economists can suggest 
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reasons for forecasting failures and can help defi ne limits to the current 
capability of macroeconomic forecasts. The traditional and the most 
popular way of evaluating probability forecasts is the MSE type of mea-
sure, such as Brier’s quadratic probability score (QPS), which evaluates 
the external correspondence between the probability forecasts and the 
realization of the event. This approach, however, can fail to identify the 
ability of a forecasting system to evaluate the odds of the occurrence of 
an event against its nonoccurrence, which is a very important character-
istic to the users of forecasts. A high performance score can be achieved 
by totally unskilled forecasts having little information value. Thus, the 
traditional approach can be inadequate in evaluating the usefulness of 
probability forecasts, particularly for rare events.4
The SPF has been collecting subjective probability forecasts of 
real GDP/GNP declines during the current and four subsequent quar-
ters since its inception in 1968.5 At the end of the fi rst month of each 
quarter, the individual forecasters in the SPF form their forecasts. The 
survey collects probability assessments for a decline in real GDP in the 
current quarter and in each of the next four quarters, conditional on the 
growth in the current period. The number of respondents has varied 
between 15 and 60 over the quarters. Since our aim in this study is to 
evaluate the SPF probability forecasts at the macro level, we use fore-
casts averaged over individuals. Using the July revisions, during our 
sample period from the fourth quarter of 1968 to the second quarter of 
2004, there were 20 quarters of negative GDP growth spread out over 
six periods, variously beginning in 1969:4, 1973:4, 1980:1, 1981:3, 
1990:3, and 2001:1. These made up six separate episodes of real GDP 
declines. Thus, only about 14 percent of quarters in the entire sample of 
143 quarters exhibited negative GDP growth. The annualized real-time 
real GDP growth issued every July is used as the forecasting target, 
against which the forecasting performance of the SPF forecasts will be 
evaluated.
As noted above, the traditional way of evaluating probability fore-
casts for the occurrence of a binary event is to assess the calibration of 
the forecasts against realizations—that is, to assess the external corre-
spondence between the probability forecasts and the actual occurrence 
of the event. A measure-oriented approach simply compares the fore-
cast probabilities with the realization of a binary event, which is rep-
resented by a dummy variable taking value 1 or 0, depending upon the 
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occurrence of the event. The most commonly used measure is Brier’s 
QPS, a probability analog of mean squared error. Thus,
(3.2) 2
1
)(/1 t
T
t
t xfTQPS  

 ,
where tf  is the forecast probability made at time t, xt is the realization of 
the event (1 if the event occurs and 0 otherwise) at time t, and T is the 
total number of the observations—or forecasting quarters in our case. 
The QPS ranges from 0 to 1, with a score of 0 corresponding to 
perfect accuracy, and is a function only of the difference between the 
assessed probabilities and realizations. The calculated quadratic prob-
ability scores for each forecasting horizon from the current quarter (Q0) 
to the next four quarters (Q1, Q2, Q3, and Q4) are calculated to be 
0.077, 0.098, 0.103, 0.124, and 0.127, respectively. Thus, even though 
these scores deteriorate as the forecast horizon increases, all seem to 
suggest good calibration and are close to zero. 
RECEIVER (OR RELATIVE) OPERATING 
CHARACTERISTIC (ROC) 
In evaluating rare event probabilities, it is crucial to minimize the 
impact of the predominant outcome on the outcome score. More spe-
cifi cally, the impact of correctly identifying the frequent event, which 
is the primary source of the hedging, should be minimized. So a better 
approach to forecast performance should concentrate on the hit rate and 
false alarm rate of the infrequent event, instead of the “percentage cor-
rectly predicted” that is the very basis of QPS (Doswell, Davies-Jones, 
and Keller 1990; Murphy 1991).
A simple and often-used measure of forecast skill, the Kuipers score, 
or KS—sometimes referred to as the Pierce skill score—is obtained by 
taking the difference between the hit rate (H) and the false alarm rate 
(F), where H is the proportion of the number of times an event was 
forecast to the number of times it occurred, and F is the proportion of 
the number of times the event was forecast to the number of times it did 
not occur. Given a decision threshold w, the contingency table for suc-
cesses and failures for the event can be written as in Table 3.2. Then the 
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KS can be calculated as  H − F = (ad − bc) / ([a + c] [b + d]). Assuming 
independence of the hit and false alarm rates, the asymptotic standard 
error of the KS is given by
        .[ (1 ) / ( )] [ (1 ) / ( )]H H a c F F b d    
(See Agresti [1996].) Alternatively, based on the market-timing test of 
Pesaran and Timmermann (1992), Granger and Pesaran (2000a,b) have 
suggested an alternative test for the signifi cance of the Kuipers test,
_ _
/ (1 ) / (1 )x xPT T KS P P x x? ? ? , where _ _(1 )xP x H x F? ? ? .
 
Stephenson (2000) notes that if one of the two elements in a column of 
the contingency table (e.g., d) is very large, then the Kuipers skill score 
effectively disregards the other element (e.g., b) almost completely. 
This can be a limitation of the KS in evaluating rare event forecasts. 
Instead, the forecast skill can better be judged by comparing the 
odds of making a good forecast (a hit) to the odds of making a bad 
forecast (a false alarm)—i.e., by using the odds ratio θ = [H/(1 − H)]/
[F/(1 − F)], which is simply equal to the cross-product ratio (ad)/(bc) 
obtainable from the contingency table. The odds ratio is unity when 
the forecasts and the realizations are independent or KS = 0, and can 
be easily tested for signifi cance by considering the log odds, which are 
approximately normal with a standard error, given by
dcba /1/1/1/1  . 
Table 3.2  Schematic Contingency Table 
Event
occurred
Event
did not occurEvent forecast Total
Yes a (hit) b (false alarm) a + b 
No c (miss) d (correct 
rejection) 
c + d 
Total a + c b + d a + b + c + d = T
NOTE: T = total number of observations.
SOURCE: Author’s own research.
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Note that each cell count should be at least 5 for the validity of the 
approximation. KS and θ are reported in Table 3.3 for relevant values of 
the decision threshold w. 
One important but often overlooked issue in the evaluation of prob-
ability forecasts is the role of the selected threshold. The performance 
of a probability forecast in terms of discrimination ability is actually 
the result of the combination of the intrinsic discrimination ability of 
a forecasting system and the selection of the threshold. In this regard, 
the receiver (or relative) operating characteristic (ROC) is a convenient 
descriptive approach, but unfortunately has drawn little attention in 
econometrics.6 
The decision to issue a forecast for occurrence or nonoccurrence of 
an event is typically made based on a predetermined threshold (say, w) 
on the weight of evidence scale W. The occurrence forecast is announced 
if W > w; the nonoccurrence is announced otherwise. ROC can be rep-
resented by a graph of the hit rate against the false alarm rate as w var-
ies, with the false alarm rate plotted as the x axis and the hit rate as the 
y axis. The location of the entire curve in the unit square is determined 
by the intrinsic discrimination capacity of the forecasts, and the location 
of specifi c points on a curve is determined by the decision threshold 
w that is selected by the user. As the decision threshold w varies from 
low to high, or the ROC curve moves from right to left, H and F vary 
together to trace out the ROC curve. Low thresholds lead to both high 
H and high F, found toward the upper-right-hand corner. Conversely, 
high thresholds make the ROC points move toward the lower-left-hand 
corner along the curve. Thus, a perfect discrimination is represented 
by an ROC that rises from (0,0) along the y axis to (0,1), then straight 
right to (1,1). The diagonal H = F represents zero skill, indicating that 
the forecasts are completely nondiscriminatory. ROC points below the 
diagonal represent the same level of skill as they would if they were 
located above the diagonal and are merely mislabeled—i.e., a forecast 
of nonoccurrence should be taken as occurrence.
Figures 3.3A–3.3E display the ROC curves, together with their 95 
percent confi dence intervals for the current quarter and the next four 
quarters. The confi dence interval was calculated using the formula
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for each w, where za / 2 = z0.025 = 1.96 for a standard normal variate. It can 
be seen that the ROC for the current quarter (Q0) is located maximally 
away from the diagonal towards the left upper corner, demonstrating 
the highest discrimination ability of the SPF forecasts, followed by the 
one-quarter-ahead forecasts. For longer-term forecasts, ROCs become 
rapidly fl atter as the forecasting horizon increases. For the four-quarter-
ahead (Q4) forecasts, the ROC mildly snakes around the diagonal line, 
and the associated confi dence band suggests that practically none of the 
values are statistically different from the values on the diagonal line. 
This means that the Q4 forecasts have no skill or discrimination ability 
for any value of the threshold. In situations where the analyst may have 
only a vague idea about the relative costs of type I and type II errors 
(e.g., in the problem of predicting the turning point in a business cycle), 
he or she can pick a comfortable hit rate (or false alarm rate) of choice, 
and the underlying ROC curve will give the corresponding false alarm 
rate (or hit rate). This will also give an optimal threshold for making 
decisions. When the relative costs of the two types of errors are known 
exactly, the decision-theoretic framework developed by Zellner, Hong, 
and Min (1991) and Granger and Pesaran (2000a,b) can be used to issue 
recession signals. However, before using the probability forecasts in 
decision making, the signifi cance of their skillfulness should fi rst be 
established. 
The hit rates and false alarm rates for selected threshold values in 
the range 0.50–0.05 are reported in Table 3.3, where one can fi nd the 
mix of hit and false alarm rates that is expected to be associated with 
each horizon-specifi c forecast.7 For example, for achieving a hit rate of 
90 percent with Q0 forecasts, one should use 0.25 as the threshold, and 
the corresponding false alarm rate is expected to be 0.16. Table 3.3 also 
shows that at this threshold value, even though the false alarm rates are 
roughly around 0.15 for forecasts of all horizons, the hit rate steadily 
declines, from 90 percent for Q0 to only 21 percent for Q4. This clearly 
documents the rapid speed of deterioration in forecast capability as the 
forecast horizon increases. Though not reported in Table 3.3, for the 
same hit rate of 90 percent, the false alarm rates for Q1–Q4 forecasts 
are 0.189 (w = 0.237), 0.636 (w = 0.13), 0.808 (w = 0.115), and 0.914 
(w = 0.10), respectively. Thus, for the same hit rate, the corresponding 
false alarm rates for Q3–Q4 forecasts are so large (80 percent and 91 
percent, respectively) that they can be considered useless for all practi-
cal purposes, and thus may have very little value in decision making. 
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Panel C: ROC for Q2 ± 95 Percent Band
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Figure 3.3  (continued)
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In Table 3.3 we have also reported the Kuipers scores (KS) and the 
odds ratios (θ) for selected w. The rapid decline in these values as the 
forecast horizon increases is remarkable, and for Q4 forecasts these val-
ues are close to zero and unity, respectively, suggesting no skill. Using 
the critical value 1.645 for a one-sided normal test at the 5 percent level, 
the KS and θ values were found to be statistically signifi cant for Q0–Q2 
and insignifi cant for Q4 forecasts.8 For Q3 forecasts, there is some con-
fl icting evidence, depending on the tests we use. Based on the standard 
error formula 
       [ (1 ) / ( )] [ (1 ) / ( )]H H a c F F b d    
for KS reported in Agresti (1996), KS values for Q3 were insignifi -
cant at the 5 percent level for all allowable values of w. However, the 
Pesaran-Timmermann (PT) test and the test based on the log odds ratio 
Panel E: ROC for Q4 ± 95 Percent Band
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NOTE: ROC = receiver (or relative) operating characteristic.
SOURCE: Author’s analysis of SPF data.      
Figure 3.3  (continued)
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for Q3 were statistically signifi cant only for w = 0.25, even at the 1 
percent level. Notwithstanding this result, the weight of our previous 
evidence suggests that Q3 forecasts have very little skill. We should, 
however, emphasize that statistical signifi cance or insignifi cance does 
not mean the forecasts have utility or value in a particular decision-
theoretic context.9 
I fi nd overwhelming evidence that Q0–Q2 forecasts have good 
operating characteristics. Given the relative costs of two types of clas-
sifi cation errors, the end user can choose an appropriate threshold w 
to minimize the total expected cost of misclassifi cation. This type of 
optimal decision rule cannot be obtained by only studying QPS. More 
importantly, for forecasting relatively rare events like recessions, ROC 
and odds ratios are useful for making sure that the probability forecasts 
have operational value. This is because, in this approach, the success 
rate in predicting the predominant event is not part of the goodness of 
fi t measure. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this chapter I fi rst report the characteristics of fi xed-target monthly 
GDP growth forecasts for 18 developed countries during the period 
1989–2004. I show how forecasting performance improves as the fore-
cast horizon decreases, and at what horizons forecasts start to become 
informative. Since there are many forecasting organizations around the 
world that provide forecasts for many macroeconomic variables, with 
horizons of up to 12 quarters or more, it is interesting to explore the 
value of these forecasts and thereby try to understand the limits to how 
far ahead today’s professional forecasters can reasonably predict these 
variables. Since the panel of forecasters in Consensus Economics Inc. 
are all private-market professionals, the limits to forecasting that these 
professionals exhibit can safely be taken as indicative of the current 
state of economic forecasting. I fi nd wide diversity in the quality of 
the forecasts across countries, and in the horizons at which forecasts 
start becoming useful—possibly refl ecting the forecast diffi culty of the 
underlying series.
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44  Table 3.3  Measures of Forecast Skill: Quarter 0 to Quarter 4
Q0  Q1 Q2  Q3 Q4
w H F 
Kuipers
score
Odds
ratio H F
Kuipers
score
Odds
ratio H F 
Kuipers
score
Odds
ratio H F 
Kuipers
score
Odds
ratio H F
Kuipers
score
Odds
ratio
0.50 0.55 0.07 0.48 17.57 0.25 0.05 0.20 6.44 0.05 0.03 0.02 1.54 0.00 0.00 0.00 — 0.00 0.00 0.00 —
0.45 0.60 0.07 0.53 19.00 0.30 0.07 0.23 5.38 0.10 0.05 0.05 2.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 — 0.00 0.00 0.00 —
0.40 0.60 0.08 0.52 16.95 0.40 0.08 0.32 7.47 0.10 0.07 0.03 1.57 0.00 0.00 0.00 — 0.00 0.00 0.00 —
0.35 0.70 0.10 0.60 21.58 0.50 0.10 0.40 9.17 0.15 0.07 0.08 2.20 0.00 0.03 −0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 —
0.30 0.85 0.11 0.74 44.12 0.75 0.14 0.61 18.53 0.35 0.11 0.24 4.47 0.10 0.08 0.03 1.37 0.00 0.05 −0.05 0.00
0.25 0.90 0.16 0.74 46.35 0.80 0.18 0.62 18.18 0.50 0.15 0.35 5.72 0.25 0.12 0.13 2.52 0.21 0.16 0.06 1.45
0.20 0.95 0.20 0.75 74.48 0.95 0.25 0.70 58.27 0.70 0.26 0.44 6.77 0.45 0.36 0.09 1.47 0.32 0.43 −0.12 0.61
0.15 1.00 0.23 0.77 — 0.95 0.37 0.58 32.51 0.85 0.53 0.32 5.05 0.80 0.66 0.14 2.08 0.74 0.66 0.07 1.42
0.10 1.00 0.40 0.60 — 1.00 0.66 0.34 — 1.00 0.81 0.19 — 1.00 0.86 0.14 — 0.89 0.93 −0.04 0.63
0.05 1.00 0.68 0.32 — 1.00 0.94 0.06 — 1.00 0.99 0.01 — 1.00 1.00 0.00 — 1.00 1.00 0.00 —
NOTE: w = decision threshold; H = hit rate; F = false alarm rate; — = not defi ned. 
SOURCE: Author’s own research.
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I use Theil’s U-statistic with the lagged GDP growth as the bench-
mark, as well as another measure of predictability recently suggested 
by Diebold and Kilian (2001) with the two-year-ahead forecast as the 
benchmark. In terms of Theil’s U, for only 7 of the 18 countries (Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Norway, and the United States) 
did the initial 24-month-ahead forecasts beat the naive forecast. In terms 
of the worst performance, the Irish, Portuguese, Swiss, and Dutch fore-
casts beat the naive forecast at horizons as late as 10–13 months. 
In terms of the Diebold-Kilian skill measure, I fi nd that for the major-
ity of the countries, the long-term forecasts for up to 18 months are as 
good as the initial 24-month-ahead forecasts. That is, over these longer 
horizons, forecasters do not receive dependable information with which 
to adjust their forecasts systematically. I also observe a similar pattern 
when I look at the horizons at which the survey forecasts beat the naive 
no-change forecast. These fi ndings imply that the survey forecasts do 
not have much value when the horizon goes beyond 18 months or so. 
I then go on to evaluate the subjective probability forecasts for 
real GDP declines during the period 1968–2004, using methodologies 
developed in psychology and meteorology. The SPF records probability 
forecasts for real GDP declines during the current and next four quar-
ters. I fi nd overwhelming evidence that the shorter-run forecasts (Q0–
Q2) possess signifi cant skill. In contrast, Q3 and Q4 forecasts exhibit 
poor performance, as measured by ROC measures. It is clear from my 
analysis that our professional forecasters do not have adequate infor-
mation to forecast GDP declines meaningfully at horizons beyond two 
quarters; they lack relevant discriminatory cues. Since the SPF panel is 
composed of professional economists and business analysts who fore-
cast on the basis of models and informed heuristics, their failure in the 
long-term forecasts may indicate that, at the present time, forecasting 
real GDP growth beyond two quarters may not be possible with rea-
sonable type I and type II errors. Since survey probabilities embody 
important additional information over point forecasts, an analysis of the 
probability forecasts provides us with a unique opportunity to under-
stand the reasons for forecast failures. Our analysis of probability fore-
casts suggests that it is more challenging to predict a GDP decline or a 
recession than quantitative growth rate. This is because in predicting a 
relatively uncommon event like real GDP decline, the time series prop-
erty and the persistence of the series are less useful than forecasting the 
quantitative GDP growth rate. 
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I have emphasized that for forecasting rare events like recessions, 
it is important to examine the ROC curves, where the relative odds for 
the event can be studied in depth. The analysis also helps fi nd an opti-
mum probability threshold for transforming the probability forecasts to 
a binary decision rule. In many instances the selection of the threshold 
is quite arbitrary. In this regard, ROC analysis provides a simple but an 
objective criterion, incorporating the end user’s loss function for missed 
signals and false alarms. The ROC analysis in our case reveals that for a 
preassigned hit rate of, say, 90 percent, the associated false alarm rates 
for the Q3–Q4 forecasts are so high that they may be considered useless 
for all practical purposes. 
One wonders if the professional forecasters can be trained to do 
better. In the current situation, forecasting improvement may not be 
possible for various reasons. In most psychological and Bayesian learn-
ing experiments, the outcomes are readily available and are known with 
certainty; thus, prompt feedback for the purpose of improvement is pos-
sible. In contrast, the GDP fi gures are announced with considerable lag 
time, and are then revised repeatedly. Also, as I have mentioned before, 
correct and dependable cues for predicting recessions a few quarters 
ahead may not be available to economists. The excess variability of 
forecasts and the observed lack of discriminating ability may just be 
a refl ection of that hard reality. It may be the same reason that model-
based forecasts over business-cycle frequencies have not succeeded in 
the past. 
Finally, I should point out that the relative inferiority of real GDP 
forecasts can also be determined by the demand side of the forecasting 
market—i.e., the professional forecasters may devote more efforts to 
generating better forecasts if their clients demand that. It is interesting 
that as part of the Fed’s major changes in its communication strategies, 
which took effect in September 2007, the horizon of the projections for 
GDP growth and infl ation by all FOMC members has been extended 
from two years to three.10 As I report earlier in this chapter, currently the 
real GDP growth forecasts do not seem to have any value beyond the 
18-month horizon. If the demand side of the forecasting market has any 
effect on forecast quality, we may expect that, as a result of this change 
in FOMC policy, the content horizon for these forecasts will lengthen 
in the future. 
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Notes
 1. See Isiklar and Lahiri (2007) and Isiklar, Lahiri, and Loungani (2006) for further 
details on the data. 
 2.  Galbraith and Tkacz (2007) have, however, found that forecast horizons do not 
improve even when dynamic factor models with many predictors are used in place 
of simple univariate autoregressive models.
 3.  Notable exceptions include Braun and Yaniv (1992), Graham (1996), Lahiri and 
Wang (2006), and Stock and Watson (2003). However, these studies emphasized 
different aspects of the data. More recently, Clements (2009) has studied the rela-
tionship between intrapersonal uncertainty and interpersonal disagreement in 
these forecasts. Details of this data set are described in Lahiri and Wang (2008). 
 4.  See Doswell, Davies-Jones, and Keller (1990), Lahiri and Wang (2006), Murphy 
(1991), and Stephenson (2000) for more discussion on this issue. 
 5.  See Croushore (1993) for an introduction to the SPF. 
 6.  This approach has a long history in medical imaging, and has also been used 
in evaluating loan default and rating forecasts (Hanley and McNeil 1982; Stein 
2005). See Jolliffe and Stephenson (2003), Stephenson (2000), and Swets and 
Pickett (1982) for additional analysis of the use of ROC. 
 7.  In order to save space, we did not report in Table 3.3 the values of w greater than 
0.5. Moreover, these values were less relevant in our context.
 8.  Note that the cell counts were in excess of 5 only in cases of w values (0.50–0.35) 
for Q0, (0.45–0.35) for Q1, (0.30–0.20) for Q2, (0.25–0.20) for Q3, and (0.20–
0.15) for Q4. The signifi cance tests were conducted only for these cases. 
 9. Granger and Pesaran (2000a) show how, under certain simplifying assumptions, 
the Kuipers score can be used as an indicator of economic value. 
 10.  See Bernanke (2007). 
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Forecasting Regional and
Industry-Level Variables
Challenges and Strategies
David E. Rapach
Saint Louis University 
Forecasting regional and industry-level (RIL) variables is an im-
portant task for a wide variety of economic agents. Policymakers at all 
levels of government utilize such forecasts, including local and state 
governments when planning budgets and the Federal Reserve when 
formulating U.S. monetary policy (e.g., the Beige Book). Businesses 
in the private sector also rely on such forecasts as inputs when taking 
employment, production, and investment decisions. The recent “Great 
Recession” highlights the relevance of forecasting RIL variables for 
policymakers and businesses: revenue reductions make accurate fore-
casts imperative for planning purposes and the effi cient allocation of 
now-more-limited resources.
Forecasting almost any economic variable is, of course, extremely 
challenging. Nevertheless, forecasting RIL variables exacerbates typi-
cal forecasting diffi culties. In particular, there are usually a plethora 
of potential predictors—global, national, regional, and industry vari-
ables—that are relevant for forecasting RIL variables. While theoretical 
models help to identify key determinants of a given RIL variable, such 
models are usually highly stylized and thus do not necessarily provide 
the most appropriate forecasting specifi cations, especially given the 
various idiosyncrasies surrounding individual RIL variables. A fore-
caster thus faces substantial model uncertainty. While the forecaster 
could include all potential predictors in a single forecasting model, 
such highly parameterized models usually fare very poorly in terms of 
out-of-sample forecasting, due in no small part to model uncertainty.1 
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Alternatively, the forecaster could preselect a relatively small number 
of predictors, but this ignores the potentially useful information avail-
able in the excluded variables. In this chapter, I outline some tractable 
approaches for incorporating information from a large number of po-
tential predictors that avoid overly parameterized specifi cations. Recent 
research indicates that such approaches are quite benefi cial for improv-
ing forecasts of RIL variables.
In addition to model uncertainty, model instability is a serious con-
cern for forecasting RIL variables. Changes in institutions, public policy, 
and technology, among many other factors, can precipitate structural 
breaks that cause the predictive power of individual variables to vary 
signifi cantly over time. Moreover, it is extremely diffi cult to predict the 
occurrence of structural breaks. Similar to model uncertainty, model 
instability causes highly parameterized models to break down in out-of-
sample forecasting, so that a forecaster of RIL variables needs tractable 
approaches that are reasonably robust to structural breaks. Fortunately, 
approaches useful for dealing with model uncertainty also appear help-
ful for mitigating structural instability when forecasting RIL variables.
I outline three approaches—1) general-to-specifi c modeling with 
bagging (GETS-bagging), 2) forecast combination, and 3) factor mod-
els—for improving forecasts of RIL variables. GETS-bagging and 
forecast combination are methods for utilizing, in a tractable manner, 
information from a large set of potential predictors that are reasonably 
robust to model uncertainty and instability. Factor models focus on 
potentially strong relationships between RIL and national variables. I 
provide intuition and guidance on implementing these approaches. In 
addition, I discuss empirical results from recent research on forecasting 
RIL variables, highlighting examples pertaining to forecasting employ-
ment growth for Michigan and Missouri.
It is important to stress that the present chapter is relatively brief and 
is not meant as an exhaustive literature survey. Instead, it is intended 
to introduce the reader to strategies for improving forecasts of RIL vari-
ables from the recent literature—strategies designed to address the keen 
challenges posed by model uncertainty and instability.2
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FORECASTING STRATEGIES
This section outlines forecasting approaches aimed at improving 
forecasts of RIL variables. I begin with a general (“kitchen sink”) model 
that serves to illustrate some of the pitfalls that the GETS-bagging, 
combination, and factor model approaches are designed to avoid.
Kitchen-Sink Model
Consider the following general model specifi cation:
(4.1)
 
, , , , ,
1
N
h h
k t h k k k t k i i t k t h
i
y a b y c x e 

     
 
, 
where t denotes the time period, , ,1(1/ )
hh
k t h k t jj
y h y    ,
, , , 1k t k t k ty y y    , ,k ty  is in log-levels, and ,hk t he   is a zero-mean distur-
bance term. The left-hand side of Equation (4.1) is a cumulative growth 
rate for the variable of interest that we wish to forecast.3 The k subscript 
indicates that ,k ty  is an RIL variable, where k indexes the region or in-
dustry. The ,i tx  variables (i = 1, . . . , N) on the right-hand side of Equation 
(4.1) represent N potential predictors of ,
h
k t hy  , where N can be large. 
For expositional and notational simplicity, the right-hand side of Equa-
tion (4.1) includes only a single lag of ,k ty  and each ,i tx  variable; it is 
straightforward to allow for additional lags and thus a more general 
dynamic structure.
Consider forming a forecast of , * 1
h
k ty   using information available 
through *t  based on the general model given by Equation (4.1):
(4.2) , * , * , * , * , , * , *
1
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ
N
h
k t h k t k t k t k i t i t
i
y a b y c x

      , 
where , *ˆk ta , , *kˆ tb , and ĉk,i,t* (i = 1, . . . , N) are ordinary least square (OLS) 
estimates of the corresponding parameters in Equation (4.1) based on 
data from the beginning of the sample through t*. When N is large, 
a serious drawback to this approach is that it can entail substantial 
in-sample overfi tting, which translates into very poor out-of-sample 
forecasting performance. Intuitively, a highly parameterized model—a 
model with many ,i tx  variables—can deliver a substantial 
2R  statistic for 
Higgins.indb   53 11/3/2011   10:22:34 AM
54   Rapach
the in-sample period, but because of model uncertainty and structural 
instability, the good fi t is specifi c to the sample and not robust.
Goyal and Welch (2008) and Rapach, Strauss, and Zhou (2010) 
provide recent examples of the poor forecasting performance of kitchen-
sink models in the context of forecasting U.S. stock returns. Many po-
tential predictors of aggregate market returns have been proposed in the 
fi nance literature, and different theoretical models emphasize different 
predictors. Goyal and Welch, as well as and Rapach, Strauss, and Zhou, 
fi nd that general models with a large number of potential predictors 
from the literature substantially underperform when measured against 
the simple random-walk model with respect to U.S. stock returns. This 
type of result is common in the literature, so one can conclude that very 
simple models are almost always better than very general models for 
forecasting purposes. When forecasting RIL variables, one should thus 
avoid kitchen-sink models.4
GETS-Bagging
Pretesting provides a method for paring down Equation (4.1) into 
a more parsimonious model that includes only the important predic-
tors of ,
h
k t hy  . This is often referred to as general-to-specifi c (GETS) 
modeling. Consider again the problem of forming a forecast of , *
h
k t hy   
using information available through t*. Instead of including all N of the 
,i tx  variables in the forecasting model, as in Equation (4.2), we fi rst esti-
mate Equation (4.1) and compute the t-statistic associated with each ,i tx
. We then drop any variable from the forecasting model with a t-statistic 
whose absolute value is below a certain threshold, for example, 1.96 or 
1.645. The forecasting model thus becomes a reduced version of Equa-
tion (4.2) that contains only the signifi cant predictors. In this way, we 
attempt to identify a more parsimonious forecasting model that only 
includes what we deem to be important determinants of ,
h
k t hy  .
While pretesting reduces the dimension of the forecasting model, 
the selection of the predictors to include in the forecasting model can be 
sample-specifi c, thereby representing in-sample overfi tting in another 
guise. Breiman (1996) introduces the idea of bootstrap aggregating 
(bagging) as a procedure for stabilizing the pretesting decision rule. In 
essence, we harness the power of the computer to generate a large num-
ber of pseudo samples of observations for ,
h
k t hy   and ,i tx  (i = 1, . . . , N) 
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using bootstrapping techniques. For each pseudo sample, we apply 
the decision rule and select the predictors to include in the forecasting 
model, forming a forecast based on the selected predictors under the 
pseudo sample. The GETS-bagging forecast is then a simple average of 
the forecasts corresponding to each of the pseudo samples. Intuitively, 
the pseudo samples provide new learning sets for the decision rule, 
thereby reducing the instability of the decision rule and its dependence 
on a specifi c sample and improving forecasting performance.5
Inoue and Kilian (2008) were the fi rst to employ GETS-bagging 
in a macroeconomic forecasting context (the U.S. infl ation rate). They 
fi nd that GETS-bagging produces signifi cant forecasting gains rela-
tive to a simple autoregressive (AR) time-series model and a general 
model similar to Equation (4.1), as well as relative to pretesting with-
out bagging. More to the theme of this chapter, Rapach and Strauss 
(forthcoming) fi nd that GETS-bagging produces consistent and signifi -
cant out-of-sample gains for forecasting U.S. state-level employment 
growth. Results for forecasting Michigan and Missouri employment 
growth are discussed in more detail in the next section.
Forecast Combination
Instead of beginning with a general model, forecast combination 
takes a weighted average of forecasts generated by a large number 
of individual models. In the context of macroeconomic forecasting, 
Stock and Watson (1999, 2003, 2004) have popularized a combination 
approach that pools information from N individual autoregressive dis-
tributed lag (ARDL) models:
(4.3) , , , , ,    ( 1, , )
h h
k t h k k k t k i i t k t hy a b y c x e i N         . 
Analogous to Equation (4.2), we can form a forecast of , *
h
k t hy   at t* for 
each ARDL based on estimates of the parameters in Equation (4.3) de-
rived from data available through t*.6 A combination forecast of , *
h
k t hy   
is then given by
 
, ,
, * , * , *
1
ˆ ˆ
N
h C h i
k t h i t k t h
i
y y 

   , (4.4)
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where ,, *ˆ
h i
k t hy   (i = 1, . . . , N) is the forecast of , *hk t hy   based on the 
individual ARDL model with ,i tx , , *i t  (i = 1, . . . , N) is the combin-
ing weight corresponding to ,, *ˆ
h i
k t hy  , and , *1 1
N
i ti
  . As stressed by 
Timmermann (2006), the intuition behind forecast combination is the 
same as that behind portfolio diversifi cation: we reduce forecasting 
“risk” by averaging across a large number of individual forecasts, rather 
than by relying on a single forecasting model.
To implement the combination forecast, we need to determine the 
combining weights. There are a myriad of methods available for doing 
this, which are nicely surveyed by Timmermann (2006). An interesting 
result from the literature is that relatively simple schemes typically out-
perform more elaborate schemes, even though more elaborate schemes 
are theoretically optimal under certain assumptions. The problem is that 
model uncertainty and instability frequently render these assumptions 
inaccurate, limiting the usefulness of theoretically optimal weights in 
practice.
A simple combining scheme that often works well in practice is 
equal weighting: , * 1/i t N   for all i. In the context of the general 
model, Equation (4.1), Rapach, Strauss, and Zhou (2010) show that 
equal weighting can be viewed as a type of “shrinkage” estimator. In-
tuitively, shrinkage limits the parameter space and prevents overfi tting, 
thereby improving out-of-sample forecasting performance. While equal 
weighting often produces very consistent forecasting gains, additional 
gains can be realized by “tilting” the combining weights toward partic-
ular individual forecasts. For example, we could select the combining 
weights based on the performance of the individual forecasting mod-
els over a reasonably long holdout out-of-sample test period. The key, 
however, is not to overdo it. That is, it is typically best to hew fairly 
closely to equal weighting; otherwise, we have another manifestation 
of overfi tting, and the forecasts become overly susceptible to model 
uncertainty and instability.7
Rapach and Strauss (forthcoming) fi nd that combination forecasts 
outperform AR benchmark forecasts of U.S. state-level employment 
growth for 49 of the 50 individual states for a fi rst-quarter 1990 to 
fourth-quarter 2010 forecast evaluation period, demonstrating the use-
fulness of the forecast combination approach for RIL variables. Specifi c 
results for Michigan and Missouri employment growth forecasts are 
presented on pp. 59–61.8 In another recent application, Rapach and 
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Strauss (2009) show that combination forecasts improve upon AR 
benchmark forecasts of real housing price growth for a number of inte-
rior states for the period from fi rst-quarter 1995 to fourth-quarter 2006. 
However, combination forecasts do not outperform the AR benchmark 
forecasts for a number of coastal states during this period, which could 
indicate that these coastal states experienced housing price bubbles.
Factor Models
Another potentially useful approach for forecasting RIL variables 
is factor modeling. If RIL variables have strong links to a national 
variable, factor models can exploit these links to generate improved 
forecasts. Consider the following simple factor model:
(4.5) , ,k t k k t k ty f       , 
where ƒt is an economy-wide or aggregate factor and ,k t   is a zero-mean 
disturbance that may be serially correlated. The coeffi cient on the factor 
( k ) is referred to as the factor “loading” or “exposure.” This coeffi -
cient captures the strength of the relationship between the RIL variable 
and the aggregate factor, with a larger k  indicating a stronger response 
of ,k ty  to fl uctuations in ƒt . Perhaps the best-known example of a fac-
tor model in economics and fi nance is the canonical capital asset pricing 
model, where ,k ty  is the excess return on a particular stock and ƒt  rep-
resents the excess return on the market portfolio. The return on a stock 
with large k  value, or “beta,” responds more strongly to changes in the 
market return and thus has greater systemic risk exposure in the context 
of the capital asset pricing model.9
While ƒt  can be treated as an unobserved latent variable to be 
estimated (using, e.g., principal component analysis), ƒt  frequently 
coincides with an observable aggregate variable. It is then straightfor-
ward to construct a forecast of an RIL variable based on Equation (4.5). 
Consider, for example, forecasting U.S. state-level employment growth 
using the following factor model specifi cation:
(4.6) ,, * , * , * , * , *ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆ
h f h h
k t h k t k t US t h k t hy y          , 
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where , *ˆ
h
US t hy   is a forecast of aggregate U.S. employment growth; , *ˆk t  
and  , *ˆk t  are OLS estimates of the intercept and slope coeffi cients, 
respectively, in a regression of state k employment growth on U.S. em-
ployment growth based on data through t*; and , *ˆ
h
k t h   is a forecast of the 
disturbance term in Equation (4.5) that takes into account the possible 
serial correlation in the disturbance term.10 The forecast given by Equa-
tion (4.6) requires a forecast of U.S. employment growth to plug into 
the right-hand side. A GETS-bagging or combination forecast of U.S. 
employment growth is a natural choice.
Building on Owyang, Rapach, and Wall (2009), Rapach and Strauss 
(forthcoming) forecast U.S. state-level employment growth using 
Equation (4.6). They show that factor model forecasts outperform AR 
benchmark model forecasts for the vast majority of states. The forecast-
ing gains are very sizable for a number of states (including Michigan 
and Missouri, as described in more detail in the next section). There are 
a few states, however, where the factor model performs much worse 
than the AR benchmark, so that factor model forecasts appear to of-
fer gains on a somewhat less consistent basis than GETS-bagging and 
combination forecasts. Rapach et al. (2011) provide another application 
in the context of forecasting stock returns for industry-sorted portfo-
lios. They fi nd that a conditional version of the popular Fama-French 
three-factor model (Fama and French 1993) delivers statistically and 
economically signifi cant out-of-sample gains for forecasting industry 
returns.
Estimation Window
The discussion thus far has assumed that the parameters of the 
forecasting model are estimated using data from the beginning of the 
available sample through the time of forecast formation. If we suspect 
the existence of substantial structural breaks, at fi rst blush it may seem 
appropriate to use an estimation window that excludes prebreak data. As 
shown by Pesaran and Timmermann (2007) and Clark and McCracken 
(2009), however, it can be optimal to include prebreak data according 
to a mean-squared-error criterion; this is a manifestation of the clas-
sical bias-effi ciency trade-off. Furthermore, Pesaran and Timmermann 
(2007) and Clark and McCracken (2009) show that the theoretically 
optimal estimation window is a complicated function of the timing and 
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magnitude of structural breaks. A forecaster will not know these things a 
priori, so they must be estimated from the data. Estimating the timing of 
breaks is notoriously diffi cult. Moreover, by estimating these additional 
parameters, we again run the risk of having an overly parameterized 
forecasting model that performs poorly out-of-sample. In practice, it is 
thus often advisable to employ an expanding window (as assumed in 
the discussion above). Another strategy is to combine forecasts across 
models estimated using a variety of window sizes, since this approach 
recognizes that an expanding window is not necessarily optimal but still 
avoids the overfi tting problem associated with trying to estimate the 
precise timing of structural breaks.
Amalgamating the Approaches
Finally, it is also worth considering amalgamating the GETS-
bagging, forecast combination, and factor model approaches. We can 
straightforwardly accomplish this by taking an average of the GETS-
bagging, combination, and factor model forecasts of an RIL variable. 
Indeed, Rapach and Strauss (forthcoming) fi nd that such an amalgam 
forecast performs very well with respect to state-level employment 
growth: it outperforms the AR benchmark forecast for nearly every 
state, does not produce the outliers of the factor model approach, and 
delivers larger gains than the three individual approaches for the clear 
majority of states. Results for Michigan and Missouri are discussed in 
the next section.
FORECASTING MICHIGAN AND MISSOURI
EMPLOYMENT GROWTH
This section reports more detailed results from Rapach and Strauss 
(forthcoming) on forecasting Michigan and Missouri state employ-
ment growth. The quarterly data composing the full sample span the 
fi rst quarter of 1976 to the fourth quarter of 2010. Employment data 
are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), and annualized em-
ployment growth is computed as 400 times the difference in the log 
levels of employment. As emphasized in this chapter, there are a host 
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of potential predictors of RIL variables. Rapach and Strauss consider 
11 potential predictors, which are given in Table 4.1. These predictors 
are representative of the types of national and regional determinants of 
state employment growth suggested by economic intuition and more 
formal models.11
Table 4.1 reports forecasting results for the fi rst-quarter 1990–
fourth-quarter 2010 forecast evaluation period and a forecast horizon of 
two quarters ( 2h   in the notation of the previous section). The “AR 
MSFE” row provides the mean squared forecast error (MSFE) for an 
AR benchmark model. This is a popular benchmark forecasting model 
that only relies on lagged values of the variable to be forecasted. While 
it is a seemingly naive time-series model, such simple time-series mod-
els are often diffi cult to beat in practice. The other rows in Table 4.1 
report the ratio of the MSFE for the forecasting model specifi ed in the 
row heading relative to the AR MSFE. A ratio below (above) unity thus 
indicates that the competing model outperforms (underperforms) the 
AR benchmark in terms of MSFE.
As seen in Table 4.1, the AR model produces an MSFE of 4.44 
percent (2.57 percent) for Michigan (Missouri). The next rows report 
MSFE ratios for 11 ARDL models, each based on an individual predic-
tor, as in Equation (4.3). Individual ARDL model results are reported to 
illustrate the diffi culties in identifying a priori the most relevant predic-
tors for a given RIL variable. While all 11 predictors appear plausible, 
they often vary signifi cantly in their forecasting ability. For example, the 
ARDL model based on real housing price growth generates an MSFE 
that is 13 percent higher than the AR benchmark for Michigan, so the 
AR benchmark provides substantially more accurate forecasts. Hous-
ing permit growth, in contrast, reduces MSFE by 6 percent relative to 
the AR benchmark. In general, as emphasized throughout this chapter, 
model uncertainty and instability make it extremely diffi cult to deter-
mine a priori the most relevant variables for forecasting RIL variables.12
The “GETS-bagging,” “Forecast combination,” and “Factor model”
 rows in Table 4.1 report results for the forecasting strategies outlined 
on pages 54–58.13 Finally, the “Amalgam” row reports results for an 
amalgam forecast that takes the form of a simple average of the GETS-
bagging, combination, and factor-model forecasts (page 59). Table 4.1 
shows that the suggested strategies produce MSFE ratios that are always 
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below unity, so they consistently deliver forecasting gains relative to 
the AR benchmark.
Among the GETS-bagging, combination, and factor model fore-
casts, the factor model forecast performs the best for both Michigan and 
Missouri. The factor model forecast reduces MSFE by 24 percent (35 
percent) relative to the AR benchmark for Michigan (Missouri).14 For 
both states, the amalgam forecast also performs well: the MSFE reduc-
tion for the amalgam forecast relative to the AR benchmark is a very 
sizable 22 percent (32 percent) for Michigan (Missouri).
Overall, the results in Table 4.1, together with other results from 
recent research, illustrate the usefulness of the strategies suggested in 
Table 4.1  Forecasting Results, State-Level Employment Growth, Two-
Quarter Horizon, First-Quarter 1990 to Fourth-Quarter 2010 
Evaluation Period
Forecasting model Michigan Missouri
AR MSFE 4.44 2.57
ARDL models
State unemployment rate, differences 1.02 1.01
State real income growth 1.15 1.02
State real housing price growth 1.13 1.02
State housing building permit growth 0.94 1.07
U.S. manufacturing hours, differences 0.99 1.01
U.S. unemployment claims, log levels 0.96 0.79
U.S. new consumer good order growth 0.93 0.83
U.S. building permit growth 0.86 0.93
U.S. real stock price growth 0.82 0.88
U.S. real oil price growth 1.09 1.13
Average adjacent state employment growth 1.08 1.02
Suggested strategies
GETS-bagging 0.91 0.80
Forecast combination 0.91 0.86
Factor model 0.76 0.65
Amalgam 0.78 0.68
NOTE: The AR (autoregressive) MSFE (mean squared forecast error) row reports the 
MSFE for the AR benchmark model. Other rows report the MSFE ratio for the fore-
casting model indicated in the row heading relative to the AR benchmark model.
SOURCE: Adapted from Rapach and Strauss (forthcoming).
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this chapter for forecasting RIL variables. Of course, it is important 
not to read too much into these results and overgeneralize them. Fore-
casters of RIL variables should thus employ thorough back-testing of 
these strategies for a given application.15 Nevertheless, the positive 
results in recent applications are very promising, so the suggested strat-
egies should form an integral part of a forecaster’s toolbox for dealing 
with the model uncertainty and instability inherent in forecasting RIL 
variables.
Notes
1. There also may simply be an inadequate number of time-series observations to 
feasibly estimate a model that includes a very large number of potential predictors.
2. For more extensive coverage of some of the topics covered in this chapter, see 
the volumes edited by Elliott, Granger, and Timmermann (2006) and Rapach and 
Wohar (2008), as well as the references at the end of this chapter.
3. The disturbance term will be serially correlated when h > 1. 
4. Indeed, as mentioned in note 1, OLS estimation of the kitchen-sink model may not 
even be feasible if the timespan is limited relative to the large number of potential 
variables that exist for RIL variables.
5. See Inoue and Kilian (2008) and Rapach and Strauss (forthcoming) for more de-
tailed expositions of the construction of bagging forecasts.
6. Again, we can include additional lags of the right-hand-side variables in Equation 
(4.3) to allow for a more general dynamic structure.
7. Hendry and Clements (2004) provide theoretical insight on how forecast combina-
tion can improve forecasting in the presence of structural breaks.
8. Also see Rapach and Strauss (2005), who investigate the performance of a large 
number of combining methods with respect to forecasting Missouri employment 
growth.
9. Under the capital asset pricing model, the intercept term should actually be zero in 
Equation (4.5), since it represents the abnormal, risk-adjusted return (or “alpha”), 
which will be zero in an effi cient market.
10. See Rapach and Strauss (forthcoming) for details on the construction of the dis-
turbance term forecast.
11. Rapach and Strauss (forthcoming) provide data sources for the predictors.
12. In addition, in unreported results, the kitchen-sink model performs very poorly 
for each state.
13. The combining weights in Equation (4.4) for the combination forecasts are se-
lected based on the performance of the individual models over a relatively long 
holdout out-of-sample period, as discussed on page 56.
14. With respect to the factor model forecast for Michigan, the average estimate of 
βk in Equation (4.5) used in the computation of the factor model forecasts is 1.45, 
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among the largest for individual U.S. states. Michigan employment thus has large 
“exposure” to national employment cycles, likely due in large part to the automo-
bile industry’s strong link to the national business cycle.
15.  Even if back-testing provides positive results, as it says in the fi ne print, past per-
formance is no guarantee of future success.
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Forecasting Asset Prices
Using Nonlinear Models
Michael D. Bradley
 George Washington University
Dennis W. Jansen
Texas A&M University
Over the past 25 years, a substantial body of research has produced 
evidence indicating the presence of nonlinearities in the behavior of 
both fi nancial and real variables. Nonlinearity can arise for a variety 
of reasons. First, frictions and transaction costs can exceed gains from 
arbitrage when market deviations are small. Thus, the dynamic reaction 
to disequilibria may be dependent upon the size of the price change 
required to restore equilibrium. In other words, transaction costs may 
be large enough to preclude a complete price response to a small shock 
but not to large shocks, making the size of the reaction state-dependent.
Another source of nonlinearity is asymmetric dynamics, in which a 
variable’s generating process following declines in its value may differ 
from the process following increases in its value. For example, the effects 
of positive shocks may be more persistent than the effects of negative 
shocks, which may be more rapidly offset. Similarly, herd behavior may 
cause market participants to overreact during periods of market stress, 
generating movements in asset prices that exceed normal dynamics. This 
is another reason a variable’s dynamics would be state-dependent.
Still another source of nonlinearity is a variable’s volatility. On 
one level, volatility may be a state variable, with a variable’s dynamics 
changing depending on the state of volatility. Alternatively, volatility 
itself may be state-dependent, changing because of changes in a state 
variable such as the state of the economy (expansion, recession) or the 
state of the fi nancial market (bear market, bull market). These exam-
ples show that nonlinearity can arise in the variance or in the mean of 
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the variable. Nonlinearity in the variance typically arises because the 
variance is time-varying, such as in a generalized autoregressive condi-
tional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model, whereas nonlinearity in the 
mean arises because the equation generating the evolution of the mean 
is nonlinear. 
There are a variety of approaches and specifi c classes of econo-
metric models that have been developed to capture nonlinearities in 
economic relationships. These include the threshold models (e.g., 
threshold autoregressive (TAR) models—see Chan and Tong [1986], 
Tong [1990], and Tsay [1989]); smoothed versions of threshold models 
(e.g., smooth threshold autoregressive (STAR ) models—see Granger 
and Teräsvirta [1993] and Teräsvirta [1994]); linear models with non-
linear appendages (e.g., the current depth of the recession (CDR) 
model—see Beaudry and Koop [1993]); the Markov switching model 
(see Hamilton [1989]); various artifi cial neural network models (see 
Cheng and Titterington [1994]); and various nonparametric models in 
general (see Li and Racine [2007]). These various models have all been 
employed in estimating nonlinear economic relationships, and most 
have seen some success as forecasting models. 
Many of these models have been applied to business cycles. Neftçi 
(1984) and Falk (1986) ask whether business cycle dynamics are asym-
metric. Teräsvirta and Anderson (1992) and Granger, Teräsvirta, and 
Anderson (1993) apply smooth transition models to capture business 
cycle nonlinearities including asymmetries. Van Dijk and Franses 
(1999) add multiple-regime smooth transition models. Beaudry and 
Koop (1993) take a different approach, which Potter (1995), Pesaran 
and Potter (1997), Jansen and Oh (1999), and Bradley and Jansen 
(1997, 2000) follow up on. However, few of these papers look in-depth 
at forecasting issues.
Even though nonlinear models have been successfully applied to 
model a wide variety of fi nancial and macroeconomic variables, the 
results from using those models to forecast has been mixed. Nonlinear 
models generally improve upon linear models in terms of in-sample 
forecasting, but they often show little improvement in terms of out-
of-sample forecasting. This somewhat disappointing performance has 
been ascribed to a number of causes. First, the nonlinearity may not 
occur in the forecast period. The forecasting advantage of a nonlinear 
model could arise from its ability to accurately capture the dynamics of 
a series during periods of time when it exhibits nonlinear behavior. If 
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the out-of-sample forecasting period does not include any such periods, 
there will be no forecasting advantage for the nonlinear model. 
This characteristic of nonlinear models to capture periods of time 
with “normal” dynamics as well as with exceptional dynamics can lead 
to other forecasting issues. One such issue is the need to forecast the 
regime switch or structural break in which the dynamics change. In an 
out-of-sample forecast, the moment of switch is unknown and may in 
itself be diffi cult to forecast, thus reducing the utility of the nonlinear 
model. Similarly, nonlinear forecasts may be state-dependent, meaning 
that an accurate out-of-sample forecast will require accurate forecasts 
of the state of nature over the period of the forecast. For linear models 
the impact of a shock is the same regardless of the state of the world in 
which the shock occurs. For nonlinear models this is not true—a dis-
turbance or shock will have different impacts depending on the state of 
the world in which the shock occurs. Finally, if periods with exceptional 
dynamics are relatively rare but empirically signifi cant, there may be 
a tendency for nonlinear models to overfi t the sample, reducing their 
value in an out-of-sample forecast.
A last challenge for out-of-sample forecasting comes from the diffi -
culties in using nonlinear models in multistep forecasts. Linear models 
can be solved recursively, making the calculation of multistep forecasts 
relatively straightforward. This is not true for nonlinear models. The 
nonlinearity makes multiple-step-ahead forecasting intrinsically more 
diffi cult. We will outline some of the diffi culties with multiple-step-
ahead forecasts later in this paper. 
These problems notwithstanding, we believe it is important to con-
tinue the research into nonlinear forecasts so we can make better use of 
our ability to model the nonlinear aspects of the economy. We fi nd the 
problems not to be drawbacks of nonlinear models so much as chal-
lenges that must be overcome to improve the accuracy of forecasts. The 
problems lead to inaccuracy in both linear and nonlinear forecasts, and 
the task is to better understand nonlinear forecasting in order to over-
come these obstacles.
We thus examine an ongoing research question as to whether 
fi nancial-sector variables help forecast real-sector variables, or real-
sector variables help forecast fi nancial sector variables—or both. We 
use nonlinear models to investigate this question. We do so because this 
allows us to investigate the out-of-sample forecasting ability of these 
nonlinear models in a multivariate context. 
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THEORETICAL PRELIMINARIES
The specifi c relationship that we investigate is between a key 
cyclical real-sector variable (industrial production) and two fi nancial-
sector variables, the 10-year Treasury bond rate and excess returns for 
Standard and Poor’s 500. We model that relationship using nonlinear 
approaches and then examine the out-of-sample forecasting properties 
of those models. Before estimating the models and evaluating the fore-
casts we present three important defi nitions and a description of the 
data we use. What follows here is just the briefest of introductions to 
ideas of fi nancial economics that provide the backdrop to any fi nancial 
forecasting exercise.
The fi rst defi nition is the asset pricing equation. A typical fi rst-order 
condition from an asset allocation problem (i.e., a typical Euler equa-
tion for an asset pricing problem) is found in Equation (5.1):
(5.1)  1 1'( ) '( )t t t tu c E u c R    ,
 
where u(ct) is a utility function, u '(ct) indicates the derivative of the util-
ity function, Rt+1 is real gross return on stocks purchased at time t and 
held until time t + 1, and ct is real consumption at time t. Typically, op-
timization requires equating the marginal utility of current consumption 
(the left-hand side of Equation [5.1]) to the marginal utility of deferring 
consumption to the next period (the right-hand side of Equation [5.1]). 
The marginal utility of current consumption is straightforward and is 
written as u '(ct). The marginal utility of deferring consumption to the 
next period is calculated as the product of three terms: 1) the rate of 
return on a unit of deferred consumption, Rt+1; 2) the marginal utility 
of consumption that is deferred to the next period, u ' (ct+1); and 3) the 
discount factor β (used to calculate the present value of this additional 
future marginal utility). 
Equation (5.1) is potentially highly nonlinear, and any variable af-
fecting consumption can potentially affect forecasts of stock returns. 
This asset pricing condition provides a theoretical basis for nonlinear 
econometric modeling.
The second defi nition is of excess returns. Common models of eq-
uity returns focus on modeling excess returns, which are returns over 
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and above a risk premium. Often the risk premium is a government 
bond yield, in which case excess returns are returns on equity over and 
above returns on the government bond. We thus defi ne excess returns as
(5.2) 1 11 1t tt t t t
t
S DER I R I
S
 
 
     .
  
Here, ERt+1 is the excess return on stocks purchased at time t and 
held until time t + 1, and Rt+1 is the gross return on stocks purchased at 
time t and held until time t + 1. The gross return on bonds purchased at 
time t and held until time t + 1 is It .
The third and last defi nition is that of the information set used for 
forecasting. It is important to think carefully about what should be 
included in the information set when investigating the forecasting per-
formance of various models. The excess return formula indicates that, 
at time t, an investor knows the nominal return on bonds between t and 
t + 1. If one were to buy a bond at time t, one would know what its 
interest payments were between t and t + 1. But when one buys equity, 
one won’t know the equity’s return between t and t + 1 until time t + 1 
occurs and one can observe the price of stock at time t + 1. With this 
defi nition of the information set, Ω, we can defi ne the forecast for an 
excess return as
(5.3) 1 11( | ) |t tt t t t
t
S DE ER E I
S
         .
DATA DESCRIPTION
We estimate models of excess returns on equities and bond interest 
rates using monthly data for the United States. The two sources for our 
data are 1) Shiller’s monthly data set on stocks and associated variables 
and 2) Federal Reserve System data on industrial production. We also 
employ a measure of the general price level, the Consumer Price Index 
calculated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
Our data include the value of the Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 500 
index at the end of each month, calculated as the monthly average of 
daily closing prices. We represent this variable as the stock index value 
St . Dividends are represented by the symbol Dt , and according to Shiller 
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(2011) are “computed from the S&P four-quarter tools for the quarter 
since 1926, with linear interpolation to monthly fi gures.” The price in-
dex, Pt , is the CPI-U series. Industrial production is yt . Finally, we use 
Shiller’s 10-year government security rate (GS10) as our measure of the 
gross long-term nominal interest rate, It .
Below are plots of the key variables. Figure 5.1 graphs the log 
of industrial production (left scale) and the growth rate, calculated as 
changes in the log of industrial production (right scale). The general 
upward trend in industrial production is clearly visible, as are various 
periods when industrial production was declining. These periods are 
typically recessions, such as the period around 1975 and the period at 
the end of our sample, 2009. The plot of the growth rate indicates pe-
riods of greater volatility, especially at the beginning of our sample, 
1955–1960, and again at the end of our sample. The impact of the reces-
sion in 1974–1975 is clear. The long period of relatively low volatility 
in the growth rate of industrial production from the mid-1980s until 
2005 is also apparent.
Figure 5.1  U.S. Industrial Production, January 1955–December 2009
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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Figure 5.2 graphs the log of the stock price index, both its level 
(left-hand scale) and its growth rate (right-hand scale). Again the gen-
eral upward trend in the stock price index is clear, as are periods of 
declining stock prices after 2000 and again at the end of our sample. 
The growth rate of stock prices shows considerably more volatility 
than the growth rate of industrial production. For stock prices, monthly 
changes of plus or minus 0.1 (10 percent) occur at times, whereas we do 
not see such large movements in industrial production.
Figure 5.3 graphs our interest rate data, where we have converted 
this series to monthly net interest rates. Interest rate levels are shown on 
the left-hand scale, while changes in the interest rate levels, calculated 
as simple differences, are shown on the right-hand scale. Most apparent 
is the secular increase in interest rates from the beginning of our sample 
until the very early 1980s, and the secular decline from the early 1980s 
until the end of our sample. Interest rates begin our sample at about 0.2 
percent per month (roughly 2.4 percent per year), increase to a rate of 
Figure 5.2  U.S. Stock Price Index, January 1955–December 2009
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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almost 1.2 percent per month (roughly 14.4 percent per year), and then 
return by the end of our sample to a rate near 0.2 percent per month. 
This run-up and subsequent decline in rates is most often blamed on 
infl ation rates, which increased from the mid-1960s through the 1970s, 
peaking in the early 1980s before declining gradually throughout the 
next several decades. Of course, the large secular movements contain 
many shorter periods of ups and downs in interest rates, as the graph of 
interest rate changes makes clear. Also apparent in the graph of interest 
rate changes is the high volatility from the late 1970s through the early 
1980s.
Figure 5.3  U.S. Interest Rate, January 1955–December 2009
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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ESTIMATING THE NONLINEAR MODELS
In this section we describe how we estimate the nonlinear models 
that we use for producing our out-of-sample forecasts. Our estimation 
proceeds in three steps. First we test for linearity in our three variables. 
The null hypothesis will be that the modeled relationship is linear, and a 
rejection leads to continued estimation of a nonlinear model. The idea is 
not to estimate a nonlinear model if that is unnecessary. Second, when 
nonlinearity is detected, we will estimate a threshold model. Third, we 
will also estimate a second nonlinear model, which we will call a “cur-
rent depth of recession” model.
Threshold models capture the possibility that the dynamics of a 
variable may be state-dependent. They allow the data-generating pro-
cess to vary across two or more states of nature. For this reason, they 
are also often called “regime-switching” models. Seasonal models for 
industrial production or “day of week” models for stock returns are 
examples of deterministic threshold models. For these models the oc-
currence of a regime switch is known with certainty. However, many 
interesting cases involve stochastic threshold models, in which the re-
gime switch is unknown. An example is given by a model in which 
stock market returns are driven by a different dynamic process after 
large declines in stock prices. Bradley and Jansen (2004) provide one 
attempt at forecasting stock returns in a nonlinear framework.
Threshold models are an example of a model in which the state 
variable is observable. In a deterministic threshold model it is clear that 
we observe the day of the week and that we can allow our model to 
behave differently on different days of the week. In a stochastic thresh-
old model we can observe that there has been a large decline in stock 
prices, and then we can allow our model to behave differently after such 
a large decline. The key feature is that the state variable, either the day 
of the week or the decline in stock prices, is observable. This stands in 
contrast to models with unobserved state variables, such as the vari-
ous Markov switching models. In those models the state variable is an 
unobserved variable, and changes in the underlying hidden state vari-
able lead to changes in the behavior of the variable we are modeling. 
Thus a key modeling decision is between using a nonlinear model with 
observable state variables and using a nonlinear model with hidden 
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or unobserved state variables. The choice depends in part on whether 
there are observed variables that can adequately indicate or represent 
the state of the world. Here we estimate and forecast with observable 
state variables.
We investigate two types of threshold models, the threshold autore-
gressive (TAR) model and the smooth transition autoregressive (STAR) 
model. A TAR model specifi es (at least) two sets of dynamics for the 
variable of interest, y, with the regime switch dependent upon the value 
of a “transition” variable, labeled z. The threshold model can be written 
as follows: 
0
1 1
p p
t i t i i t i t t
i i
y a y y    
 
         ,
where
(5.4) 
0
1
t d
t
t d
if z c
if z c



                        .
In this threshold model, the behavior of the variable yt is a pth order 
autoregressive model governed by the coeffi cients αi when the transi-
tion variable zt−d is below the threshold value, c. When the transition 
variable is greater than the threshold value, the behavior of the variable 
yt is an autoregressive model governed by the coeffi cients αi + βi. Thus 
the variable yt changes behavior depending on the relationship between 
the transition variable and the threshold. 
The transition variable is the observable state variable we men-
tioned above. Changes in this variable lead to changes in the behavior 
of yt. The transition variable has a subscript t − d to indicate that it is a 
lagged value, and d is an integer value of 1 or higher. The parameter d 
is known as the “delay” and indicates the delay between changes in the 
transition variable and changes in the behavior of yt. 
The TAR model seems simple, with an indicator variable δ switch-
ing from zero to one as the transition variable crosses a threshold value. 
This is a step function, with δ equaling zero when zt−d is on one side of 
the threshold and one when zt−d is on the other side of the threshold. 
Yet, despite this simplicity, the TAR model has proven useful as a 
model to capture nonlinear behavior. 
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The STAR model generalizes the threshold approach by allowing a 
smooth transition between the two regimes. This transition is governed 
by a function of the threshold variable, z, and the transition function 
is usually specifi ed as being either logistic (LSTAR) or exponential 
(ESTAR). The shape of the transition function governs the nature of 
the movement from one regime to another. The main difference is that 
logistic specifi cation is one-sided, in the sense that there are alternative 
dynamics for either large or small values of the transition function, and 
an intermediate range where the dynamics are a combination of the dy-
namics at the two extremes. The exponential specifi cation is two-sided, 
in the sense that there is a set of dynamics for both large and small val-
ues, and a different set of dynamics for intermediate values. 
The structure of the STAR model is given by
0
1 1
( )
p p
t i t i i t i t d t
i i
y a y y F z    
 
       
 
,
where
(5.5) 
1( )( ) 1 t dz ct dF z e
                 (LSTAR)
or 
  
 
^2( )( ) 1 , 0t dz ct dF z e
                 (ESTAR).
We illustrate the nature of a STAR model transition function in Fig-
ure 5.4. In a TAR model there is a discrete switch between the two 
regimes, as illustrated by the line that goes almost straight up. The tran-
sition function takes a value of zero before the period of the switch 
and a value of one afterward. In a STAR model the switch between 
the regimes is more gradual, with the degree of smoothness depending 
upon the size of the transition parameter, γ. When gamma takes a small 
value the transition is very gradual, as illustrated by the dotted line. As 
gamma gets larger, the STAR model begins to approximate the discrete 
switch of the TAR model, as illustrated by the curved lighter line. Thus, 
one advantage of the STAR model is that it permits, but does not re-
quire, a relatively abrupt switch between regimes.
There are four steps involved in identifying and estimating a STAR 
model. The fi rst step is the identifi cation and estimation of a linear auto-
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regressive model. The primary purpose of this step is to determine the 
lag lengths that will be used for linearity testing and, if nonlinearity is 
detected, for estimating the STAR model. Step two is to test for linear-
ity, to make sure that a nonlinear model is needed. If linearity is not 
rejected, there is often no need to continue the process of estimating 
a nonlinear model. If linearity is rejected, the third step is to identify 
the STAR model specifi cation. Here identifi cation is used in the time 
series sense and is meant to specify the various features of the model, 
such as lag lengths. It is in this third step that one determines whether 
an exponential or a logistical star model is appropriate. The last step is 
the actual estimation of the specifi ed STAR model. This can be done 
with various nonlinear optimization procedures, and we use nonlinear 
least squares.
In this exercise we will identify and estimate three models: one for 
industrial production, one for a long-term bond rate, and one for ex-
cess equity returns. We begin the estimation of the linear models with 
stationarity testing. We perform both the Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) and the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) tests, and 
Figure 5.4  STAR Transition Functions—Role of Gamma
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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the results are presented in Table 5.1. Note that the ADF test has a null 
hypothesis of nonstationarity or “integrated of order one,” written as 
I(1). The KPSS test has a null hypothesis of stationarity, or I(0).
Our ADF tests fail to reject the null of I(1) for the levels of the log 
industrial production [Log(IP)] and the bond interest rate (INT), but re-
ject that null for the level of excess returns (ER). This indicates that log 
industrial production and the bond interest rate should be differenced, 
while excess returns are stationary as calculated. We note that the ADF 
test fails to reject the null of I(1) for the S&P 500, which is consistent 
with the result that excess returns, calculated in part from differencing 
the log S&P 500 index [Log(S)], are I(0). The ADF results are corrobo-
rated by the KPSS tests, which reject the null of I(0) for the levels of 
the log of industrial production and the bond rate, but fail to reject that 
null for excess returns. 
Table 5.1  Testing for Stationarity
Variable
ADF testa 
series in levels
ADF testa
series in fi rst 
differences
KPSS testb
series in levels
KPSS testb
series in fi rst 
differences
Log(IP) −2.55
(p = 0.31)
(2 lags, trend)
Fail to reject
−12.25
(0.00)
(1 lag)
Reject
0.42
(5% CV = 0.15) 
(trend)
Reject
0.14
(5% CV = 0.46)
Fail to reject
Log(S) −1.71
(p = 0.75)
(1 lag, trend)
Fail to reject
−19.29
(p = 0.00)
(0 lags)
Reject
0.63
(5% CV = 0.15) 
(trend)
Reject
0.10
(5% CV = 0.46)
Fail to reject
INT −1.73
(p = 0.42)
(2 lags)
Fail to reject
−18.08
(0.00)
(1 lag)
Reject
0.96
(5% CV = 0.15) 
Reject
0.27
(5% CV = 0.46)
Fail to reject
ER −19.20
(p = 0.00)
(0 lags)
Reject
 0.09
(5% CV = 0.15) 
Fail to reject
 
NOTE: Blank = not applicable.
a ADF test: Null hypothesis is I(1). 
b KPSS test: Null hypothesis is I(0). 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations. 
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Based upon these two tests, we estimate linear models in the fi rst 
differences of the log of industrial production (DLIP) and the bond in-
terest rate (DINT), and in the level of excess returns (ER). We proceed 
to determine the appropriate lag length for these linear models, and here 
we select the lag lengths using a standard goodness of fi t criterion, the 
Schwartz Information Criterion (SIC). Using the SIC to pick lag lengths 
involves searching over a range of possible lag lengths selected a priori 
and fi nding the lag length within that set that will minimize the SIC. 
Here we searched over a range from 1 lag to 12 lags. 
Our models will possibly contain multiple right-hand-side vari-
ables at various lags, and not just lags of the dependent variable. This 
raises a few issues with lag selection. One procedure is to search over 
the entire lag space, with 1 through 12 lags of each variable. If there 
are three right-hand-side variables, as there are in some of our models, 
this involves 12 cubed regressions. An alternative is to use an itera-
tive procedure, fi rst picking the lags of the dependent variable and then 
proceeding with the other explanatory variables. We follow this latter 
approach. We fi rst selected the best univariate model, then the best lags 
of the second variable, holding constant the lags specifi ed for the de-
pendent variable in the univariate specifi cation, and then the best lags 
of the third variable given the lags of the fi rst two variables. The results 
are provided in Table 5.2. 
 The linear model for the change in the log of industrial production 
contains two lags of the change in the log of industrial production, two 
lags of excess stock returns, and one lag of the change in the interest 
rate. The linear models for the asset returns are more parsimonious. 
Neither one contains any lags of change of the log of industrial produc-
tion, so the real sector variable will not be included in the models for 
the fi nancial variables. 
Table 5.2  Determining the Lag Length for the Linear Models
DLIP ER DINT
Univariate AR(2); −6.74 AR(1); −3.93 AR(2);  −14.14
Bivariate 2 lags ER; −6.75 0 lags DLIP; −3.93 2 lags ER;  −14.15
Trivariate 1 lag DINT; −6.75 1 lag DINT; −3.94 0 lags DLIP; −14.15
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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The estimated linear models are presented in Table 5.3. Estimation 
was by ordinary least squares. Excess returns have a positive effect on 
current growth in industrial production. Interestingly, increases in the 
interest rate also have a positive effect on current growth in industrial 
production. As for excess returns, increases in the interest rate have a 
decidedly negative impact on excess returns. Finally, changes in the 
interest rate are affected positively by excess returns. 
The next step is to test for linearity. We use the approach derived 
by Luukkonen, Saikkonen, and Teräsvirta (1988) and Teräsvirta and 
Table 5.3  Linear Model Estimates
DLIP ER DINT
Constant 0.0015
(0.0004)
p = 0.0000
4.43E-04
(1.36E-03)
p = 0.7440
1.20E-06
(8.18E-06)
p = 0.8829
DLIP(−1) 0.3098
(0.0404)
p = 0.0000
—
—
—
—
—
—
DLIP(−2) 0.1028
(0.0399)
p = 0.0103
—
—
—
—
—
—
ER(−1) 0.0231
(0.0100)
p = 0.0211
0.2086
(0.0397)
p = 0.0000
6.27E-04
(2.50E-4)
p = 0.0122
ER(−2) 0.0308
(0.0099)
p = 0.0020
—
—
—
6.31E-04
(2.50E-04)
p = 0.0119
DINT(−1) 4.6626
(1.5652)
p = 0.0030
−26.5785
(6.2857)
p = 0.0000
0.3863
(0.0404)
p = 0.0000
DINT(−2) —
—
—
—
—
—
−0.1925
(0.0406)
p = 0.0122
R2 0.1951 0.0842 0.1720
Std. error 0.0081 0.0332 0.0002
SIC −6.7509 −3.9441 −14.1487
NOTE: — = data not available.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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Anderson (1992), in which linearity is tested with the “approximating 
equation.” The advantage of this approach is that it simultaneously tests 
for linearity and provides guidance about the specifi cation of the non-
linear model. The approximating equation is given as follows:
(5.6) 20 1, 2, 3,
1 1 1
p p p
t i t i i t i t d i t i t d
i i i
y y y z y z       
  
     
                
         3
4,
1
p
i t i t d t
i
y z  

                        ,
where yt is the variable being modeled, zt−d is the transition variable, and 
d is the delay between when the transition variable crosses the threshold 
value and the variable of interest’s alternative dynamics become active. 
The null hypothesis of linearity is a test of β2i = β3i = β4i = 0. 
We take a general approach to testing for linearity by using fi ve 
possible transition variables and up to a three-period delay. We start by 
using the dependent variable as the transition variable to see if the vari-
able’s own values indicate the source of nonlinearity. This would mean, 
for example, that the change in the log of the industrial production 
would be the transition variable for itself. We then look at the possi-
bility that one of the other two variables being modeled could be the 
transition variable. For the change in the log of industrial production, 
this means testing whether the change in the bond rate or excess returns 
is the transition variable. Finally, we consider two external variables. 
The fi rst, called current depth of the recession, or CDR, is the distance 
from the past peak in industrial production and its current value. This 
variable would capture a situation in which recessions and expansions 
had alternative dynamics. A variable similarly defi ned for the stock in-
dex, CDB (current depth of stocks), measures the difference between 
the previous peak in the S&P 500 index and index’s current value. This 
variable would capture a situation in which rising and falling S&P 500 
index values generated different dynamics. 
The results of estimating the approximating equation and testing 
for linearity are given in Table 5.4. First, there is no evidence suggest-
ing rejection of linearity for excess returns. No tests for any threshold 
variable for any delay are close to suggesting a rejection of linear-
ity. We conclude that excess returns are best modeled here as a linear 
process. There is abundant evidence, however, to support rejecting 
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linearity for both the change in the log of industrial production and 
the change in the bond rate. Of the 15 different tests for linearity, 9 
of them support rejection, suggesting that a fi nding of nonlinearity is 
not dependent upon a very specifi c combination of threshold variable 
and delay. A review of all instances that show rejection indicates that 
a single lag of the change in the log of industrial production should 
be chosen as the threshold variable. Similar results are found for the 
change in the bond rate, in that 11 of the 15 tests produce evidence 
indicating rejection of linearity. A review of those tests indicates that a 
single lag of excess returns should be chosen as the threshold variable 
for the change in the bond rate.
Table 5.4  Testing for Linearity
Dependent variables for linearity test
Threshold
variables
DLIP                               ER DINT
Chi-sq. P-value Chi-sq. P-value Chi-sq. P-value
CDB(−1) 35.59 0.0020 5.03 0.5402 18.27 0.1076
CDR(−1) 30.63 0.0098 4.34 0.6302 28.47 0.0047
ER(−1) 22.08 0.1056 2.43 0.8764 52.13** 0.0000
DINT(−1) 16.59 0.3442 8.68 0.1925 51.96* 0.0000
DLIP(−1) 52.25** 0.0001 8.77 0.1871 25.80 0.0114
CDB(−2) 41.87* 0.0002 2.73 0.8424 20.88 0.0522
CDR(−2) 28.53 0.0185 7.91 0.2445 30.83 0.0021
ER(−2) 29.70 0.0131 5.36 0.4985 24.30 0.0185
DINT(−2) 17.23 0.3052 6.83 0.3369 43.54 0.0000
DLIP(−2) 25.84 0.0398 5.03 0.5400 19.52 0.0768
CDB(−3) 29.04 0.0159 1.68 0.9467 15.93 0.1944
CDR(−3) 14.45 0.4917 5.75 0.4515 35.18 0.0004
ER(−3) 19.50 0.1921 5.20 0.5182 39.93 0.0001
DINT(−3) 31.66 0.0072 3.48 0.7469 40.05 0.0001
DLIP(−3) 17.54 0.2878 6.50 0.3692 9.66 0.6459
NOTE: * signifi cant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed test); ** signifi cant at the 0.05 level 
(two-tailed test).
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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Given that we fi nd evidence rejecting linearity for two of the vari-
ables, the next step is to identify which STAR model is appropriate for 
each, the LSTAR or the ESTAR model. This is done through a series of 
hypothesis tests on the coeffi cients in the approximating equation. The 
null hypothesis of linearity is tested through setting to zero all of the es-
timated coeffi cients on the threshold variable. The identifi cation of the 
model specifi cation looks at similar tests for subsets of the coeffi cients. 
Teräsvirta and Anderson (1992) specify a set of three hypotheses:
(5.7) 1 4,: 0,iH i    ,
 
2 3, 4,: 0 | 0,i iH i     , and      
3 2, 3, 4,: 0 | 0,i i iH i                      .
Rejection of H1 indicates that an LSTAR model is appropriate. Fail-
ure to reject H1 but rejection of H2 indicates that an ESTAR model is 
appropriate. Finally, failure to reject H1 or H2 but rejection of H3 indi-
cates that an LSTAR model is appropriate. 
The results of testing theses hypotheses for our models are pre-
sented in Table 5.5. The table shows that H1 is rejected for both vari-
ables, indicating an LSTAR specifi cation is appropriate for both the 
change in the log of industrial production and the change in the bond 
rate.
At this point we estimated the LSTAR model for changes in the 
log of industrial production by nonlinear least squares, with results re-
ported in Table 5.6. There are some important issues in estimating TAR 
and STAR models that have to do with discontinuities in the likelihood 
function, and these have been documented and discussed in Hansen 
(1997). Our solution is to conduct a grid search for various values of the 
threshold value in the TAR model, and the parameter estimates of the 
TAR model are used as starting values for the STAR estimation.
In Table 5.6 we will fi rst examine the transition variable and its role 
in our model. The transition variable is one lag of the change in the log 
of industrial production. Here the estimated value for the threshold is 
−0.0035, which suggests that, roughly, the dynamics of the growth in 
industrial production will differ when that growth is positive (specifi -
cally, above −0.0035) as compared to when it is negative (specifi cally, 
below −0.0035). 
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One important issue to examine is whether one regime of the STAR 
model is just being estimated on a single or a very few data points, so 
that the model is really just showing that a few data points are a special 
case. To examine this issue we use the following histogram, Figure 5.5, 
which shows that the estimated threshold does not simply identify a few 
observations at the extreme tail of the distribution. Instead, we see that, 
over the history of the variable, many observations occur above, and 
below, the threshold. Thus both regimes occurred with some regularity.
The estimated value of the transition parameter, γ, is relatively large 
at 262.04, suggesting a relatively sharp transition between the regimes, 
as DLIP(−1) varies around −0.0035. We thus also estimate a TAR 
model for the change in the log of industrial production to serve as a 
Table 5.5  Identifying the STAR Model Specifi cations
Hypothesis tests
Dependent variable:
DLIP
Dependent variable: 
DINT
Chi-sq. Prob. Chi-sq. Prob.
Threshold variable: 
DLIP(−1)
Threshold variable: 
ER(−1)
0 2, 3, 4,: 0,i i iH i      52.25 0.0000 52.13 0.0000
1 4,: 0,iH i   16.90 0.0047 13.85 0.0078
2 3, 4,: 0 | 0,i iH i    14.01 0.0155 3.14 0.5340
3 2, 3, 4,: 0 | 0,i i iH i      21.34 0.0007 35.13 0.0000
Threshold variable: 
CDB(−2)
Threshold variable: 
DINT(−1)
0 2, 3, 4,: 0,i i iH i      41.87 0.0002 51.96 0.0000
1 4,: 0,iH i   12.79 0.0254 9.91 0.0420
2 3, 4,: 0 | 0,i iH i    2.60 0.7611 17.62 0.0015
3 2, 3, 4,: 0 | 0,i i iH i      26.48 0.0001 24.43 0.0001
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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basis for comparison with the STAR model. The estimated value for the 
threshold for the TAR model is reported in Table 5.7 and is very close to 
that of the STAR model. Figure 5.6 graphs the transition functions for 
the TAR and STAR model. Of course this is a step function for the TAR 
model, and, as the graph makes clear for the STAR model, there is a 
large range where the two extreme regimes are “smoothly” combined to 
generate the dynamics that we observe. As the following graph shows, 
the switch between regimes takes place just below zero. 
The estimated LSTAR model for the change in the bond rate is pre-
sented in Table 5.8. The coeffi cients on lags of the changes in the bond 
rate in the lower regime were statistically insignifi cant in initial esti-
mates of both the STAR and TAR models, and their inclusion caused 
convergence diffi culties for the STAR model, so we set these two coef-
fi cients to zero for the results reported in Table 5.8 (and for the TAR 
model reported in Table 5.9). 
Table 5.6  LSTAR for DLIP, January 1955–December 2004
Constant 0.0018 (0.0004); p = 0.0001
DLIP(−1) 0.1795 (0.1034); p = 0.0830
DLIP(−2) 0.3527 (0.1265); p = 0.0055
ER(−1) −0.0116 (0.0313); p = 0.7115
ER(−2) 0.1109 (0.0381); p = 0.0037
DINT(−1) 9.0912 (3.4673); p = 0.0090
DLIP(−1) × F[DLIP(−1)] 0.1581 (0.1325); p = 0.2331
DLIP(−2) × F[DLIP(−1)] −0.3357 (0.1508);  p = 0.0263
ER(−1) × F[DLIP(−1)] 0.0502  (0.0407); p = 0.2173
ER(−2) × F[DLIP(−1)] −0.1145 (0.0486); p = 0.0189
DINT(−1) × F[DLIP(−1)] −7.3670  (4.9938); p = 0.1407
Gamma   262.04 (187.44); p = 0.1626
Threshold for DLIP(−1) −0.0035 (0.0032); p = 0.2758
R2 0.2283
Std. error 0.0079
SIC −6.7184
Log likelihood 2,057.110
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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For the bond rate the transition variable is one lag of the change in 
the bond rate, or DINT(−1). The estimated threshold value is −0.00048, 
a value that falls far to the left in the distribution of changes in the bond 
rate between positive and negative values, suggesting that changes in 
the bond rate are largely governed by one regime, with occasional large 
declines in the bond rate leading to alternative dynamics. Figure 5.7 
presents the histogram of excess returns. We see that there are only a 
small, though not trivial, number of observations in the lower regime. 
The estimated value for the transition parameter is also large for this 
model, 464.7, so we again estimate a TAR model for comparison, with 
results reported in Table 5.9. In the TAR model, the estimated threshold 
value is −0.00048, nearly the same as the STAR model. Given this and 
the size of the transition variable in the LSTAR model, the two models 
provide very similar results in terms of the region around the switch, as 
seen in Figure 5.8. 
So far, we have estimated four nonlinear models to be used in out-
of-sample forecasting, an LSTAR and a TAR for both the change in 
Figure 5.5  Histogram for DLIP
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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the log of industrial production and the change in the bond rate. We 
now supplement these models with an alternative approach to captur-
ing nonlinearity among the real and fi nancial variables. We specify and 
estimate CDR models for the change in the log of industrial production, 
for excess returns, and for the change in the bond rate. 
Beaudry and Koop’s (1993) CDR model is designed to capture the 
asymmetric dynamic caused by the fact that negative shocks to real and 
fi nancial variables tend to have temporary effects but positive shocks 
tend to have permanent effects. This asymmetry is embodied in the 
model through the inclusion of a CDR term, which measures the dis-
tance from the previous peak of the variable to the current value. This 
term is positive when the current value is below the previous peak:
(5.8) CDRt  =   max(Yt − j)j ≥ 0 − Yt  .
      
Inclusion of this CDR term converts an otherwise linear model (like 
an AR model) into a nonlinear model:
Table 5.7  TAR For DLIP, January 1955–December 2004
Constant 0.0018   (0.0005);  p = 0.0001
DLIP(−1) 0.2199   (0.0818); p = 0.0074
DLIP(−2) 0.2635    (0.0823); p = 0.0014
ER(−1) 0.0013    (0.0190); p = 0.9461
ER(−2) 0.0800   (0.0178); p = 0.0000
DINT(−1) 9.3324    (2.6351); p = 0.0004
DLIP(−1) × δ 0.0971    (0.1095); p = 0.3755
DLIP(−2) × δ −0.2099   (0.0932); p = 0.0246
ER(−1) × δ 0.0303    (0.0222); p = 0.1727
ER(−2) × δ −0.0679   (0.0213); p = 0.0015
DINT(−1) × δ −7.1795   (3.2521); p = 0.0277
Threshold for DLIP(−1) −0.003
R2 0.2258
Std. error 0.0079
SIC −6.7365
Log likelihood 2,056.135
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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(5.9) Θ(L)t ΔYt = δ + [Ω(L) − 1]CDRt + εt  .    
  
Here Θ(L) and Ω(L) represent polynomials in the lag operator L, a 
convenient way to represent that there are lags of ΔY and lags of CDR 
in the equation. If the coeffi cient on the CDR term is positive, then ΔY 
grows faster when CDR increases—that is, when the recession is deeper. 
In other words, ΔY grows fasters after a negative shock has placed the 
economy in a deep recession. When the economy recovers and is grow-
ing above its previous peak, this extra growth in ΔY is eliminated. In 
this case, positive shocks will have longer-lasting positive effects on ΔY 
than negative shocks. Of course, if the coeffi cient on the CDR term is 
< 0, the opposite case holds: a negative shock leads to more persistent 
performance below the previous peak. 
To allow for possible nonlinear effects from the fi nancial markets 
and the real sector, we investigate two versions of a CDR-type model, 
one for industrial production and one for stock prices. The CDR term has 
a positive value when industrial production is below its previous peak, 
and the CDB term has a positive value when the S&P 500 is below its 
Figure 5.6  DLIP Models: Transition Functions TAR and STAR
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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Table 5.8  LSTAR for DINT, January 1955–December 2004
Constant 1.95E-06 (8.07E-06); p = 0.8090
DINT(−1) — — —
DINT(−2) — — —
ER(−1) −0.0118 (0.0028); p = 0.0000
ER(−2) 0.0083 (0.0017); p = 0.000
DINT(−1) × F 0.3995 (0.0461); p = 0.0000
DINT(−2) × F −0.2235 (0.0409); p = 0.0000
ER(−1) × F 0.0129 (0.0029); p = 0.0000
ER(−2) × F −0.0078 (0.0170); p = 0.0000
Gamma 464.68 (183.01); p = 0.0014
Threshold for DINT(−1) −4.81E-04 (4.78E-05); p = 0.0000
R2 0.2276
Std. error 1.94E-04
SIC −14.1756
Log likelihood 4,281.459
NOTE: — = data not available.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
Table 5.9  TAR for DINT, January 1955–December 2004
Constant 1.29E-06 (7.97E-06); p = 0.8710
DINT(−1) — — —
DINT(−2) — — —
ER(−1) −0.0099 (0.0014); p = 0.0000
ER(−2) 0.0086 (0.0014); p = 0.0000
DINT(−1) × δ 0.3869 (0.0439); p = 0.0000
DINT(−2) × δ −0.2159 (0.0401); p = 0.0000
ER(−1) × δ 0.0108 (0.0014); p = 0.0000
ER(−2) × δ −0.0080 (0.0014); p = 0.0000
Threshold for DINT(−1) −0.00048
R2 0.2245
Std. error 1.94E-04
SIC −14.1928
Log likelihood 4,280.239
NOTE: — = data not available.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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Figure 5.7  Histogram for Changes in the Interest Rate
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
Figure 5.8  DINT Models: Transition Functions TAR and STAR
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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previous peak. The two graphs in Figure 5.9 display the values for CDR 
and CDB and illustrate the differences in their time series histories.
To investigate this specifi cation of nonlinearity, we took the linear 
models presented in Table 5.3 and augmented them with both terms—
CDR and CDB. Neither the CDR term nor the CDB term was signifi cant 
for the change in the bond interest rate, indicating that the CDR class 
of models was not appropriate for that variable. In contrast, both the 
CDR and the CDB terms were signifi cant in the model for the change 
in the log of industrial production (see Table 5.10). The sum of the coef-
fi cients on the CDR term is positive, meaning that industrial production 
grows faster after a negative shock to industrial production. This means 
that negative real shocks have shorter lasting effects than positive real 
shocks and industrial production tends to grow relatively rapidly after 
Figure 5.9  Current Depth of Recession and Current Depth of Stocks, 
January 1955–December 2004
NOTE: CDR stands for current depth of recession. CDB stands for current depth of stocks.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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recessions. In contrast, the sign of the sum of the coeffi cients on the 
CDB term is negative. This suggests that industrial production grows 
more slowly after stock market declines. 
Only the CDR term was signifi cant in the excess returns equation, 
and the estimated model is presented in Table 5.11. The coeffi cient on 
the CDR term is positive, suggesting that excess returns grow faster 
Table 5.10  CDR Model for DLIP
Constant 0.0023 (0.0006); p = 0.0001
DLIP(−1) 0.1296 (0.0872); p = 0.1378
DLIP(−2) 0.1229 (0.0411); p = 0.0029
ER(−1) 0.0770 (0.0258); p = 0.0030
ER(−2)   —   —  —
DINT(−1) 4.9270 (1.5277); p = 0.0013
CDR(−1) −0.1840 (0.0997); p = 0.0655
CDR(−2) 0.2241 (0.0958); p = 0.0197
CDB(−1) 0.0611 (0.0286); p = 0.0335
CDB(−2) −0.0722 (0.0278); p = 0.0096
R2 0.2274
Std. error 0.0079
SIC −6.7599
Log likelihood 2,056.741
NOTE: — = data not available.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
Table 5.11  CDR Model for ER
Constant 1.19E-03 (1.59E-03); p = 0.4529
ER(−1) 0.1996          (0.0399); p = 0.0000
DINT(−1) −26.4039        (6.2711); p = 0.0000
CDR(−1) 0.0960      (0.0486); p = 0.0486
R2 0.0902
Std. error 0.0331
SIC −3.9400
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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when industrial production is in its “recovery” phase and expanding out 
of a recession.
FORECAST EVALUATION
The above models were all estimated over a sample period from 
January of 1955 to December of 2004 (1955.01–2004.12). We reserved 
the fi nal 58 data points, 2005.01–2009.10, for an out-of-sample fore-
casting comparison. The idea is to estimate the model up to 2004.12, 
as if we are actually in 2004.12, and use that information and param-
eter estimates to forecast in 2005.01. Then we update the sample to 
1955.01–2005.01 and use that information to forecast 2005.2. We 
continue this exercise through our last data point, forecasting 2009.10 
using the sample 1955.01–2009.09. In this way our forecasts are all 
constructed using only information available at the time of the forecast. 
The above description is an ideal, however, as data revisions oc-
cur after the fact, and we have used data available to us late in 2009. 
If data revisions occurred—and they certainly did to industrial produc-
tion—then our entire sample in 2009 contains data different from what 
a forecaster would have available in real time. This is a topic of great 
interest in the current literature but not one we deal with in this study. 
Fortunately, fi nancial series such as stock prices and returns are not 
typically subject to the data revision problem.
An important issue is how to judge forecasting performance. We 
can calculate how far off each individual forecast is for the various 
models, and average the forecast errors over our 58-data-point fore-
casting sample. More often, we calculate the average of the squared 
forecast errors, and still more often we calculate the square root of the 
average of the squared forecast errors, or the root mean square forecast-
ing error (RMSFE). This is probably the most widely cited measure of 
forecast accuracy. Another widely used measure is the average of the 
absolute value of the forecasting errors, the mean absolute forecasting 
error (MAFE). Other loss functions are possible, including measures of 
turning points and loss functions based on utility or profi t functions, but 
we will not pursue those alternatives here.
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Table 5.12 provides the out-of-sample measures of the RMSFE and 
MAFE for our three variables (DINT, DLIP, ER) and our four models 
(linear, TAR, STAR, CDR). For excess returns we also provide a ran-
dom walk model. We highlight the model that achieves the best (lowest) 
value for each variable. For the RMSFE criterion, the best DINT model 
is the linear model. The TAR model does a particularly poor job. For 
DLIP, the best RMSFE values are given by the STAR model, followed 
by the TAR model. The linear model only does better than the CDR 
model. Finally, for ER the best RMSFE value is provided by the CDR 
model, and both models beat a random walk.
For the MAFE criterion, we again fi nd that the best forecasts of 
DINT are provided by the linear model, although here the STAR model 
appears to do almost as well as the linear model. For DLIP, the best 
forecasts are from the TAR model, followed by the STAR model, with 
the linear model third. Again the CDR model does the worst of the four. 
For ER, the best forecasts come from the CDR model, followed by the 
linear model, with the random walk bringing up the rear.
More insight into the relative forecast performance can be gleaned 
from examining the forecasts and forecast errors. Figure 5.10 plots the 
values for the changes in the bond rate, DINT, along with forecasts of 
DINT from the linear model and the TAR model. These are graphed on 
the left-hand scale. The actual values are represented by the line identi-
Table 5.12  Performance Measures for Out-of-Sample Forecasts, January
2005–October 2009
RMSE loss 
criterion Linear TAR STAR CDR
Random 
walk
DINT 1.76E-04 3.40E-04 1.92E-04 —
DLIP 8.28E-03 7.64E-03 7.54E-03 8.64E-03 —
ER 4.52E-02 — — 4.46E-02 4.77E-02
MAE loss 
criterion Linear TAR STAR CDR
Random 
walk
DINT 1.33E-04 1.82E-04 1.35E-04 —
DLIP 5.67E-03 5.16E-03 5.28E-03 5.72E-03 —
ER 2.90E-02 — — 2.84E-02 3.11E-02
NOTE: — = model not estimated; blank = not applicable.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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fi ed in the legend as “DINT_M12,” and the forecasts are the other lines. 
There is a big difference between the actual values and the forecast 
from the TAR model in the middle of 2008. The TAR model predicted a 
large value for DINT at this time, but the large value failed to material-
ize. The difference between the actual value of DINT and the forecast 
from the TAR model is about −0.002, a large value that led the TAR 
model to perform quite poorly based on the RMSFE. The forecast er-
rors themselves are plotted at the top, and on the right-hand scale, of 
Figure 5.10. The large downward spike in mid-2008 is the TAR model 
forecast error we have just discussed.
Figure 5.11 plots the forecasts, actual value, and forecast errors for 
changes in the log of industrial production. The line with black squares 
in the lower part of the graph is the actual value of DLIP, which expe-
rienced large upward and downward moves in the latter half of 2008. 
These movements in DLIP were not forecast by either the linear or TAR 
Figure 5.10  Changes in the Bond Rate and Forecasts, January 2005–
September 2009
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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models. Hence this movement generated forecast errors, which can be 
seen in the top of Figure 5.11 on lines graphed against the right-hand 
scale. The forecast errors from the linear and TAR models seem similar 
in Figure 5.11, although there is some discrepancy near the end of 2008 
and at the beginning of 2009. During this period the TAR model does 
slightly better, and this leads to the TAR model having a lower RMSFE 
in Table 5.12.
Finally, Figure 5.12 plots linear and CDR forecasts of excess re-
turns. Again we see there was a large downward spike in ER in the 
fourth quarter of 2008 that was not forecast by either the linear or the 
CDR models. Thus this spike shows up in the top of Figure 5.12 as 
forecast errors for both the linear and CDR models. As with industrial 
production in Figure 5.11, it is diffi cult to see much difference in the 
forecasts, or forecast errors, from the linear and CDR models. The main 
Figure 5.11  Forecasts, Actual Value, and Forecast Errors for Changes in 
the Log of Industrial Production, January 1955–September 
2009
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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difference appears beginning in the middle of 2009, and this small 
difference leads to the CDR model having somewhat lower RMSFE 
values compared to the linear model. 
One issue with results such as in Table 5.12 is the lack of a mea-
sure for saying just how much better one model’s forecasts are over 
another’s. We would like a way of answering this question. Usually 
this is phrased as an issue of statistical signifi cance. We want to know 
whether, for the ER model, the CDR model forecasts are statistically 
signifi cantly better than the forecasts of the linear model.
There are a variety of tests available for answering this question. A 
classic test of forecast accuracy is the Diebold and Mariano (1995) test, 
which has as its null hypothesis that two forecasts are equally accurate 
by the chosen criterion (say RMSFE), and the alternative that one of 
the two is better. Another test is called the encompassing test, which 
Figure 5.12  Linear and CDR Forecasts of Excess Returns, January 1955–
September 2009
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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compares two forecasts and asks whether, given one forecast, there is 
additional useful information in the second forecast. If the answer is 
yes, then you might want to combine the two forecasts. If the answer 
is no, then you might want to use the best forecast and ignore the second 
forecast as containing no additional information once you have the fi rst 
forecast. Encompassing tests have been in use for quite some time, and 
some early advocates include Chong and Hendry (1986) and Harvey, 
Leybourne, and Newbold (1989).
In conducting these tests, an important practical issue is whether or 
not your forecasting models are nested. The initial Diebold and Mariano 
test was designed for use with nonnested forecasting models, which are 
basically two unrelated forecasting models. Nested forecasting models, 
in contrast, are models where one model is a subset of another model. In 
our models, the linear model is nested inside the CDR model. If we just 
eliminate the CDR terms—say, by setting the coeffi cients on the CDR 
terms to zero—we get back the linear model. Similarly, our TAR and 
STAR models also nest the linear model. If we just set the terms mul-
tiplying the transition variable all to zero, then we have a one-regime 
linear model. 
Statistical comparisons of nested models bring up complications 
relative to comparisons of nonnested models. This issue has been ex-
plored by a number of authors, including work by West (1996), Clark 
(1999), McCracken (2000), and Clark and McCracken (2001), and we 
refer the interested reader to those papers.
Giacomini and White (2006) suggest a new approach to statistical 
comparisons of forecasts from nested models. Basically they have a 
version of the Diebold and Mariano test that works for nested models, 
a model based on the idea of conditional forecast comparisons, and we 
use their approach here. In Table 5.13 we report tests of the RMSFE 
loss function for our various models. In these tests we select a baseline 
model and compare our other models to the baseline. For the DINT 
and DLIP forecasts we use the linear model as the baseline. For the ER 
forecasts we use the random walk model as the baseline. 
For the DINT forecasts we see in Table 5.12 that the smallest 
RMSFE was for the linear model. Thus the test results in Table 5.13 
are basically tests of whether the baseline linear model is statistically 
signifi cantly better than the TAR or STAR models. The answer is that 
while the linear model has a lower RMSFE, it is not statistically sig-
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nifi cantly lower than either of the two nonlinear models. This is even 
true for the TAR model, which appeared to perform quite poorly in 
terms of RMSFE. Still, this is no victory for the nonlinear models. A 
linear model is much easier to estimate and to use for forecasting. If a 
linear model gives forecasts that are as good or better than the nonlinear 
model alternatives, then we would usually avoid going to the trouble of 
forecasting from a nonlinear model.
For the DLIP forecasts, we see in Table 5.12 that the lowest 
RMSFE values were generated by the two nonlinear models. In Ta-
ble 5.13 we see that even though TAR and STAR both provided better 
RMSFE values, the improvement was not statistically signifi cant. The 
TAR model has the best marginal probability value, 13.1 percent, but 
that means that at conventional signifi cance levels of 5 or even 10 per-
cent we would not reject the hypothesis of equal RMSFE for the linear 
and TAR forecasts. 
For the ER forecasts, we compared both the linear model and the 
CDR model to a random walk baseline. In Table 5.12 we see that the lin-
ear model had better RMSFE values than the random walk model, and 
that the CDR model had better RMSFE values than the linear model, 
but in Table 5.13 we see that neither the linear nor the CDR model im-
proves on the random walk model in a statistically signifi cant amount. 
The results for the DLIP and ER forecasts are disappointing for 
fans of the nonlinear model. In both cases a nonlinear model or models 
made improvements in terms of RMSFE values, but these improve-
ments were not statistically signifi cant.
Table 5.13  GW Version of DM Test (unconditional)—RMSE Loss Function
 Variable to 
forecast
Random 
walk Linear TAR STAR CDR/CDB
DINT — Baseline 1.2871
(p = 0.203)
0.9974
(p = 0.323)
—
DLIP — Baseline 1.5092
(p = 0.131)
1.2880
(p = 0.198)
−0.7353
(p = 0.465)
ER Baseline 1.5329
(p = 0.125)
  0.5257
(p = 0.601)
NOTE: — = model not estimated; blank = not applicable.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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In Table 5.14 we report a similar exercise using the MAFE crite-
rion. Here we fi nd a bit better news for the nonlinear models. For DINT 
we again fi nd that the linear model is best, but for DLIP we fi nd that the 
forecasts from the TAR model are statistically signifi cantly better than 
forecasts from the linear model. The marginal probability value is 3.2 
percent, indicating that at standard signifi cance levels of 5 percent we 
would reject the hypothesis of equal forecasting accuracy—in terms of 
MAFE—of the linear model and the TAR model.
For the ER model the results in Table 5.14 indicate that forecasts 
from the linear model are statistically signifi cantly better than forecasts 
from the random walk model. But we fi nd the disappointing result that 
forecasts from the CDR model are statistically insignifi cantly different 
in accuracy from forecasts of the random walk model. Even though 
the CDR model generated a better MAFE value compared to the linear 
model, the variability of the forecasts from the CDR model means that 
the difference is judged to be statistically insignifi cant.
Overall, then, our forecast evaluation indicates only weak support 
for the superiority of forecasts of DLIP from a TAR model, and even 
weaker support for using a CDR model to forecast ER. We fi nd no sup-
port for using anything other than a linear model for forecasting DINT. 
Basically we fi nd the result, familiar to many in this literature, that non-
linear models appear to fi t well in estimation samples but that these 
models don’t fair nearly as well in out-of-sample forecasting exercises.
Table 5.14  GW Version of DM Test (unconditional)—MAE Loss Function
Random 
walk Linear TAR STAR CDR/CDB
DINT — Baseline 1.3157
(p = 0.194)
1.6432
(p = 0.106)
—
DLIP — Baseline 2.1438
(p = 0.032)
1.4329
(p = 0.152)
−0.2010
(p = 0.841)
ER Baseline 2.0097
(p = 0.044)
0.7158
(p = 0.477)
NOTE: — = model not estimated; blank = not applicable.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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SOME COMMENTS ON MULTIPLE-STEP-AHEAD
FORECASTING
In the analysis above we have investigated the ability of a set of 
nonlinear models to generate forecasts of two fi nancial variables and 
industrial production that are better than forecasts from a linear model. 
This analysis has looked at one-step-ahead forecasts, or forecasts made 
at time t for the value of variables at time t + 1. It is also possible, of 
course, to construct multiple-step-ahead forecasts—forecasts made at 
time t for the value of variables at time t + 2 or later (better represented 
as t + H, where H stands for the horizon) and for multiple-step-ahead 
forecasts H  > 1.
Nonlinear models present particular challenges when construct-
ing multiple-step-ahead forecasts. For linear models the law of iterated 
expectations and the use of the linear expectation operator on linear 
equations makes multiple-step-ahead forecasting a straightforward 
extension of one-step-ahead forecasts. To see this, consider a simple 
AR(1) model:
(5.10) yt = βyt−1 + εt .      
 
To calculate the one-step-ahead forecast we rewrite Equation (5.10) for 
time t + 1 and take expectations conditioned on knowledge of the value 
of y at time t:
(5.11) yt+1 = βyt + εt + 1 .      
   
Then, taking expectations conditioned on knowledge of yt  , we have
(5.12) E(yt+1│yt) = βyt  .      
       
To think about a two-step-ahead forecast made at time t, rewrite Equa-
tion 5.10 for time t + 2 and iteratively substitute to write the result as a 
function of the value of y at time t:
(5.13) yt+2 = βyt+1 + εt+2 = β(βyt + εt+1) + εt+2 = β2yt + βεt+1+ εt+2 .
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Then, taking expectations conditioned on knowledge of yt , we have
(5.14) E(yt + 2 | yt) = β2yt .
Thus the two-step-ahead forecast in Equation 5.14 is a simple 
extension of the one-step-ahead forecast in Equation 5.12. While the 
above is a particularly simple model in terms of notation, the principle 
holds more generally in forecasts from linear models. 
Consider now a nonlinear model. A simple TAR model would be
(5.15) yt = βyt - 1 + γyt - 1 × I (yt - 1 < c) + εt .
         
To calculate the one-step-ahead forecast, we rewrite Equation (5.15) 
for time t + 1 as
(5.16) yt + 1 = βyt + γyt × I (yt < c) + εt + 1 .    
    
Then, taking expectations conditioned on knowledge of yt , we have
        
(5.17) E(yt + 1 | yt) = βyt + γyt × I (yt < c) . 
So far this looks straightforward, much like the one-step-ahead forecast 
from the linear model. However, consider the two-step-ahead forecast made 
at time t. Rewrite Equation (5.15) for time t + 2 and iteratively substitute to 
write the result as a function of the value of y at time t :
(5.18) yt + 2 = βyt + 1 + γyt + 1 × I(yt + 1 < c) + εt + 2
       
or
 yt + 2 = β[βyt + γyt × I (yt < c) + εt + 1] + γ[βyt + γyt ×
 
 I(yt < c) + εt + 1] × I{[βyt + γyt × I(yt < c) + εt + 1] < c} + εt + 2 .
    
Higgins.indb   101 11/3/2011   10:22:55 AM
102   Bradley and Jansen
Then, taking expectations conditioned on knowledge of yt , we have
(5.19) E(yt+2|yt) = β[βyt + γyt × I(yt < c)] + γ[βyt + γyt × I(yt < c)]
 × E(I{[βyt + γyt × I(yt < c) + εt+1] < c}|yt) + E{εt+1
 × I[εt+1< c −βyt − γyt  × I(yt < c)]|yt}. 
 
Clearly, Equation (5.19) is not a straightforward extension of Equa-
tion (5.17). In fact, the last term in Equation (5.17) involves expectation 
of the disturbance term εt + 1 interacted with a function of the same dis-
turbance term εt + 1 . It is evident, then, that the two-step-ahead forecast 
involves considerations of higher moments than the mean. To put this 
in practice requires distributional assumptions on the error term or else 
some sort of bootstrap procedure to calculate expectations from the 
empirically realized (i.e., estimated) disturbances. None of this makes 
multiple-step-ahead forecasts from nonlinear models impossible, but 
they are much more involved than such forecasts in a linear model, and 
as this chapter is already quite long we do not pursue such forecasts 
here.
CONCLUSION
Our study demonstrates once again how nonlinear models can fi t 
very well in-sample and yet struggle to outperform linear models in 
out-of-sample forecasting. This fi nding is not unusual, but it is frustrat-
ing to proponents of nonlinear modeling. Nonlinear modelers usually 
exert care in trying to avoid overfi tting within sample, and yet the out-
of-sample performance diffi culties point to overfi tting as one possible 
source of the problem. The exact reason for these diffi culties with fore-
casts from nonlinear models remains an open issue. 
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Perspectives on Evaluating
Macroeconomic Forecasts
H.O. Stekler
George Washington University
Over the past 50 or so years, I have been concerned with the qual-
ity of economic forecasts and have written both about the procedures 
for evaluating these predictions and the results that were obtained from 
these evaluations. In this chapter I provide some perspectives on the 
issues involved in judging the quality of these forecasts. These include 
the reasons for evaluating forecasts, the questions that have been asked 
in these evaluations, the statistical tools that have been used, and the 
generally accepted results. (I do also present some new material that has 
not yet been published.) I do this in two parts: fi rst focusing on short-
run gross domestic product (GDP) and infl ation predictions and then 
turning to labor market forecasts.
The process of forecasting involves a number of sequential steps. 
Part of that process is concerned with evaluating either the forecasts 
themselves or the methods that generated the predictions. This evalua-
tion may occur either when past forecasts are examined prior to preparing 
the next one or in a postmortem session to determine what went wrong 
and what can be learned from the errors. However, there are different 
perspectives or approaches for conducting these examinations. These 
differences may occur because some forecasts are model-based while 
others are derived primarily from the judgmental approach. There is a 
second issue. Originally, the evaluations were concerned with judging a 
particular model or individual. A more recent development has been to 
determine the value that the forecast has for the users of that prediction. 
The original approach calculated a variety of statistics that mea-
sured the errors of the forecasts and then compared these errors with 
those generated by alternative methods or individuals. The newer ap-
proach for forecast evaluation is to base it on the loss functions of the 
Higgins.indb   105 11/3/2011   10:22:56 AM
106   Stekler
users (Pesaran and Skouras 2002). Elliott and Timmermann (2008), 
in summarizing the theoretical literature on how to evaluate forecasts, 
take the same approach. These studies defi nitely suggest that the pre-
ferred evaluation methodology utilize decision-based methods; Pesaran 
and Skouras, however, note that it has had limited use, and that most 
studies have focused on statistical measures to evaluate the skills of the 
forecaster or the accuracy of the model.1 There are many reasons why 
the decision-based methods have not been used, including technical dif-
fi culties and the huge amount of data required to describe the decision 
environment, particularly the loss functions of the users.
The theoretical procedures provide the guidelines for undertaking 
forecast evaluations, but since there are problems in applying them, 
they have not yet yielded much information about the quality of the 
forecasts or an understanding of the types of errors that occur or their 
causes. Even though we cannot, in general, evaluate the cost of the 
forecast errors in the context of decision functions, I will present one 
particular result where it was possible to use this approach.2
Statistical measures have been the most common method for evalu-
ating forecasts, and they have provided many insights about the quality 
of the forecasts and their limitations. I will, therefore, focus on that 
approach. These measures also provide us with the ability to obtain 
information about the forecasting process and why particular errors oc-
curred. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. I fi rst present a list of questions 
that should be addressed in any evaluation of macroeconomic forecasts; 
this list was taken from an old paper of mine (Stekler 1991a). That pa-
per also presented the statistical methods that could be used to address 
those questions. In the intervening 20 years, forecasters have both de-
veloped new techniques for answering the original questions and asked 
additional questions. I will discuss these in the context of the original 
questions.
Our macroeconomic forecast evaluations have primarily been con-
cerned with the predictions of GDP growth and infl ation. I will, therefore, 
summarize some of the fi ndings relating to these two variables. In mak-
ing macro forecasts, economists also estimate the unemployment rate, 
but these forecasts have not been analyzed as extensively. Consequently, 
there is a limited amount of information about the quality of these 
forecasts.
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Moreover, in analyzing labor markets in a macroeconomic growth 
context, long-term projections of annual employment by industry and 
occupation are sometimes also issued. Not as much attention has been 
paid to the procedures for evaluating these projections. I will present 
some fi ndings about these forecasts, utilizing a statistic that has not 
conventionally been used in evaluations. There are also many types of 
regional forecasts, but I will only discuss the population projections of 
the Census Bureau. I conclude with a summary of the fi ndings and sug-
gest topics that warrant further research.
QUESTIONS ADDRESSED IN MACROECONOMIC
FORECAST EVALUATIONS
In 1991, I asked a number of questions, some of which are related, 
that can be and have been used in forecast evaluations (Stekler 1991a). 
These questions are all statistical in nature and describe the character-
istics of the forecasting method or the particular forecaster. The main 
questions are
• How good is Method A (Forecaster X)?
• Do the forecasts show systematic errors?
• Are all methods (forecasters) equally good?
• Is Method A (Forecaster X) signifi cantly better than Method 
B (Forecaster Y)?
• Does Forecast M contain information not in Forecast N? 
• Does Forecaster X produce forecasts that are useful to users?
How Good is Method A (Forecaster X)? 
If the forecasts are quantitative, the fi rst question is answered by 
using some error metric, usually mean square error or mean square 
percentage error, and comparing it with the similar error metric of a 
benchmark or naive model.3 On the other hand, different procedures are 
used to assess nonquantitative macroeconomic forecasting techniques, 
which are primarily concerned with predicting whether a cyclical turn 
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will occur. These forecasting methods are based on indicators. Originally, 
rules were used for determining whether an indicator was signaling a 
turn. (See Stekler 1991b.) More recently, models that predict the prob-
ability of a cyclical turn have been developed, and probability scoring 
rules such as the Brier Score have been used to evaluate these forecasts. 
Further analysis of these qualitative forecasts is beyond the scope of 
this paper.
Bias and Effi ciency
Accurate forecasts should be unbiased (not have systematic errors) 
and should use all available information. Bias and effi ciency tests are 
used to determine whether there are systematic errors. These tests are 
usually derived from the Mincer-Zarnowitz equation:  
(6.1a)  At = α + β Ft + et  , where                                      
 
 At and Ft refer to the actual and forecast values (Mincer and Zarnowitz 
1969). The condition for unbiasedness and weak form effi ciency is that 
α = 0 and β = 1. An alternative test for bias is 
(6.1b) At − β Ft  = c + et  ,      
 
with the null that c = 0 (Holden and Peel 1990). These tests are applied 
to one individual’s forecasts at one horizon. 
A newer and more sophisticated methodology has been developed 
by Davies and Lahiri (1995, 1999) and has been applied to surveys 
that contain the forecasts of many individuals or organizations, e.g., 
the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) or Blue Chip Forecasters. 
The use of this methodology permits an analysis of multidimensional 
forecasts, i.e., many forecasters each making a prediction for a target 
year at several horizons.4 The errors can be decomposed as
(6.2a)  At − Fith  =  Φi + λth + eith  
  
and 
      
(6.2b)  λth  = ∑ utj , where                                            
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Fith  is the forecast made by the ith forecaster for year t at an h month 
horizon, Φi  represents the specifi c bias of each individual, and λth repre-
sents the shocks that were not anticipated. This model can identify the 
specifi c sources of each forecaster’s errors.
Using the Davies-Lahiri methodology it is no longer necessary to 
confi ne the evaluation of the predictions obtained from a survey to the 
“consensus” forecast. It has the inherent advantage that the opposing 
biases of individuals can make the mean (median) forecast look unbi-
ased even when, in fact, the individual forecasts from which the mean 
is calculated are all biased.
Comparing Forecasters and Benchmarks
Nonparametric procedures have been used to determine whether 
all forecasters are equally accurate. For each set of forecasts, the er-
rors of each forecaster are ranked according to their accuracy. If the 
accuracy of all forecasters were equal, their rankings would have the 
same expected values. It is thus possible to test the hypothesis that all 
forecasters have equal rankings (and are equally good). The chi-square 
goodness-of-fi t test statistic, x2, is used. (See Batchelor 1990.)
The fourth question asks whether a particular method (forecaster) 
is signifi cantly more accurate than another method (forecaster). Origi-
nally, Theil’s U coeffi cient was the basis of comparison:
(6.3)  U = √ (ef,t)2/ √ (en,t)2  ,       
                                                                        
where (ef,t) is the error of the forecast that is being evaluated and (en,t) is 
the error of the naive benchmark. This naive model can be either a no-
change or the same change as the last period prediction. At a minimum, 
the forecasts should be more accurate than naive models and U must 
be less than 1. Statistical models, such as ARIMA, have also been used 
as benchmarks, and new statistics for comparing models have been 
developed.
Currently the Diebold-Mariano (DM) statistic is the preferred meth-
odology for testing whether there is a statistically signifi cant difference in 
accuracy between any two sets of forecasts (Diebold and Mariano 1995). 
That statistic (Equation 6.4) has been modifi ed by Harvey, Leybourne, 
Higgins.indb   109 11/3/2011   10:22:56 AM
110   Stekler
and Newbold (1997), and their modifi cation has resulted in an improve-
ment in the behavior of the test statistic for moderately sized samples:  
 
*
1 1
1 2( 1) ( 1) /( )T h h h TS S
T
     −1/2,    
 
1 1/ 2ˆ[ ( )]
dS
V d

 
(6.4)                    ,
where h is the horizon, d is the mean absolute difference of the pre-
diction errors, ˆ( )V d  is the estimated variance, S1 is the original DM 
statistic, and *1S  is the modifi ed DM statistic. The modifi ed DM test 
statistic is estimated with Newey-West corrected standard errors that 
allow for heteroskedastic autocorrelated errors (Newey and West 1987).
Several procedures have been developed to determine whether 
one forecast contains information not embodied in another procedure. 
One involves combining the two sets of forecasts. If the variance of 
the combined forecasts is not signifi cantly less than the variance of the 
prediction that is being analyzed, then this particular forecast does not 
contain additional useful information. This analysis is similar to the 
concept of encompassing, where a model that encompasses another 
contains the information of the latter.
Directional Accuracy: A New Approach
Even though the analysis does not directly use utility functions, 
the fi nal question listed above relates to the usefulness of a forecast to 
a decision maker. It concerns the directional accuracy of the forecast. 
Merton (1981), in analyzing fi nancial forecasts, indicates that they have 
value if the signs of the predicted and actual changes are similar. The 
various tests that have been implemented seek to determine whether 
the sign of the forecast change is probabilistically independent of the 
actual change. If the hypothesis that the forecasts are independent of 
the observed events is rejected, then the forecasts can be said to have 
value. 
Schnader and Stekler (1990) provide another interpretation of 
this test. We argue that testing whether the forecasts have value is the 
same as determining whether (in the sense of predicting the direction 
of change) the forecast differs signifi cantly from a naive model that 
continuously predicts up (down). The profession now categorizes the 
various tests as measuring directional accuracy. This concept can be 
( )
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illustrated either when GDP or infl ation predictions are made separately 
or when both variables are examined together.
One variable
Most macroeconomic forecast evaluations focus on GDP and in-
fl ation. Basically, when the real GDP and infl ation forecasts are each 
evaluated separately, they are grouped into two categories. The GNP/
GDP forecasts are categorized according to whether GDP growth was 
positive or negative, and the infl ation categories depend on whether in-
fl ation increased or decreased.5 A 2 × 2 contingency table is created that 
compares the predicted outcome of a variable with the actual outcome 
of that variable (Table 6.1).6  
For notation we have a total of N observations where for n1 of them 
both the actual and the predicted are positive and for n2 of them both 
the actual and the predicted are negative. We have n observations where 
the predicted outcome is positive and N − n observations where the 
predicted outcome is negative (or zero). We also have N1 observations 
where the actual outcome is positive and N2 = N – N1 observations 
where the actual outcome is negative (or zero). The Pesaran-Timmerman 
(1992) statistic along with the chi-square and Fisher’s exact test can be 
used to test this hypothesis.7
The Pesaran-Timmermann statistic for predictive performance for an 
m × m contingency table with a total of N observations is 
NOTE: N = total number of observations; N1 = number of observations where the 
actual change was positive; N2 = number of observations where the actual change 
was negative. Small n’s represent the same variables but refer to predicted changes. 
Blank = not applicable.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.
Table 6.1  The Relationship between Predicted and Actual Outcomes
Actual outcome
Predicted outcome > 0 ≤ 0
∆Y > 0 n1 N2 − n2 n
≤ 0 N1 − n1 n2 N − n
N1 N2 N
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the contingency table. ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆPP'   , where ˆ  is an m2 × m2 diagonal 
matrix with the elements of Pˆ on the diagonal.
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,
 
where NnP ii /ˆ 00  .
 NnP ii /ˆ 00  , 
where 0in  and in0  represent the ith row and column totals, respectively. 
Pesaran and Timmermann (1992) present their results based on the 
square of this test statistic in order to more easily compare it to the 
chi-square goodness of fi t statistic. This test statistic has a chi-square 
distribution with one degree of freedom. 
Several variables
All of the questions discussed above were concerned with evalu-
ating the forecasts of one variable at a time. However, in preparing a 
particular macroeconomic forecast, individuals are concerned with the 
outlook for both the growth rate and the rate of infl ation. The accu-
racy of this overall forecast thus depends on how well both variables 
are predicted simultaneously. Thus, it is necessary to use a different 
contingency table for evaluating the directional accuracy of these mac-
roeconomic forecasts. Sinclair, Stekler, and Kitzinger (2010) show that 
the simultaneous directional accuracy of the two variables can be evalu-
ated by using a 4 × 4 contingency table rather than the 2 × 2 table that 
had been used in assessing each variable individually.8
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In the expanded 4 × 4 table, instead of simply being categorized 
based on the separate GDP growth or infl ation predictions, forecasts 
about the state of the economy are grouped into four categories: 1) GDP 
growth positive, infl ation increasing; 2) GDP growth positive, infl a-
tion decreasing; 3) GDP growth negative, infl ation increasing; and 
4) GDP growth negative, infl ation decreasing. The statistical tests are 
generalized versions of those used when the forecasts were analyzed 
separately.9 Table 6.2 illustrates a 4 × 4 contingency table when the 
directional accuracy of the GDP growth and infl ation forecasts of the 
Federal Reserve are evaluated jointly.
Test statistics
The statistical methodology tests whether or not the forecasts pre-
dict the associated directions of change. There are at least three test 
statistics th at can be used to test the hypothesis that the forecasts fail to 
predict the observed events.10 Two test statistics focus on independence. 
These test statistics are the chi-square and Fisher’s exact test. The 
Pesaran-Timmermann (1992) statistic specifi cally focuses on predictive 
failure. The forecasts are said to have value only if the null hypothesis 
of predictive failure is rejected. Pesaran and Timmermann’s predictive-
failure test is particularly useful in the case where we undertake a joint 
evaluation of GDP growth and infl ation forecasts. Their test does not 
require that the two forecasts be independent of each other. Since output 
and infl ation may be predicted from the same forecasting model, this 
is an important consideration. In this particular case, the probability of 
the pattern of these forecasts occurring by chance is less than 0.001. 
Table 6.2  The 4 × 4 Contingency Table for the Zero-Month Lead
Actual outcome
Predicted outcome
ΔGDP > 0,
Δinf > 0
ΔGDP > 0,
Δinf ≤ 0
ΔGDP ≤ 0,
Δinf > 0
ΔGDP ≤ 0,
Δinf ≤ 0
ΔGDP > 0, Δinf > 0 49 13 1 1
ΔGDP > 0, Δinf ≤ 0 7 43 0 4
ΔGDP ≤ 0, Δinf > 0 1 2 4 2
ΔGDP ≤ 0, Δinf ≤ 0 0 3 5 4
SOURCE: Sinclair, Stekler, and Kitzinger (2010).
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Sinclair, Stekler, and Kitzinger (2010) thus conclude that the Fed fore-
casts for the current quarter yield an accurate view of the state of the 
economy. 
Policy Forecast Errors: An Example
In general, to obtain a quantitative measure of the economic costs 
of forecast errors, the decision rule of the user of the prediction must be 
known, but it generally is not known. However, there is at least one case 
where the cost of forecast errors can be measured without knowing an 
explicit decision rule because there is another criterion for evaluating 
forecasts: are fi nancial market and betting market decisions based on 
those forecasts profi table (Leitch and Tanner 1991)? 
Macroeconomic forecasts, however, cannot be evaluated in this 
way, because there is no generally acceptable way of calculating their 
value to policymakers. There is an exception if the rule guiding policy 
decisions is known. Sinclair et al. (2009) show that it is possible to eval-
uate the quantitative forecasts of the Federal Reserve within the context 
of the Taylor Rule, which is assumed to be the one that guides the Fed 
in setting monetary policy.11 The assumption is that the Fed’s forecasts 
of multiple series are usually generated for a specifi c policy purpose, as 
inputs for monetary policy. In this case, an assessment of the quality of 
the quantitative forecasts of two or more variables depends on the rela-
tive importance of each to the Fed.
Specifi cally, let ,
f
t t hP   be a policy decision at time t that is a lin-
ear function of the h-step-ahead forecasts of N ≥ 1 variables
,( ,
f
i t hx   i = 1,...N). The superscript f indicates that the policy decision is based on forecasts rather than on the actual outcomes of the variables: 
 
(6.5) , 1, ,( ,... )
f f f
t t h t h N t hP p x x   .  
If policymakers had perfect foresight, the policy decision would 
simply be Pt , without the superscript f :
(6.6) Pt,t+h = p(x1,t+h ,...xN,t+h) . 
However, because policy is based on forecasts, rather than on the 
actual data, policy is subject to errors that are functions of the mistakes 
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made in forecasting the underlying variables xi,t , i = 1,...N. The differ-ence between the actual policy and the policy that would have been 
pursued under perfect foresight is called the policy forecast error (PFE):
(6.7) ),...(),...( ,,1,,1,,
f
htN
f
hthtNht
f
htthttt xxpxxpPPPFE    
 
 
,...( ,,1 htNht eee  ) ,
where ,... ,,1 htNht ee   are the forecast errors associated with the individ-ual series. Thus the PFE is composed of the individual forecast errors 
weighted by their importance in the policy rule. According to the 
forward-looking Taylor rule,12 the Fed sets a target federal funds rate,
Tf
ti , based on Equation (6.8), where, as above, the superscript f denotes 
that the target is based on forecast variables.13 The Fed’s policy decision 
)( ,
f
httP   is written as
(6.8) , * 0.5( *) 0.5( *)
f Tf f f f
t t h t t h t h t hP i r y y            ,
 
where r* is the equilibrium real interest rate, π* is the Fed’s implicit 
infl ation rate target, and y* is the potential output growth rate.14
The actual outcome in period t + h, however, may differ from the 
Fed’s forecasts. Therefore, if the members of the FOMC had known the 
actual values for t + h and yt + h (i.e., if they had perfect forecasts or per-
fect foresight), they would have chosen a (potentially different) federal 
funds rate. Consequently, their policy decision under perfect foresight 
)( , httP  would have been 
(6.9) , *
T
t t h tP i r     0.5( *) 0.5( *)A A At h t h t hy y        ,
where At h   and A hty  represent the actual realizations of t + h and yt + h . 
The difference between iTf and iT measures the difference in the federal 
funds rate that occurs because of inaccurate forecasts of output growth 
and infl ation and thus represents the Federal Reserve’s policy forecast 
error, PFEt :
(6.10)     1.5 0.5T Tf A f A ft t t t h t h t h t hPFE i i y y          . 
The differences,  f htA ht    and  f htA ht yy   , are the Fed’s fore-
cast errors for the infl ation rate and real output growth, respectively. 
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Given the PFEs, the evaluation procedures are similar to those used in 
judging individual forecast errors. 
Using this methodology, Sinclair et al. (2009) were able to evalu-
ate the impact that forecast errors had on the Fed’s monetary policy 
as characterized by the Taylor rule. They found that the Fed’s policy 
forecast error was in general unbiased and signifi cantly smaller than 
the errors that would have resulted from naive forecasts, but not always 
signifi cantly smaller than the errors that would have resulted from the 
SPF predictions. Nevertheless, the mean absolute policy forecast error 
of the Fed forecasts was approximately 1 percent (100 basis points).
FINDINGS FROM FORECAST EVALUATIONS (OF GDP 
GROWTH AND INFLATION)
There have been many studies that have reported on the accuracy 
of the forecasts of the growth of GDP and infl ation. I have been in-
volved in two survey papers that have summarized and synthesized the 
results of these studies. One looks at U.S. and U.K. forecasts (Fildes 
and Stekler 2002). The other does a similar analysis of the G7 (exclud-
ing the U.S.) predictions (Stekler 2008). By comparing the forecasts of 
various countries, we can determine whether the fi ndings are robust. 
The focus will be on fi ve topics: 1) directional errors; 2) biases and 
systematic errors; 3) the magnitude of the errors; 4) the source of the 
errors; and 5) the trend, if any, in forecast accuracy.
Directional Errors
There are very few analyses about directional errors, because most 
forecast evaluations focus on the magnitude of the quantitative errors. 
However, Fildes and Stekler (2002) note that most U.S. and U.K. reces-
sions were not predicted in advance, but neither did economists make 
many predictions of peaks that did not occur.15 In a more recent study, 
Sinclair, Stekler, and Kitzinger (2010) analyze the directional accuracy 
of the Fed’s forecasts of GDP and infl ation and show that the predic-
tions of increases and decreases in the infl ation rate are not associated 
with the actual changes in that rate. When, however, the directional ac-
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curacy of the GDP and infl ation predictions were analyzed jointly, on 
average the Fed’s forecasts for the current quarter and the one-quarter-
ahead period yielded an accurate view of the state of the economy. 
The record for other countries is no better. The turning points in Ger-
man GDP were not predicted, but the accelerations and decelerations of 
the growth rate were forecast accurately. (Stekler [2008] summarizes 
the literature relating to the forecasts of the G7 countries and indicates 
that the results apply equally to private forecasters, research institutes, 
and international organizations.) The evidence suggests that forecasters 
are not able to predict turning points in advance and may even have dif-
fi culty in detecting them quickly once they have occurred.
Biases and Systematic Errors
Most evaluations examine the rationality and effi ciency of the pre-
dictions in order to determine whether they could have been improved. 
Stekler (2002) reviews a large number of studies and concludes that 
there is no defi nitive evidence that the U.S. infl ation forecasts display 
weak-form informational effi ciency. While more of the U.S. growth 
forecasts did not reject the null of informational effi ciency, these results 
were also mixed.16 The results were dependent on the database that was 
examined, the years that were examined, and the methodology that was 
employed. However, most of these analyses did not test whether the 
forecasts were truly ineffi cient or whether the errors could be attribut-
able to asymmetric loss functions.
Forecasters also made systematic errors. They overestimated the rate 
of growth during slowdowns and underestimated it during recoveries 
and booms. Similarly, infl ation was underpredicted when it was rising 
and overpredicted when it was declining. (See the surveys of Fildes and 
Stekler [2002] and Stekler [2008] for the specifi c studies from which 
these results were obtained.) Fildes and Stekler conclude, “These errors 
occurred when the economy was subject to major perturbations, just the 
time when accurate forecasts were most needed” (p.442).
Magnitude of the Errors
Although these qualitative fi ndings about directional and system-
atic errors are important to our understanding the forecasting process, 
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most evaluations have also provided quantitative estimates of these er-
rors. Fildes and Stekler (2002) report that the mean absolute error of 
annual U.S. and U.K. GDP growth forecasts is around 1 percent. Newer 
studies have found similar results for the G7 countries, but previously 
Öller and Barot (2000) had found that the errors were larger for some of 
the other European countries (Stekler 2008). 
When quarterly GDP estimates were examined, the previous papers 
did not all use identical procedures for calculating the mean absolute 
errors.17 Consequently, our fi ndings are not as complete. We do know 
that there is a substantial improvement in accuracy when the forecast-
ing task switches from predicting what will happen in the next quarter 
to estimating the level of activity in the current quarter. This is largely 
attributable to the availability of actual data for the current period.
The infl ation forecasts seem to have improved. The earlier U.S. in-
fl ation forecasts had mean absolute errors between 1.0 and 1.4 percent, 
but Stekler’s (2008) survey of G7 forecasts shows that those errors are 
now between 0.5 and 0.75 percent. The reduction may be attributable 
to the lower infl ation rates that have been observed in the past several 
decades.
Have the Forecasts Improved?
Given the number of papers that have evaluated macroeconomic 
forecasts, it is surprising how few have asked whether the quality of 
the predictions has improved over time. The problem is not the lack 
of data, for we have 40 years’ worth of forecasts for some countries. 
However, the fi ndings of those studies that have examined this issue 
are contradictory, and thus there are no defi nitive conclusions. For ex-
ample, Heilemann and Stekler (2003) examine German forecasts and 
adjust the errors for the diffi culties in predicting the relevant periods, 
but the results are mixed. Dopke and Fritsche (2006) also look at Ger-
man forecasts and suggest that accuracy may have improved. As for the 
predictions of international organizations, Vogel (2007) shows that the 
accuracy of the OECD forecasts has improved, but Timmerman (2007) 
indicates that the quality of the International Monetary Fund forecasts 
has deteriorated. These fi ndings are consistent with those summarized 
by Fildes and Stekler (2002). We conclude that despite all the resources 
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that have been devoted to forecasting, there is no clear evidence that 
accuracy has improved.
This fi nding suggests that we may have reached the limits of 
forecastability. Heilemann and Stekler (2003) have investigated this 
hypothesis. We calculated the ex post forecast errors generated by simu-
lations obtained from econometric models. These models can serve as a 
benchmark of the maximum accuracy that is attainable because they are 
free from errors caused by wrong assumptions about the predetermined 
variables and the inability to capture the dynamics of multiperiod fore-
casts. We fi nd that the model’s infl ation errors are very similar to those 
that were made ex ante for the same period. This result indicates that 
the accuracy of the infl ation forecasts could not have been improved 
substantially. On the other hand, the model’s growth rate errors are sub-
stantially smaller than the ex ante errors, suggesting that the quality of 
the ex ante real-sector forecasts can still be improved.
Sources of Error: Recessions
A model-based forecast can be decomposed into various sources. 
The forecast depends upon the econometric specifi cation, the exoge-
nous variables and the corresponding predictions of these variables, and 
any adjustment that the economist makes to the model output. There are 
analytical diffi culties associated with determining why each of these 
errors occurred. One example of this diffi culty occurs when econome-
tricians make assumptions about the exogenous variables rather than 
model adjustments to subjectively infl uence their forecasts. 
Nevertheless, there is agreement that recessions are a signifi cant 
cause of some of these errors. A large portion of GDP forecast errors 
are attributable to the failure to predict the occurrence of recessions. 
If recessions and booms are caused by events such as changes in asset 
prices that, it is assumed, cannot be predicted, then the recessions are 
themselves unforecastable. Fair (2009) fi nds that, ex post, some reces-
sions could be predicted even if some key exogenous asset variables 
were estimated using only baseline paths.18 The failure to adequately 
predict the other recessions could be explained by the inability to esti-
mate some or all of these key exogenous variables.
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What Have We Learned?
The evidence about the macro forecasts that has been presented 
here is very robust.19 The fi ndings of Fildes and Stekler (2002) that 
primarily related only to U.S. and U.K. forecasters are similar to those 
relating to the G7 economists. Both types of studies fi nd that recessions 
are not predicted in advance and account for a signifi cant portion of the 
quantitative errors. Neither type of study is able to show that forecast 
accuracy had improved, and both fi nd that there were systematic errors. 
There may be a quantitative limit beyond which forecast accuracy can-
not be improved (Heilemann and Stekler 2003).
Finally, we now have a somewhat better understanding of the fore-
casting process. We have learned that forecasts for a horizon longer 
than 12–18 months might not be valuable (Isiklar and Lahiri 2007; 
Vuchelen and Gutierrez 2005). We also know more about the causes of 
bias. Batchelor (2007) shows how the systematic errors or “biases” are 
related to the forecasters’ optimism (or pessimism) and conservatism in 
revising their predictions. He notes that standard rationality tests are not 
appropriate if there has been a structural break. The pattern of the errors 
can then provide a way of understanding the forecasters’ learning pro-
cess about the impact of this structural break. Isiklar and Lahiri (2007) 
use forecast revisions to explain the behavioral characteristics of fore-
casters—i.e., how do they react to news and when is news important?20 
We know that there is much more work to be done in determining the 
importance of asymmetric losses, the sources of biases, the limits of 
accuracy, etc. Much can be learned about the sources of error if we un-
dertake more studies like Heilemann’s (2002).
LABOR MARKET FORECASTS
We now turn to a discussion of labor market forecasts. There are 
many fewer studies of these types of forecasts. Consequently, our re-
sults will be less informative. Before I discuss the results of evaluations 
of the forecasts of these variables, I want to briefl y note that several 
labor market series are used as indicators or predictors about the over-
all state of the economy. These are outlined in the next section. Next 
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I consider the short-run quantitative forecasts of the U.S. unemploy-
ment rate. Finally, I consider long-run projections and the procedures 
for evaluating them. I also show that the methodology for evaluating 
long-run labor market forecasts can be used to analyze other types of 
long-run projections.
Labor Market Series as Indicators
The U.S. unemployment rate moves countercyclically and may dis-
play an asymmetric relationship with changes in GDP. It may have a 
short lead (or be coincident) at business cycle peaks, but it lags at the 
troughs (Montgomery et al. 1998). The unemployment rate is not con-
sidered either a leading or a coincident indicator. There are, however, 
two other series that are considered leading indicators of cyclical move-
ments and one series that is considered a coincident indicator. These 
are series that are included in the various indicator indexes currently 
compiled and published by the Conference Board.
The two leading series are 1) average weekly hours in manufac-
turing and 2) average weekly claims for unemployment insurance.21 
While Diebold and Rudebusch (1989, 1991) have evaluated the com-
posite leading indicators, I have found only one paper that examined 
the forecasting behavior of either of those series—Seip and McNown 
(2007). Seip and McNown examined the behavior of average weekly 
hours, but their analysis produced contradictory fi ndings. For example, 
they examined the Granger causality between movements in the weekly 
hours series and changes in the Federal Reserve Board Index of Indus-
trial Production. Their results show that the hours series is a lagging 
indicator with respect to the Index of Production, which is a coincident 
indicator. On the other hand, using sophisticated phase analysis, they 
fi nd that the timing at turning points suggests that it is a leading indica-
tor, but not that accurate of one.
It is possible that there may be another labor market series that 
could be a leading indicator. The offi cial U.S. unemployment rate series 
is not the only measure of labor slack in the economy; the U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor also compiles other measures of unemployment. The 
offi cial or conventional unemployment rate is called U3 and measures 
the total number of unemployed persons as a percentage of the civilian 
labor force. The broadest BLS measure of unemployment is called U6. 
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It includes two additional categories: 1) people who have left the labor 
force because they have become discouraged at failing to fi nd employ-
ment and 2) individuals who are working part time but would prefer to 
be full-time employees.
The difference between the two rates, therefore, represents the 
degree of labor underutilization that is not captured by the traditional 
unemployment rate. Figure 6.1 displays the difference between the U6 
and U3 series and seems to indicate that this difference becomes larger 
before the cyclical turns of the U.S. business cycles for the period 
1970–2009. The NBER-dated recessions are shaded. However, there 
has been no rigorous and systematic evaluation of this series to deter-
mine whether, in fact, this series is an adequate leading indicator.
The Conference Board also compiles and publishes a composite 
index of coincident series. The movements in this index roughly track 
the cyclical movements of the economy. There are four series in this 
composite index, with “employees on nonagricultural payrolls” repre-
senting the labor market. We should note the importance of using labor 
market data for forecasting cyclical movements, but the procedures for 
evaluating these time series as indicators are beyond the scope of this 
chapter.
Modeling and Forecasting the Unemployment Rate
Neftçi (1984) fi nds that the U.S. unemployment rate has an in-
teresting characteristic: it displays asymmetric behavior because the 
probability of a decline following two previous declines differs from 
the probability of an increase given two prior increases. This suggests 
that a linear model would not adequately explain the behavior of this 
series. Subsequently, a number of univariate nonlinear models were de-
veloped to explain and then forecast this series.22 More recently, Milas 
and Rothman (2008) go one step further by developing multivariate 
nonlinear models to explain the U.S. unemployment rate.
Only a small number of these nonlinear models have actually been 
used to forecast the U.S. unemployment rate. Rothman (1998) uses 
six models and, based on out-of-sample recursive simulations, con-
cludes that their performance is better than that of a linear model.23 
Montgomery et al. (1998) undertake a more comprehensive evaluation. 
They use a threshold autoregressive (TAR) model to generate simulated 
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recursive forecasts. These forecasts displayed smaller errors than were 
generated by the linear ARIMA model. Moreover, although no formal 
statistical tests were used, the forecasts of the TAR model appeared 
to be unbiased. Similarly, neural network models (Moshiri and Brown 
2004) and nonparametric nonlinear models (Golan and Perloff 2004) 
were superior to linear models in forecasting the unemployment rate. 
In fact, Golan and Perloff indicate that their model is superior to the 
nonlinear TAR model. 
Unfortunately, it is unlikely that any of these models will become 
the standard methodology for forecasting the unemployment rate. The 
median SPF forecast was more accurate than either the TAR or the non-
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Figure 6.1  Difference between U6 and U3, 1970–2009
NOTE: U3 = The percentage of U.S. workers unemployed according to the conven-
tional measure. U6 = The percentage of those people plus two other categories: 
1) people who have left the labor force because they became discouraged at not fi nd-
ing work and 2) people working part time who would prefer to be working full time. 
The NBER-dated recessions are shaded.
SOURCE: Dougherty (2009).
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parametric nonlinear models. In addition, Golan and Perloff fi nd that 
the Michigan structural model also generated smaller errors.
Given these results, it is appropriate to also report some fi ndings 
about nonmodel forecasts of the unemployment rate. The median SPF 
forecast was not only more accurate than the model predictions, but it 
was also superior to the Federal Reserve’s Greenbook estimates for the 
period 1983–2004 (Baghestani 2008). The SPF errors are asymmetric, 
with mean errors during expansions amounting to less than 0.1 per-
cent, while during recessions those errors sometimes exceed 1.0 percent 
(Montgomery et al. 1998). The Greenbook estimates are unbiased, but 
the errors are also asymmetric (Sinclair, Stekler, and Joutz 2008). 
There is additional information about the quality of nonmodel un-
employment rate forecasts. Carroll (2003) notes that the SPF forecasts 
were more accurate than those obtained from the Michigan Household 
Surveys (MHS). The MHS eventually did update its forecasts to con-
form to those of the professional forecasters. Professional forecasters’ 
estimates of the unemployment rate were also consistent with Okun’s 
Law, given their predictions of the change in real GDP (Pierdzioch, 
Rülke, and Stadtmann 2011).
These results suggest that we economists recognize the asymmetric 
behavior of the unemployment rate but have not yet been able to de-
velop an appropriate model that captures the asymmetries better than 
our judgment does.
Long-Term Labor Market Forecasts: Methodology
The Bureau of Labor Statistics makes long-run projections of a 
number of variables. The variables include the size of the labor force, 
employment by industry, and employment by occupation. Because the 
projections are for a horizon of 10 or more years, they may be evaluated 
differently from analyses of short-term macroeconomic predictions. 
For example, an evaluation of these BLS long-term projections poses 
three methodological issues that usually are not encountered in analyses 
of short-term macroeconomic forecasts. 
First, no other organization made projections of these variables. 
Consequently, there is no benchmark for judging the BLS forecasts. 
Second, these projections are long-term, not the short-term macroeco-
nomic forecasts that have been evaluated in the past. Thus, the questions 
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that must be addressed in such an evaluation can differ from those 
addressed in the macro forecasts. Finally, such a projection is a one-
time forecast.24 I will illustrate these issues with an example and show 
how the labor-force, employment-by-industry, and occupation projec-
tions that BLS made in 1989 for the year 2000 were evaluated (Stekler 
and Thomas 2005). Although these forecasts had already been evalu-
ated individually (Fullerton 2003), it was possible both to ask additional 
questions that had not been addressed in earlier studies and to use eval-
uation methodologies different from those employed previously.
Benchmarks
There are no other forecasts that are comparable to the BLS pro-
jections; it is, therefore, necessary to construct a benchmark for the 
projections of each variable. In each case, BLS projections are com-
pared with similar data obtained from the forecasts of these benchmarks. 
The benchmarks that were selected all use data that were available at 
the time when the BLS projections were prepared. In actuality, the 
benchmarks are taken from one of two naive models that are either 
1) projecting the latest available information or 2) predicting that the 
change over the forecast period is equal to that observed over the previ-
ous time interval, which is of the same length as the forecast period.25 
The projections that are being analyzed in this article were prepared in 
1988; thus the forecast period is 12 years in length. Consequently, the 
change from 1976 to 1988 was used as the benchmark here. At a mini-
mum, the BLS projections should be more accurate than the forecasts 
of these naive models.
Questions in evaluating long-term projections versus short-
term forecasts
The questions that are appropriate for evaluating the short-term 
forecasts have been examined in detail, but the questions that should 
be asked in analyzing longer-run projections have not been given the 
same degree of attention. Because BLS projections primarily focus on 
long-run trends, the questions asked and the statistics used in evaluat-
ing these forecasts should be related to the primary emphasis of the 
forecast. 
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Thus, the two basic questions to be asked in evaluating these pro-
jections are as follows:
1) Have the trends, specifi cally structural changes, been predicted 
correctly? and
2) Were these forecasts better than those that could have been pro-
duced by a benchmark method?
Additional questions concerning the sources of the errors and 
whether the forecasts improved over time can also be posed. 
The statistics that can answer these questions include the following 
four:
1) the percentage of components where the direction of change 
was predicted correctly;
2) dissimilarity indexes that measure the structure of the labor 
force;
3) contingency tables that determine whether the actual and pre-
dicted directions of change are related; and
4) Spearman’s rank correlation coeffi cients, which measure the 
relationship between the predicted and actual changes in the 
components of an aggregate forecast. 
Questions about the labor force projection are listed in Table 6.3.26 
These include the following four:
1) What is the projected size of the labor force, by age and gender?
2) What is the growth rate of the labor force?
3) What are the participation rates of the various groups? and
4) What is the distribution of the total labor force by age and 
gender?
The error measures that were used in evaluating these projections 
are also presented in Table 6.3. They include the direction of error, the 
absolute and percentage error, the dissimilarity index, etc. The limita-
tions of these questions and statistics are also noted.
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Measuring structural change: dissimilarity indexes 
In order to determine whether the structural changes and major 
trends that occurred between 1988 and 2000 were predicted accurately, 
a statistic is used that directly addresses this question. The forecast of 
the total labor force is an aggregated estimate, and it is important to also 
examine the disaggregated component predictions. Such an analysis en-
ables one to determine whether the structure of the aggregate has been 
predicted accurately—i.e., whether the distribution of the labor force 
across various categories is accurate.
If the aggregate, X, is predicted according to some scenario (for 
example, full employment), one would want to determine whether 
the structure is accurate even if the total is wrong. Kolb and Stekler 
(1992) developed a procedure for decomposing the total error into two 
components, where the fi rst measures the scenario discrepancy and the 
second the structural error. They calculated the proportion of the aggre-
gate predicted and actual totals that were associated with each of the i 
components. While their analysis was based on an information-content 
statistic, using dissimilarity indexes would yield the same result. 
A dissimilarity index is a statistic that can be used to determine 
whether one distribution approximates another one. Specifi cally, it 
measures the amount by which the forecasted distribution would have 
to change to be identical to the actual distribution. The formula for the 
dissimilarity index is 
(6.11) D = 0.5 ∑ | (Pfi  / Pf ) − (Pai / Pa) | , 
where Pfi  is the forecast proportion of the labor force that will be in the 
ith group, and Pf is the forecast for the total labor force. Similarly, Pai 
and Pa are the corresponding actual data. D is bounded in the interval 
of 0 to 100 percent. The smaller the value of D, the smaller the differ-
ence between the predicted and actual distributions—that is, the more 
accurate the forecast.
The dissimilarity index for the BLS labor force projections was 
based on the 14 age/gender categories that had been used in 1989 to 
prepare the estimates for 2000. Similar dissimilarity indexes were 
constructed for the other distributions that serve as standards of com-
parison. The values of the various dissimilarity indexes are presented 
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Questions Accuracy measure
Problem with 
measure or question New question or measure
What is the size of the total 
labor force?
Mean absolute error; 
percentage error; direction 
of error
Does not distinguish between 
census population errors and 
participation rate errors; 
no standard of comparison
How much of total labor 
force error is the result of 
participation rate errors? 
Standard of comparison: 
1988 participation rates
What is the size of the labor 
force by gender?
Mean absolute error; 
percentage error; direction 
of error
Same as total labor force Same as total labor force
What is the growth rate of
the total labor force?
Error in percentage points Same as total labor force How much of the error in 
the growth rate forecast is 
the result of participation 
rate errors? Standard 
of comparison: 1988 
participation rates
What are the participation 
rates of total labor force?
Of men? Of women?
By age and sex?
Error in percentage points,
or absolute error/
participation rate; mean 
absolute percentage error
Does not indicate whether 
direction of change in 
participation rate was 
predicted; no standard of 
comparison
Were the directions of 
change in the participation 
rates accurately predicted? 
Standard of comparison: 
number of changes accurately 
predicted vs. predictions by 
chance (binomial,  p = 0.5)
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What is the distribution of the 
labor force by age and sex?
— No standard of comparison Comparison standard: 
dissimilarity index based on 
1988 distribution
NOTE: — = no established accuracy measure.
SOURCE: Stekler and Thomas (2005).
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in Appendix Table 6A.3. The benchmarks were the projections based 
on various estimates of the population and alternative estimates of the 
participation rates.
The results are mixed. In some cases, the dissimilarity indexes ob-
tained from the BLS projections are smaller (and thus more accurate) 
than those of the standards of comparison. In other cases, the opposite 
results were obtained. However, the dissimilarity index for the actual 
BLS forecast never exceeds 2 percent for any age/gender category or 
for men or women separately. The values of the dissimilarity indexes 
of the standards of comparison were comparable. While there is no 
statistical distribution for the dissimilarity index, the BLS projection 
substantially predicted the structural changes that occurred in the labor 
force between 1988 and 2000. On the other hand, similar results were 
obtained from the naive models that served as the benchmarks.
Similar procedures were used to evaluate the employment-by-
industry and occupational projections. The BLS employment and naive 
projections were again similar, but the BLS occupational estimates were 
more accurate than the naive benchmark. Stekler and Thomas (2005) 
conclude that the accuracy of the BLS projections are comparable to the 
estimates obtained from naive extrapolative methods.
The applicability of the long-term evaluation methodology
The methodology that was applied in evaluating the BLS long-
term projections has not been widely used. I want to show that it has 
a wider applicability by evaluating some long-run census population 
projections. One benefi t of this analysis is the existence of multiple pro-
jections for a given date, permitting us to determine how the accuracy 
changes with a reduction in the forecast horizon.
The Census Bureau makes periodic forecasts of the population of 
the United States 5, 10, or more years into the future. These forecasts 
are both for the total U.S. population and for the number of inhabitants 
of each of the states. There have been many evaluations of these state 
forecasts (e.g., Campbell 2002; Smith and Sincich 1990, 1992; Wang 
2002). In all cases, the error measures were based on the magnitude 
of the discrepancies between the projected and actual state population 
fi gures.
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In addition to statistics that measure the quantitative errors, one 
can use the methodology that was applied to the BLS projections for 
these census data. One of the purposes of a long-range projection of 
each state’s population is to provide a picture of the distribution of the 
aggregate U.S. population among the various states. If one were only 
interested in knowing whether the projections captured the important 
trends that actually occurred, one might not be concerned with the mag-
nitude of the errors. The accuracy of the quantitative projections of each 
state’s total population is then not as relevant.
It is possible that the share of the nation’s population that was in 
each state was predicted correctly, but that the national total and the 
estimates for each of the states were inaccurate by the same proportion. 
In that case, the projected distribution of the state populations would 
have exactly matched the observed distribution. Thus, the evaluation 
procedure that is suggested here does not focus on the specifi c numbers 
in the projections or the magnitude of the misestimates. Rather, this 
evaluation asks whether the projected share of the total U.S. population 
by state was similar to the actual distribution. Such an analysis enables 
one to determine whether the state distribution of the aggregate popula-
tion was accurate even if the aggregate estimate is inaccurate.
Decomposing the errors. Assume that atx  is the actual aggregate 
population of the United States at time t and ftx  is the aggregate value 
that was projected for time t. The error in the aggregate projection is 
(6.12)  a ft t te x x  .    
                           
In addition, it is possible to examine the errors associated with the 
population projections for each of the i states. Accordingly, the pro-
portions of the forecasted ( fi) and actual (ai) aggregated population 
associated with each of the i states are
, ,( )
f f
i t i t tx f x  ;        . ,( ) ;a ai t i t tx a x         ∑ fi,t = 1;        ∑ ai,t = 1 ;          
                  
and the forecast error for each state is  
(6.14)  , , ,( ) ( )
a f
i t i t t i t te a x f x  .     
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If the aggregate forecast is absolutely accurate, the quantitative er-
ror for each state would be
(6.15)  , , , ,( )
a
i t i t i t i te a f x   , 
                                 
which is the difference between the actual and forecast proportions of 
the aggregate population in each state. The same holds true if the ag-
gregate forecast is inaccurate. If a ft tx x , 
(6.16)  , , , ,( ) ( )
a a f
i t i t i t t i t t te a f x f x x    .  
                            
Thus the quantitative forecast error for each state, ei,t , is the sum 
of two components. The fi rst represents the error in predicting the pro-
portion of the population in each state. The second measures the error 
in failing to predict the aggregate correctly. In order to evaluate these 
long-term population forecasts, we will focus on the fi rst term, using the 
dissimilarity measure as our statistic.
The alternative methodology (benchmark) in this case is a naive 
model, because a valid forecasting procedure should be as accurate as 
this type of model. In this case, we assume that the naive projection 
of the states’ shares of the U.S. population for year t + h is identical to 
the known distribution that is available from either the census count or 
from the population estimate in year t, the year from which the projec-
tion was extended.
Data. We evaluate the census state population projections that were 
made between 1970 and 1996 for the years 1975–2005.27 There are 
seven such sets of projections. The length of the forecasting horizon 
varied between 2 and 25 years. The naive projections were made using 
the same starting points and horizons. These projections were compared 
either with the actual census counts for 1980, 1990, and 2000 or with 
the population estimates that the Census Bureau made for 1975, 1985, 
1995, and 2005.
Results. The dissimilarity indexes derived from both the census 
and naive projections are presented in Table 6.4. The longer the pro-
jection horizon, the larger the size of the dissimilarity index that was 
associated with the projections—i.e., the less accurate the projected 
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distribution. This result is similar to fi ndings about the relationship 
between quantitative errors and the length of the horizon in short-run 
forecasts. As indicated above, the size of these indexes measures the 
amount by which the projected distribution would have to change to be 
identical to the actual distribution. This ranged from less than 1 percent 
for the very short projections to more than 5 percent for some of the 
longer horizons. 
Moreover, the projections seem to have improved over time. For the 
fi ve-year projections, the values of the dissimilarity indexes declined 
from more than 1.5 percent to less than 1 percent. The magnitude of the 
index for the ten-year projection made in 1970 was almost 4 percent; 
the similar measurements for the projections made in the late 1980s and 
Table 6.4  Values of Dissimilarity Index (%) for Census and 
 Naive Forecasts
Year 
projections 
made
Year of projection
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
1970 a 1.7
b 1.7
[ 0.2]
a 3.9
b 3.9
[ 0.4]
a 5.5
b 5.5
[ 0.7]
 a  6.5
 b  6.4
  [ 0.8]
1975   1.8
[ 2.7]
 3.7
   [0.7]
5.3
   [0.9]
1980  2.5
    [0.4]
4.2
[0.7]
1986  1.0
[0.2]
1.2
   [0.3]
1.9
   [0.4]
  2.3
 [0.4]
1988  a  0.6
 b  0.8
   [0.1]
a  2.5
b  1.7
   [0.4]
1992 0.4
   [0.1]
1.4
   [0.2]
  2.0
 [0.4]
1996 0.8
   [0.2]
  1.2
 [0.3]
NOTE: Numbers in brackets are for naive (benchmark) projections. There were two 
sets of census projections issued in 1970 and 1988. They are denoted “a” and “b.” 
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.
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1990s were all less than 1.5 percent. A similar trend was observed in the 
more recent twenty-year projections.
Nevertheless, the census forecasts associated with the distributions 
of the state population forecasts are inferior to the naive forecasts (Ta-
ble 6.4). In all but one case, the dissimilarity indexes associated with 
the naive forecasts are smaller than the ones derived from the compa-
rable census projections. The exception is the fi ve-year projection made 
in 1975.
CONCLUSIONS
In providing these perspectives on forecast evaluations, I started 
with questions that were posed 20 years ago. While the nomenclature 
may have changed, we still ask the same questions today. On the other 
hand, the statistical and econometric foundations of our analyses have 
been vastly improved, and new methodologies for forecasting have 
been developed. 
Despite all these efforts, there are not many positive results to re-
port about the quality of our forecasting techniques. We do know that 
combining forecasts tends to improve accuracy. We also can test for the 
limits of forecastability and can determine whether we have achieved 
that limit yet.
On the negative side, our results on the question of whether the ac-
curacy of our forecasts has improved over time are ambiguous. We still 
fail to predict turning points, and the short-run forecasts still display bi-
ases and ineffi ciencies. The limited amount of evidence about long-run 
labor market and population projections suggests that, in some dimen-
sions, they are no better than naive models.
However, we should not despair but rather focus on another aspect 
of these results. We still have immense opportunities for productive 
research. Let me suggest a few entries in a laundry list of possible re-
search topics.
• How can we improve our forecasting models?
• Using these models, what are the limits of forecastability?
• How does one predict turning points?
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• Why do economists prefer failing to forecast a turn that occurs 
rather than predicting a turn that does not happen?
• How valuable are indicators?
• Do forecasters have asymmetric loss functions?
• How are expectations (forecasts) formed?
• How do individuals go about making and revising their 
forecasts?
• What are the appropriate techniques for evaluating multivariate 
forecasts?
• For evaluating long-run predictions?
• For evaluating probability forecasts such as those contained in 
fan charts?
• How valuable are market-based (futures) forecasts?
• Finally, to what extent do real-time data problems affect our 
predictive accuracy?
To answer these questions, many more studies, such as those cited 
here, are required. It will obviously take time to answer all of these 
questions, but the results should provide a substantial payoff in in-
creased forecast accuracy.
Notes
1. West (2006) has still another view about forecast evaluation: he argues that these 
evaluations provide inferences about the characteristics of models. Thus the fo-
cus is exclusively on forecasts generated by models, whether in sample or out of 
sample. 
2. In that regard, the aforementioned econometric procedures for conducting evalua-
tions provide a rigorous theoretical methodology for the statistical measures.
3. The mean square error criterion is associated with a quadratic loss function. (See 
Elliott and Timmermann 2008.) Another metric is mean absolute error.
4. This method can also be applied to one forecaster making several forecasts for the 
same horizon. (See Clements, Joutz, and Stekler 2007.)
5. No change is classifi ed with the negative changes. Note that we are focusing on the 
direction of change in the infl ation rate, which is equivalent to measuring accelera-
tions and decelerations of the price level.
6. The contingency table methodology is used to test whether the sign of the pre-
dicted change is probabilistically independent of the sign of the actual change. 
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This is also a test of the hypothesis that the forecasts are more accurate than those 
of a naive random-walk model in predicting the direction of change. (See Stekler 
1994, p. 497.)
7. The chi-square and Fisher’s exact test are well known and are not presented here.
8. Naik and Leuthold (1986) also use a 4 × 4 contingency table in their qualitative 
analysis of forecasting performance. Their study focuses on a different topic—the 
ability to predict turning points. (Also see Kaylen and Brandt 1988.)
9. There is, however, a difference in interpretation once we go beyond the simple 
2 × 2 case. In particular, the 2 × 2 contingency table tests for predictive failure 
of only one variable, whereas the 4 × 4 contingency table tests for predictive fail-
ure of both variables. Moreover, in the 2 × 2 case, the hypothesis of predictive 
failure is equivalent to the hypothesis that the actual and predicted values of the 
variable are independent of each other. As discussed in Pesaran and Timmermann 
(1992), however, for the 4 × 4 case they are no longer equivalent. For our contin-
gency table, independence implies predictive failure, but not vice versa. 
10. Merton (1981) and Henriksson and Merton (1981) use a test based on the hyper-
geometric distribution. This is identical to Fisher’s exact test. Their test assumes 
known row and column frequencies, which is not assumed for the Pesaran-
Timmermann test.
11. The literature assumes that the Taylor rule is an approximation to the decision rule 
of the Fed. Also note that this procedure is in the framework of a decision-based 
forecast evaluation, discussed above.
12. Although Taylor (1993) originally proposed his rule as an empirical description of 
past Fed policy actions, Woodford (2001a,b) has shown that the Taylor rule can 
also be justifi ed based on a fi rm theoretical foundation. 
13. Following Orphanides (2001), we assume that the Fed uses the Greenbook fore-
casts in their decision rule. The members of the FOMC also make their own 
forecasts, but they have access to the staff forecasts of the Greenbook when doing 
so. For an evaluation of those forecasts, see Romer and Romer (2008). 
14. While the output gap is typically used in the Taylor rule, the growth rate is 
typically used in forecast evaluation. The growth rate of the actuals is approxi-
mately ln(Yt) − ln(Yt−1), whereas the growth rate of the forecasts is approximately 
ln( ftY ) − ln(Yt−1). Thus, when we subtract one from the other for the policy forecast 
error, we have ln(Yt) − ln(
f
tY ). Approximating the output gaps in the same manner, 
we have ln(Yt) – ln(Y*) and ln( ftY ) – ln(Y*), so again we have ln(Yt) − ln(
f
tY ). It is 
this result that permits us to use the growth rate in order to construct the PFEs. This 
analysis does assume, however, that potential output, Y*, is known rather than a 
forecast. This assumption is based on the lack of forecasts for this variable in the 
Greenbook. For a discussion of the role of real time output gap estimates and the 
Taylor rule, see Orphanides (2001).  
15. The U.S. false turns predicted in 1978–1979 were an exception, but real GNP did 
decline for two quarters during this period.
16. The U.K. forecasts yielded similar results.
17. Some authors transform the errors into annual growth rates; others do not. 
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18. The exogenous asset variables in the Fair (2009) model are equity prices and hous-
ing prices. His simulations also assumed that import prices and exports as well as 
the asset variables could only be estimated using baseline benchmarks.
19. This summary refers only to the fi ndings mentioned in the text. There are many 
other topics in the forecasting literature that were not reviewed and are beyond the 
scope of this paper. These include the quality of the data (Öller and Teterukovsky 
2007), leading indicators (Allen and Morzuch 2006), and the role of judgmental 
forecasting (Lawrence et al. 2006). In addition, one could investigate the value of 
combining forecasts, the value of data revisions, and the question of which actuals 
to use in conducting an evaluation.
20. In the forecasts made for year t, the most important revisions occur at the end of 
t − 1.
21. The Conference Board has constructed a Composite Leading Index, and these se-
ries are included in that index. They have also been included in earlier composite 
indexes that have been constructed by the U.S. Department of Commerce.
22. Skalin and Teräsvirta (2002) provide a list of studies that have employed nonlinear 
models to estimate unemployment rates. Swanson and White (1997) select models 
based on their ability to predict macroeconomic variables, including the unem-
ployment rate, in real time. Clements and Krolzig (2003) survey the development 
of asymmetric business-cycle models and develop statistical tests but do not apply 
these models to U.S. unemployment data.
23. Pool and Speight (2000) had a similar fi nding for the U.K. and Japanese economies.
24. In most forecast evaluations, there is a time series of forecasts. It is then possible 
to discuss the characteristics of the average forecast. This is not possible with a 
single observation.
25. These benchmarks are identical to the ones used to calculate the U coeffi cients in 
short-run forecast evaluations.
26. The questions about occupation projections and employment are presented in Ap-
pendix Tables 6A.1 and 6A.2.
27. The data were obtained from U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Re-
ports, Series P25, Nos. 477, 735, 937, 1017, 1044, 1053, and 1111.
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140Table 6A.1  Questions about Occupational Forecasts
Question Accuracy measure
Problem with question
and/or accuracy measure New question and/or measure
How many people 
will be employed in 
each occupation?
Absolute error; absolute 
percentage error
No standard of comparison; gives 
equal weight to large and small 
occupations
Standard of comparison: naive 
model—same growth; mean 
weighted percentage error
Which occupations 
will grow fastest?
Compare the number of 
occupations projected 
to grow the fastest with 
those that did grow fastest; 
distribution of growth rates 
by growth adjectives
No standard of comparison; 
no analysis of all occupations’ 
projected and actual growth rates
Spearman’s rank correlation 
coeffi cient; standard of comparison 
not possible because of defi nitional 
changes
Which occupations 
will have the largest 
job growth?
Compare the number of 
occupations that were 
projected to have largest 
job growth with those 
that did
No standard of comparison Standard of comparison not possible 
because of defi nitional changes
What is the 
distribution of 
employment by 
occupation?
Absolute percentage error No standard of comparison Dissimilarity index: comparison 
with naive model
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What were the 
sources of errors?
Model simulations None
NOTE: Blank = not applicable.
SOURCE: Stekler and Thomas (2005).
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142Table 6A.2  Questions Asked about the Employment-by-Industry Forecasts
Questions Accuracy measure
Problem with
measure or question New question or measure
How many people will be 
employed in each industry?
Percentage error; mean 
absolute percentage error
No standard of comparison; 
gives equal weight to large 
and small industries
Standard of comparison: rates 
of growth equal to previous 
rates of growth; mean 
weighted percentage error
Which industries would 
have the highest (lowest) 
employment growth rates?
Compare the number of 
industries projected to grow 
the fastest (slowest) with 
those that did grow fastest 
(slowest)
No standard of comparison; 
no analysis of all industries’ 
projected and actual growth 
rates
Standard of comparison: 
forecasts of fastest- (slowest-) 
growing industries from naive 
model; Spearman’s rank 
correlation coeffi cient for all 
industries
What is the distribution of 
employment by industry?
Dissimilarity index No standard of comparison Standard of comparison: same 
share as in 1988; shares are 
based on previous growth rates
What were the sources of 
the industry employment 
forecast errors?
Model simulations None
NOTE: Blank = not applicable.
SOURCE: Stekler and Thomas (2005).
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Table 6A.3  Dissimilarity Indexes for Labor Force Projections (%)
Standards of comparison
 
Actual population 
and
Census population 
estimate and 
1988 partic-
ipation rateBLS projections
BLS partic-
ipation rate
1988 partic-
ipation rate
Gender, age 1.83 2.02 2.24 2.32
Men, age 1.63 0.91 0.62 1.37
Women, age 1.91 2.86 2.40 1.32
NOTE: Numbers represent the dissimilarity indexes using alternative standards of 
comparison.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.
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In practice it is quite common that one forecast model performs well 
in certain periods while other models perform better in other periods. It 
is diffi cult to fi nd a forecast model that outperforms all competing mod-
els. To improve forecasts over individual models, combined forecasts 
have been suggested (Bates and Granger 1969). Researchers including 
Newbold and Granger (1974), Granger and Newbold (1986, Ch. 9), 
Granger and Jeon (2004), and Yang (2004) show that forecast combi-
nations can improve forecast accuracy over a single model and show 
why the forecast combination can achieve a better forecast in terms of 
mean squared forecast error. Bayesian model averaging may be used to 
form a weighted combined forecast. (See, e.g., Lee and Yang [2006].) 
A matter frequently discussed in the literature is how to combine fore-
casts to achieve the most accurate result. (See Granger and Ramanathan 
[1984]; Deutsch, Granger, and Teräsvirta [1994]; Palm and Zellner 
[1992]; Shen and Huang [2006]; and Hansen [2008].) Clemen (1989) 
and Timmermann (2006) provide excellent surveys on forecast combi-
nation and related issues.
Granger and Jeon (2004, p. 327) put the forecast combination in 
a general context of thick modeling and write, “An advantage of thick 
modeling is that one no longer needs to worry about diffi cult decisions 
between close alternatives or between deciding the outcome of a test 
that is not decisive. In time series such questions are whether the pro-
cess has a unit root or not, or how many cointegrations are in a vector 
of a series. For thick models one considers all plausible alternatives and 
uses the outputs of the various models.”
Even when we have a single model, a combination of forecasts can 
also be formed over a set of training sets. While, in practice, usually 
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we have a single training set, it can be replicated via bootstrap, and the 
combined forecast trained over the bootstrap-replicated training sets can 
improve upon the original forecast of the model. This is the idea of boot-
strap aggregating (abbreviated as “bagging”), introduced by Breiman 
(1996).
Huang and Lee (2010) consider the situation in which one wants to 
predict an economic variable using the information set of many relevant 
explanatory variables. As Diebold and Pauly (1990, p. 503) point out, 
“It must be recognized that in many forecasting situations, particularly 
in real time, pooling of information sets is either impossible or prohibi-
tively costly.” Likewise, when models underlying the forecasts remain 
partially or completely unknown (as is usually the case in practice—for 
example, with survey forecasts), one would never be informed about 
the entire information set. Quite often the combination of forecasts is 
used when the only things available are individual forecasts (for ex-
ample, in the case of professional forecasters), while the underlying 
information set and the model used for generating each individual fore-
cast are unknown.
In this chapter we consider how to combine forecasts in a situa-
tion where many predictors (in other words, a large information set) are 
available, or in a situation where many forecasts are given but models 
and predictors used for generating each individual forecast are not nec-
essarily known. In each of these situations, we explain how to use factor 
models. Much of the results presented here are studied in Chan, Stock, 
and Watson (1999); Hillebrand et al. (2010); Huang and Lee (2010); 
Stock and Watson (2002); and Tu and Lee (2009).
DATA-RICH ENVIRONMENT
Bernanke and Boivin (2003) emphasize that the use of a large data 
set is a common practice, such as in the central bank’s policymaking 
analysis. They write, “Research departments throughout the Federal 
Reserve System monitor and analyze literally thousands of data series 
from disparate sources . . . Despite this reality of central bank practice, 
most empirical analyses have been confi ned to . . . exploit only a limited 
amount of information. For example, the VAR methodology generally 
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limits the analysis to eight macroeconomic time series or fewer. This 
disconnect between central bank practice and academic analysis has 
several costs . . . It thus seems worthwhile to take into account the fact 
that in practice monetary policy is made in a data-rich environment” 
(p. 526).
For example, in forecasting stock market volatility, we can use 
many predictors from many options’ implied volatilities. In predict-
ing output growth and infl ation, we can use many available economic 
predictors (Bernanke and Boivin 2003; Hillebrand et al. 2010; Stock 
and Watson 2002; Tu and Lee 2009; Wright 2009). Ang and Piazzesi 
(2003); Ang, Piazzesi, and Wei (2006); Bernanke (1990); Hillebrand 
et al. (2010); and Stock and Watson (1989) use many yields and yield 
spreads. To predict retail default probability, a retail credit model uses 
many borrower-specifi c predictors.
Bernanke and Boivin (2003, p. 525) confi rm the merit of the large 
data set: “[It] explores the feasibility of incorporating richer information 
sets into the analysis, both positive and normative, of Fed policy mak-
ing. We employ a factor-model approach . . . that permits the systematic 
information in large data sets to be summarized by relatively few esti-
mated factors. With this framework, we confi rm Stock and Watson’s 
result that the use of large data sets can improve forecast accuracy . . .”
A natural question arises as to how we should use all those vast 
data in predicting a target of interest. Using large data, there are advan-
tages to accessing rich information and robustifying against structural 
instability, which plagues low-dimensional forecasting. While we can 
exploit these advantages, there are also diffi culties attached to using 
large data due to overwhelming information, which may be highly cor-
related and noisy.
When there are many predictors in columns of the predictor matrix 
X with the column number N being large, the dimension N needs to be 
reduced. One way is to select r ( N) factors of X, and another way is to 
select r ( N) columns of X. The former way, known as a factor model, 
has recently been a popular approach in economic forecasting, because 
of pioneering work by Stock and Watson (2002), Bai (2003), and Bai 
and Ng (2002, 2006), who have explored theoretical and empirical 
analysis of factor models based on principal components. The latter 
way, known as variable selection, has been widely studied in statistics. 
The variable selection serves to reduce N by ranking and selecting a 
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subset of X that is most predictive for a forecast target y, through such 
methods as LASSO (least absolute shrinkage and selection operator) 
(Tibshirani 1996), least angle regression (Efron et al. 2004), and elastic 
net (Zou and Hastie 2005), among many other methods.
While the data-rich environment usually refers to the situation 
where there are many predictors, it also refers to the situation where 
there are many forecasts provided by many fi rms, many departments in 
an organization, many analyses in an investment bank, many different 
government agents, and so on. In this paper we consider both cases—
namely, the data-rich environment with many predictors with N-vector 
xt =  1 2,  , , t t tNx x x ', and the data-rich environment with many fore-
casts with N-vector of forecasts yˆt+h
    1 2 ( )ˆ ˆ ˆ, , , Nt h t h t hy y y     . Below 
we discuss how we form a forecast under these two types of data-
rich environment. In both cases the idea is to combine multiple fore-
casts. Therefore we begin with a review of the literature on combining 
forecasts.
When multiple forecasts of the same variables are available, it’s 
typically argued that a combination of those forecasts should be used 
instead of using any single forecast, even if it’s a dominant one (e.g., 
Timmermann 2006). This is because forecast combinations offer di-
versifi cation gains, and it’s almost impossible to identify ex ante a 
dominant forecast model. The success of the forecast combinations will 
in turn depend on how well the combination weights are determined. 
As summarized in Clemen (1989), a simple average (with weights 1N ) 
of the multiple forecasts is typically found to be a good forecast com-
bination. However, the equal weights 1N  will be very small when N is 
very large in a data-rich environment, giving little chance for a better 
model to work dominantly against bad models. Before we deal with the 
data-rich environment, we fi rst consider a simplest-case scenario, that 
of N = 2.
COMBINING FORECASTS
Bates and Granger (1969) fi rst introduced the idea of combining 
forecasts. Let us begin with their brief review of what happens when 
N = 2. Let  1ˆty  and  2ˆty  be forecasts of 1ty   with errors
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   1
1 1 ˆ , 1,2
i
t t te y y i    ,
so that  1 0,itEe        2 21 ,it iEe   and              1 21 1 1 2t tEe e      .
Defi ne a combined forecast with the weight w(–∞ ∞),
       1 2ˆ ˆ ˆ1ct t ty wy w y   ,
its forecast error
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?1 21 1 1 1ˆ 1c ct t t t te y y we w e? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ?  ,
and its expected squared forecast error loss
     22 2 2 21 2 1 21 2 1c w w w w w        
 
.
Minimizing the loss, the optimal combining forecast weight is obtained.
This expression is minimized for the value of k given by
(7.1)   22 2 1 22 2
1 2 1 2
arg min
2opt c
w w       
     .
Substitution yields the minimum achievable error variance as
   2 2 21 22 2 2
1 2 1 2
1
.
2c opt
w
      
  
Bates and Granger (1969) show that the optimal combined forecast er-
ror loss is smaller than the smaller of the two individual forecast error 
losses:
   2 2 21 2min , .c optw  
Thus, a priori, it is reasonable to expect in most practical situations that 
the best available combined forecast will outperform the better indi-
vidual forecast. It cannot, in any case, do worse.
This result has been used across various disciplines (e.g., econom-
ics, fi nance, operations research, meteorology, management, computer 
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science, and machine learning) under the names of combining forecast, 
ensemble predictor, committee of learners, team of forecasts, consensus 
of learners, mixture of experts, expert system, and others.
WHY COMBINE?
The forecast combination problem is similar to that of minimizing 
the variance of a portfolio, with the errors from the individual fore-
casts playing the role of asset returns (Aiolfi  and Timmermann 2006). 
In practice it is quite common that one forecast model performs well 
in certain periods while other models perform better in other periods. 
It is diffi cult to fi nd a forecast model that outperforms all competing 
models. Forecast combinations can improve forecast accuracy over a 
single model. Hong and Lee (2003) fi nd that the combined forecasts are 
generally the best performer for the mean, and sign prediction for the 
foreign exchange rate changes.
Aiolfi  and Timmermann (2006) consider a forecasting strategy that 
takes the average over the models in the top quartiles or cluster. There 
is clear evidence that, in general, a strategy of selecting one best (top) 
model based on past forecasting performance does not work well. This 
holds true both for linear and nonlinear forecasting methods. This is 
analogous to portfolio selection in the stock market.
Why do we combine? Aiolfi  and Timmermann (2006) answer this 
way: “Forecast combination entails using information from a typically 
large set of forecasts and emerges as an attractive strategy when indi-
vidual forecasting models are misspecifi ed in a way that is unknown to 
the modeler. Misspecifi cation is likely to be related not simply to func-
tional form (neglected nonlinearity) but also to instability (structural 
changes) in the joint distribution of forecasts and the target variable. 
In this situation, the identity of the best forecasting model is likely to 
change over time and a key question is for how long the relative perfor-
mance of forecasting models persists” (p. 33).
Aiolfi  and Timmermann (2006, pp. 31–32) also write the following:
Forecasts are of considerable importance to decision makers 
throughout economics and fi nance and are routinely used by pri-
vate enterprises, government institutions and professional econ-
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omists. It is therefore not surprising that considerable effort has 
gone into designing and estimating forecasting models ranging 
from simple, autoregressive specifi cations to complicated nonlin-
ear models or models with time-varying parameters. A reason why 
such a wide range of forecasting models is often considered is that 
the true data generating process underlying a particular series of 
interest is unknown. Even the most complicated model is likely to 
be misspecifi ed and can, at best, provide a reasonable “local” ap-
proximation to the target variable.
I would add that this is particularly so in practical forecasting 
situations in macroeconomics with a large cross section of forecast-
ing models and a short time-series dimension. Aiolfi  and Timmermann 
(2006, p. 32) go on to make a second point about forecasting models:
Model instability is a source of misspecifi cation that is likely to 
be particularly relevant in practice, c.f. Stock and Watson (1996). 
In its presence, it is highly unlikely that a single model will be 
dominant uniformly across time and the identity of the best local 
approximation is likely to change over time. If the identity of the 
best local model is time-varying, it is implausible that a forecasting 
strategy that, at each point in time, attempts to select the best cur-
rent model will work well. Most obviously, if (ex-ante) the identity 
of the best model varies in a purely random way from period to 
period, it will not be possible to identify this model by considering 
past forecasting performance across models. Similarly, if a single 
best model exists but only outperforms other models by a margin 
that is small relative to random sampling variation, it becomes dif-
fi cult to identify this model by means of statistical methods based 
on past performance. Even if the single best model could be iden-
tifi ed in this situation, it is conceivable that diversifi cation gains 
from combining across a set of forecasting models with similar 
performance will dominate the strategy of only using a single fore-
casting model.
HOW TO COMBINE?
The optimal combination weights in Equation (7.1) for N = 2 may 
be extended to a general case with a larger N. However, the estimation 
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of the weights from the regression of the form (Equation [7.2]) may 
suffer from a large estimation error, especially when N is large, and the 
forecasts may be highly correlated. The following methods have been 
widely used in applications.
A natural way is to estimate forecast combination weights by least 
squares regression or, equivalently, by using portfolio variance minimi-
zation methods. The usual problem with this estimation method is that, 
given the sample sizes typically available in practice, the combination 
weights are often imprecisely estimated. In particular, this is a problem 
when the number of models is large relative to the length of the time se-
ries, so that the covariance matrix of the forecast errors either cannot be 
estimated or is estimated very imprecisely. The assumption of a stable 
covariance structure is unlikely to be satisfi ed in practice, and weights 
may be time-varying.
A simpler way is to use the equal weights (simple mean). This 
becomes a common strategy when the models are of similar quality 
or when their relative performance is unknown or unstable over time. 
Stock and Watson (1999) use trimmed mean and median to robustify 
the simple mean–weighted combined forecasts.
Aiolfi  and Timmermann (2006) use ranking of the forecasting 
model and also use clustering. The premise of this approach is that, 
when combining forecasts from a large cross section of models, it is 
generally diffi cult to distinguish between the performance of the top 
models, but one can tell the difference between the best and worst mod-
els. This suggests including a subset of “good” models in the combined 
forecast. Another popular method is Bayesian model averaging, which 
is used in many applications, for example, Lee and Yang (2006) and 
Wright (2009).
The formula for the optimal combination weights in Equation (7.1) 
for N = 2 has an important aspect that has been ignored in many ap-
plications in the literature, although it was discussed in Granger and 
Newbold (1986, Ch. 9) in some length and detail. That is the role of cor-
relation ρ on the forecast combination as studied in Lee, Li, and Huang 
(2010). Note that the forecast combination need not be convex, and it is 
permitted that the weights can be any real number, w(–∞ ∞). There-
fore the optimal forecast combination weight w in Equation (7.1) may 
be negative (< 0) or larger than 1. What does this mean? How does ρ af-
fect the combined forecast? To combine multiple forecasts when these 
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forecasts are highly correlated or close to collinear, the optimal combi-
nation places negative weights on the inferior forecasts and larger than 
1 on the dominant forecasts, similar to the pairs-trading strategy that 
profi ts from the high correlation of the two sock returns. This optimal 
forecast combination outperforms any individual forecast and explains 
why an inferior forecast can be included in the combination to improve 
the forecast. The optimal combination weight has a pattern similar to 
that of the pairs-trading strategy. Without loss of generality, we assume 
all the forecasts are one-step-ahead forecasts. The following results can 
be easily generalized to multistep forecasts. The situation where 0optw   
is interesting. In light of the above condition, it appears that an inferior 
forecast may still be worth including with negative weight. This happens 
when 22 1 2 0     or 2 1/    ρ—i.e., when ρ is a very large posi-
tive value (say, close to 1) and  1tf  is the inferior forecast, with larger 
forecast error variance 1 .
As shown in Granger and Newbold (1986, p. 268), the optimal 
combining weight wopt can be estimated from
(7.2) 
      
      
2 2 1 2
1
1 2 2 2 1 2
1
ˆ
2
t
s s ss
t t
s s s ss
e e e
w
e e e e


  

  ,
which can be obtained from the regression
(7.3)         2 2 11 1 1 1 .ct t t te w e e e     
 
However, a common popular recommendation is to ignore ρ. For 
example, Clemen (1989, p. 562) suggests “to ignore the effect of corre-
lations in calculating combining weights.” While the optimal weight ˆ tw  
can be negative or overweighted (larger than 1) depending on the value 
of ρ, the use of a simpler form obtained with the restriction ρ = 0 has 
been a popular recommendation:
  
    
2 2
1
1 2 2 2
1
ˆ .
t
ss
t t
s ss
e
w
e e


  


Note that, if we ignore ρ, ˆ tw is always constrained on the (0,1) in-
terval (analogous to the short-sale constraint).
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When ρ is large and positive, the optimal weight on the inferior 
forecast can be negative. The forecast combination problem is analo-
gous to that of minimizing the variance of a portfolio, with the forecast 
errors playing the role of asset returns (Timmermann 2006). Gatev, 
Goetzmann, and Rouwenhorst (2006) show that “pairs trading” in fi -
nancial trading strategy profi ts from the high correlation in the returns. 
Analogously, the profi tability of using the optimal weight is linked to 
the high correlation ρ in the forecasts. Without loss of generality, let us 
assume that  1ˆty  is the inferior forecast, with larger forecast error vari-
ance. In combining forecasts, when 0  , we short the loser (the worse 
forecast) with w < 0 and buy the winner (the better one) with (1 – w) > 1.
In this case, the use of ˆ tw while ignoring the correlation ρ would be too 
restrictive.
FORECASTING IN A DATA-RICH ENVIRONMENT
So far, we have looked at the case of N = 2. Most of the combining 
forecast literature has been limited to the case in which N is small. Now 
we take up the case of combining forecasts when N is large. Consider a 
kitchen-sink model with all predictors xt in one large model
1t hy       1,2, ,t tb u t T   x
to generate the h-step forecast
ˆ 1T hy      ˆ .T Tbx
However, when N is large, the OLS estimator OˆLSb  may not be fea-
sible to compute, and the mean squared forecast error (MSFE) increases 
with N as MSFE = E 2ˆ .t h t h Ny y O T 
        A solution to these prob-
lems is not to use OLS estimation of the large model but to reduce the 
dimension N, either by selection of relevant variables for the forecast 
target to reduce N or by using a factor model to reduce N, or both. The 
variable selection is to reduce N by ranking variables in X and select-
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ing a subset of X that is most predictive for a forecast target y, through 
such methods as forward and backward selection, stepwise regression, 
LASSO (Tibshirani 1996), least angle regression (Efron et al. 2004), 
elastic net (Zou and Hastie 2005), and so on.
Alternatively, one can combine the large information in xt indirectly 
through individual forecasts  1ˆ iTy   (i = 1, . . . , N), and then combine the 
N individual forecasts
 1
1 1 1 1, 1t t ty x    
 
                
1 , 1
N
t Nt N N ty x      
to form the combined forecast (at time T using the estimated iˆ ’s) 
     1
1 1 1 1ˆ ˆ ˆ
c N
T T N Ty w y w y      .
Here each partition of the predictor vector xt need not contain only 
one predictor at a time but may contain more, and each partition need 
not be disjointed. In practice, generally the predictor vector xt may not 
be observed when only forecasts are available (e.g., in survey forecasts). 
Therefore, we will consider two types of data-rich environments. The 
fi rst is where there are N predictors
 1 2, , ,t t t tNx x x  x  ,
and the second is where there are N forecasts, with
yˆ       1 2ˆ ˆ ˆ, , , Nt h t h t h t hy y y      .
In each type of data-rich environment, we use factor models assum-
ing there are latent factors of the predictors xt or of the forecasts yˆt h  .
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FORECASTING WITH MANY PREDICTORS
First, let’s consider forecasting when there are N predictors xt = (xt1, 
xt2, . . . , xtN)′ and N is large. Following Stock and Watson (2002), we use 
a factor model that is based on the factors ft of the predictors xt:
(7.4) t t tf   x  ,
 
where Λ is the factor loading. Once the factors have been extracted 
from the predictors, the forecast of the target can be formed from the 
regression of
(7.5) yt t tf u   .
As noted in Hillebrand et al. (2010) and Tu and Lee (2009), in this 
approach, the factors are obtained from the marginal model of xt rather 
than the joint model of (yt , xt). We write the above model in Equations 
(7.4) and (7.5) as follows:
yt = E   1 1;t t t t ty u f u      x ,
xt = E(xt ; θ2) + υt = Λft + υt         (θ2 = ft ,Λ) .
Note that this assures that the joint density 
     1 1 2, ; ; ; ,t t t t t tD y D y D   x x x  
where  1 2 1 2      are variation free and we estimate the condi-
tional model (Equation [7.5]) and the marginal model (Equation [7.4]) 
separately.
FORECASTING WITH MANY FORECASTS
Next, we consider forecasting when there are N forecasts 
yˆ       1 2ˆ ˆ ˆ, , , Nt h t h t h t hy y y       and N is large. In this situation, many fore-
Higgins.indb   160 11/3/2011   10:23:07 AM
Combining Forecasts with Many Predictors   161
casts are given either from many survey forecasters or from many 
analysts. There are various organizations that operate as an aggregate 
or a group, based on many individual analysts who may or may not 
use the same information sets. Depending on the shared intersections 
of various information sets used by survey forecasters or analysts, the 
correlations among the many individual forecasts may be strong. When 
the number N of individual forecasts is large, we wish to estimate the 
weights to form the aggregate forecast (a combined forecast). The N 
individual forecasts may be given with or without the prescription on 
how they have been generated. We apply principal component analysis 
on the forecasts to extract factors
yˆt h t h t hf       
and 
ˆ ˆ
t hf    yˆt h
and estimate the following forecasting equation,
(7.6) ˆt h t h t hy f u    ,
to form the eventual forecast
ˆ ˆˆT h T h Ty f   .
From the above calculations, note that the weights to combine many 
forecasts are
 ˆ ˆˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆT h T h T h T hy f y a y w         ,
and therefore the optimal forecast combination weights are
ˆ ˆˆ :w    .
Hillebrand et al. (2010) and Tu and Lee (2009) consider the above 
model when each individual forecast  ˆ it hy   is generated by using one 
predictor  itx  at a time. In their applications, the combined forecast with 
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this weight vector ˆ ˆwˆ    outperforms the equally weighted combined 
forecast. However, it is not necessary to know how each individual 
forecast  ˆ it hy   is generated. In practice, there are various situations where 
only the forecasts are given to econometricians, without telling about 
how the forecasts are obtained.
It is generally believed that it is diffi cult to estimate the forecast 
combination weights when N is large. Therefore the equal weights 1N
     
have been widely used instead of estimating weights. An exception is 
Wright (2009), who uses Bayesian model averaging for pseudo out-of-
sample prediction of U.S. infl ation and fi nds that it generally gives more 
accurate forecasts than simple equal-weighted averaging. He uses N = 
107 predictors. It is often found in the literature that equally weighted 
combined forecasts are the best. Stock and Watson (2004) call this the 
“forecast combination puzzle.” (See also Timmermann [2006].) Smith 
and Wallis (2009) explore a possible explanation of the forecast com-
bination puzzle and conclude that it is due to estimation error of the 
combining weights. However, the empirical results occur when N is not 
very large. When N is very large, the equal weights 1N
     put too little 
weight to good models, especially when N → ∞, and the equal weights 
can hardly be justifi ed. Note that we can consistently estimate the com-
bining weights ˆ ˆwˆ   , as long as ˆ and ˆ  are estimated consistently. 
Note also that combining forecasts with the weights ˆ ˆwˆ    takes the 
correlation structure among the forecasts  ˆ it hy   into the calculation of 
the weights, as it is based on the regression in Equation (7.6), just as in 
the regression in Equation (7.3) to get Equation (7.2).
FURTHER TOPICS IN COMBINING FORECASTS
We have discussed the combining forecasts for one-step-ahead 
forecasting, for the conditional mean, of continuous random variables. 
This can be extended to the following three things:
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1) multiple-step-ahead forecasts;
2) conditional variance forecasts, conditional quantile forecasts, 
conditional density forecasts, and conditional interval fore-
casts; and
3) discrete random variables (categorized data, binary data).
Combining Multistep Forecasting
Lin and Granger (1994) classify the multistep mean forecast meth-
ods into fi ve alternative categories. Let’s assume the true DGP can be 
characterized by the following equation:
 1 1t t tY g Y    ,
where εt is a zero-mean, independent, and identically distributed se-
quence with distribution function Φ.
The optimal one-step forecast using a least square criterion is
Yt,1 = E  1 1, 0t t j tY Y j g Y       .
When g(·) is known, there should be no problem in generating a 
one-step-ahead forecast. When g(·) is not known in practice, we can 
approximate g(·) by a fl exible function form such as the polynomial 
family or the neural network family. However, the multistep forecasts 
for nonlinear models are much more complicated than the one-step 
forecast. Consider the simplest h = 2 case as an example to illustrate 
the multistep forecast methods. The optimal two-step-ahead forecast at 
time t is as follows:
(7.7) 
 
  
,2 2
1 2
1
, 0
, 0
, 0
t t t j
t t t j
t t t j
Y Y Y j
g Y Y j
g g Y Y j


 
  
 
   
    
    
E
E
E               .
= 
= 
= 
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Of the fi ve multistep mean forecast methods, there are four possible 
ways to do multistep forecasts by iterating one-step-ahead forecasts, as 
is discussed by Brown and Mariano (1989):
1) Naive (or deterministic):
  ,2nt tY g g Y ,
so that the presence of εt+1 is ignored by putting its value at zero. For 
most nonlinear function g(·), ,2
n
tY  will be biased, and the direction of the 
bias depends on whether g(·) is convex or concave, as discussed by 
Granger and Newbold (1976).
2) Exact (or optimal, or closed form):
    Ф .
 
  ,2 1et t tY g g Y d  
3) Monte Carlo:
   
     ,
 
  ,2
1
1 Jm
t t j
j
Y g g Y
J


 
where εj = 1, . . . , J are random numbers drawn from the distribution Φ. 
If J is large enough, ,
m
t hY  and ,
e
t hY  should be virtually identical.
4) Bootstrap (or residual-based):
   ,2
1
1 ˆ
t
b
t t j
j
Y g g Y
t


   ,
 
where ˆ j ,  j = 1, . . . , t are the t values of the residual estimated over the 
sample period.
An alternative way of doing a multistep mean forecast is to model 
the relationship between Yt+h and Yt directly by a new function gh(·) :
5)    ,t h h t t hY g Y e    ,
though et,h is usually not white noise, as mentioned by Lin and Granger 
(1994). Therefore, a fi fth method for doing a multistep forecast is
 ,dt h h tY g Y .
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With any of these fi ve methods, the factor models considered in the 
previous sections may be used for multistep forecasts when there are 
many predictors or many forecasts.
Combining Quantile Forecasts
The optimal forecast 1ˆty   may be estimated, for a given  0,1  , 
from minimizing the check loss:
   
1ˆ 1 1 1
min 1 0
ty t t t
e e e           ,
where 1 1 1ˆt t te y y    . Since ρα(·) is convex, the results of Bates and 
Granger (1969), as discussed in the next section, can be carried over.  
Note that the optimal forecast  * 1 1ˆt t ty q y  x  satisfi es the fol-
lowing fi rst-order condition:
  *1 1ˆ 0t t tE y y    1 x
 
, a.s.
(See, e.g., Giacomini and Komunjer [2005].) Hence,
 *1 1 1ˆt t tg y y    1  
may be called the generalized residual or generalized forecast error. 
From this we obtain
E  1    * *1 1 1 1ˆ ˆPrt t t t t ty y y y     x x .
It is interesting to note that this corresponds exactly to Equation 
(7.8) on page 169 for evaluating interval forecasts, whereas here we 
apply it to the optimal forecast * 1ˆty  .
We consider two types of data-rich environments—one where there 
are N predictors,
xt  1 2, , ,t t tNx x x    ,
and another where there are N quantile forecasts, with
yˆ       1 2ˆ ˆ ˆ, , , Nt h t h t h t hy y y       .
t
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It is necessary to generalize the principal component regression for 
conditional quantiles under the check loss ρ
α
(·) .
Combining Density Forecasts
Suppose that t ty  is a time series (e.g., the return of a portfo-
lio over a certain period) with unknown conditional density function    1t t tf y f y  x . Let    1, ,t t tp y p y  x  be a one-step-ahead 
conditional density forecast model, where θ is a fi nite-dimensional pa-
rameter. Suppose that    0,t tp y f y   for some θ0. Then, show that the 
one-step-ahead density forecast is optimal in the sense that it dominates 
all other density forecasts for any loss function (Diebold, Gunther, and 
Tay 1998; Granger 1999; Granger and Pesaran 2000). In practice it is 
not uncommon that a suboptimal forecast model does better than an-
other in predicting a certain aspect of the distribution (e.g., value at risk 
at the 5 percent level) but worse than another in predicting a different 
aspect of the distribution (e.g., value at risk at the 1 percent level). This 
makes it diffi cult for forecast users (who may not be forecast producers) 
to choose a suitable forecast model. The fact that the optimal forecast 
model is preferred by all forecast users regardless of their loss func-
tions resolves this diffi culty. It is therefore useful to check whether a 
density forecast model is optimal, and, if not, to determine what useful 
information can be provided from it for further improvement in density 
forecasts. In fact, even if point forecasts are of interest, the optimal 
conditional density forecasts are needed to construct optimal point 
forecasts under a general asymmetric loss function (Christoffersen and 
Diebold 1996, 1997).
Suppose that {yt} is generated from conditional densities { ft(y)}. If 
a sequence of density forecasts {pt(y,θ0)} coincides with {ft(y)}, then 
under the usual condition of a nonzero Jacobian with continuous partial 
derivatives, {Zt} is IID U[0,1]. That is, when the forecast model pt(y,θ) 
is optimal, the series of PITs, {Zt}, where
 0, ,tyt tZ p y dy 
 
is IID U[0,1]. (See Diebold, Gunther and Tay [1998].) Berkowitz (2001) 
considers the inverse normal transformation of the PIT, which follows 
IID N(0,1). Bao, Lee, and Saltoglu (2007) discuss how the Kullback-
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Leibler Information Criterion (KLIC) of Kullback and Leibler (1951), 
based on PIT, may be used to compare the density forecasts. (See 
Mitchell and Hall [2005] for combining density forecasts.) Combining 
many density forecasts (with large N),
            1 2ˆ ˆ ˆ, , , ,Nt h t h t hf y f y f y     
would require combinations of conditional moments or conditional 
quantiles, with mixtures of several distributions, which would be 
complicated.
Combining Interval Forecasts
Consider a stationary series   1Tt ty  . Let the one-period-ahead con-
ditional interval forecast made at time t from a model be denoted as
      ,1 ,1 ,1, , , , ,t t tJ L U t R T      
where Lt,1(α) and Ut,1(α) are the lower and upper limits of the ex ante in-
terval forecast for time t +1 made at time t with the coverage probability 
α, i.e.,  1 1t t , tPr y J     x . If we defi ne the indicator variable as    1 1 ,1t t td y J     1 , the sequence   1 Tt t Rd    is IID Bernoulli 
(α). The optimal interval forecast would satisfy
(7.8)   1t tE d   x ,
so that   1td     will be a martingale difference sequence. As the   1td   has the expected Bernoulli log-likelihood
     11 11 tt ddE        ,
we can choose a model with the largest out-of-sample mean of
1
T
t R
p

       11 ˆˆ 1log 1 tt dd       .
 
(See Bao, Lee, and Saltoglu [2006].)
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To combine interval forecasts that are generated from multiple 
models, one can use the conditional quantile forecasts derived from us-
ing regression quantiles for Lt,1(α) and Ut,1(α) and combine them; or one 
can use the conditional density forecasts, combine them, and invert the 
combined density forecast to get the conditional quantile forecasts for 
Lt,1(α) and Ut,1(α), using the methods discussed in Section 9.2.
Combining Binary Forecasts
Lee and Yang (2006) consider binary forecasts using bagging to 
form a (weighted) average over all bootstrap training samples drawn 
from the same distribution. The idea can be extended to cases where 
there are many predictors or many forecasts to form a combined fore-
cast of many binary forecasts. As in Lee and Yang, the combined binary 
predictor  ˆ cty  can be constructed by the majority voting on the N indi-
vidual binary forecasts  ˆ ity  (i = 1, . . . , N), i.e.,
  ( )
1
1ˆ ˆ
2
N
c i
t i t
i
y w y

    1  ,
where 
1
N
i
i
w

  = 1. It is not clear how to estimate the combination weights 
{wi} when N is large. Simple cases are those where we assume a perfect 
democracy, with wi = 
1
N  for all i, and those where we assume a dicta-
tor, with wi = 1 for some i. Neither case can be optimal in terms of the 
binary loss functions.
CONCLUSIONS
We have considered how to combine forecasts in a data-rich en-
vironment with many predictors, xt  1 2, , ,t t tNx x x   , or with many 
forecasts, yˆ       1 2ˆ ˆ ˆ, , , Nt h t h t h t hy y y      (when N is large). In practice 
there are situations where we, whether econometricians or forecasters, 
do not observe the predictors but only the forecasts (e.g., survey fore-
casts of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia). In such situations 
one needs to aggregate many forecasts into a consensus group forecast. 
A common way is to use the simple average, or majority voting. While 
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many empirical results from out-of-sample forecasting have shown 
that the simple average of multiple forecasts tends to work well, such a 
conclusion assumes that all individual forecasts are equally good by as-
signing equal weights. The accuracy can be improved if the weights can 
be estimated consistently without experiencing errors from the usual 
large N problem (the so-called curse of dimensionality). We use a fac-
tor model of many forecasts to derive the forecast combination weights 
without succumbing to this problem.
In a data-rich environment with many predictors or many forecasts, 
it is often necessary to use reduced-dimension specifi cations that can 
span a large number of predictors. In the recent forecasting literature, 
the use of factor models and principal component estimation has been 
advocated for forecasting in the presence of many predictors. In this 
situation, we decompose the space spanned by many predictors using 
the principal components, as in Stock and Watson (2002). We can also 
project the forecast target to many subspaces spanned by the predictors, 
obtain many artifi cially generated forecasts, and then combine those 
forecasts generated from the subspaces, as in Chan, Stock, and Watson 
(1999); Hillebrand et al. (2010); and Tu and Lee (2009).
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